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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three independent chapters: 
In the first chapter, we consider a Hotelling model of price competition where firms 
may acquire information regarding the preferences (i.e. “location”) of customers. By 
purchasing additional information, a firm has a finer partition regarding customer 
preferences, and its pricing decisions must be measurable with respect to this partition. 
If information acquisition decisions are common knowledge at the point where firms 
compete via prices, we show that a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium exists, 
and that there is “excess information acquisition” from the point of view of the firms.  If 
information acquisition decisions are private information, a pure strategy equilibrium 
fails to exist. We compute a mixed strategy equilibrium for a range of parameter values. 
The second chapter investigates a case of national versus regional pricing. 
Competition authorities frequently view price discrimination by firms as detrimental to 
consumers. In the case of the UK supermarket industry they suggested a move to 
uniform pricing. Yet theoretical predictions are ambiguous about whether third degree 
price discrimination is beneficial or detrimental to consumers, and in general there will 
be some consumers who benefit while other lose out. In this chapter, we estimate the 
impact that the move from regional to uniform pricing had on Tesco’s profits and 
consumer's surplus. We estimate an AIDS model of consumer expenditure in the eggs 
market in a multi-stage budgeting framework allowing for very flexible substitution 
patterns between products at the bottom level. We use data on farm gate prices to 
instrument price in the demand equation. Our results suggest that switching to a 
regional pricing policy can potentially increase Tesco’s profit on eggs by 37%. 
However, while there are winners and losers, the overall effect on consumer welfare is 
not significant.  
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In the third chapter, we study the kidney market in Iran. The most effective 
treatment for end-stage renal disease is a kidney transplant. While the supply of 
cadaveric kidneys is limited, the debate has been focused on the effects of the existence 
of a free market for human organs. Economists as well as medical and legal researchers 
are divided over the issue. Iran has a unique kidney market which has been in place for 
over 20 years, frequently reporting surprising success in reducing the waiting list for 
kidneys. This paper demonstrates how the Iranian system works and estimates the 
welfare effect of this system.  
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Chapter 1  
Information Acquisition and Price Discrimination 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Usually, any type of price discrimination requires customer-specific information
1. 
In general, it is costly to acquire information regarding customers. Recent developments 
in information technology allow firms to acquire more information on their customers, 
which may be used to practise price discrimination. Loyalty cards issued by 
supermarkets and customer data collected by specialist companies are just two examples 
of information acquisition. 
Consider a model of competition between firms who are able to charge different 
prices if they can distinguish customer characteristics. Most research on discriminatory 
pricing assumes that the information regarding consumers is exogenously given. The 
price discrimination literature concentrates on monopolistic price discrimination (Pigou, 
1920; Robinson, 1933; Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Varian, 1989; and Hamilton 
& Slutsky, 2004). Such discrimination always leads to higher profits for the monopolist, 
since she solves her profit maximisation problem with fewer constraints. 
Some of the more recent work on competitive price discrimination concentrates on 
efficiency from society’s point of view, the firm’s profit, and the number of the firms in 
                                                 
1  The exceptions for this claim are the case in which the firm practices price discrimination through 
setting a uniform price when the cost of supply is different and when firm uses a non-linear pricing 
strategy.  
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a free entry and exit case
2 (Borenstein, 1985; Corts, 1998; Armstrong & Vickers, 2001; 
and Bhaskar & To, 2004), but still the information regarding consumers is exogenously 
given.  
Bhaskar & To (2004) prove that without free entry, perfect price discrimination is 
socially optimal, but in free entry case, the number of firms is always excessive. 
Liu & Serfes (2004, 2005) study the relation between of the exogenously given 
quality of firm information and market outcomes in oligopoly. They show that when the 
information quality is low, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate arise in 
equilibrium.  However, once information quality is sufficiently high, firms discriminate. 
Equilibrium profits are lower, the game effectively becoming a prisoners’ dilemma.  
Shaffer & Zhang (2002) investigate one-to-one promotions. They assume that 
customers can be contacted individually, and firms know something about each 
customer’s preferences. They find that one-to-one promotions always lead to an 
increase in price competition and average prices will decrease. However, they show that 
if one of the firms has a cost advantage or higher quality product, the increase in its 
market share may outweigh the effect of lower prices..  
Corts (1998) investigates price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms. He 
shows that the intensified competition, leading to lower prices, may make firms worse 
off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Unilateral 
commitments not to price discriminate may raise firm profits by softening price 
competition. 
In this paper, we endogenise the information firms have by introducing an 
information acquisition technology. We assume that firms decide on how many units of 
information to acquire. Then each firm can charge different prices for different 
customers based on the information she acquired. We study a Hotelling type model 
where two firms are located at the ends of the unit interval. Each unit of information 
gives a firm a finer partition over the set of customers. Specifically, a firm’s information 
consists of a partition of the unit interval, and an extra unit of information allows the 
firm to split one of the subintervals into two equal-sized segments. In our benchmark 
                                                 
2  For a more detailed survey on recent literature in price discrimination see Armstrong (2006).  
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model, the information acquisition decisions of firms are common knowledge at the 
point where firms compete via prices. 
Our main result is that the equilibrium outcome is partial information acquisition, 
even if information costs are arbitrarily small. Quite naturally, a firm has no incentive to 
acquire information on customers who are firmly in its rival’s turf, i.e. those that it will 
never serve in equilibrium. But more interestingly, we find that a firm has an incentive 
not to fully acquire information on customers it competes for with the other firm. This 
allows it to commit to higher prices, and thereby softens price competition. Finally, as 
in the existing literature, we find that there is “excess information acquisition” from the 
point of view of the firms, in the sense that profits are lower as compared to the no 
information case.  
Information acquisition results in tougher competition, and lower prices. After 
information acquisition stage when firms compete via prices, if two firms share the 
market over a given set of customers, a decrease in the price of one firm over this 
interval decreases the marginal revenue of the other firm by decreasing its market share 
on this interval. As a result this reinforces the other firm to decrease its price over that 
interval. We can interpret this result in context of strategic complementarity as defined 
by Bulow et al (1985). In our benchmark model, pricing decisions are strategic 
complements. Since a firm’s optimal price is an increasing function of her opponent’s 
price. The literature on strategic complementarity finds similar results to our results 
when firms’ actions are strategically complements. Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) show 
that in a two stage entry game of investment, the incumbent might decide to underinvest 
in order to deter entry. d’Aspremont et al (1979) consider a Hotelling framework, with 
quadratic transportation costs, when firms should choose their location. They show that 
in the equilibrium in order to avoid tougher competition, firms locate themselves at the 
two extremes (maximum differentiation). Similarly, in our model, a firm acquires less 
information in order to commit to pricing high, thereby increases the price of her rival.  
We also analyse a game where a firm does not know its rival’s information 
acquisition decision at the point that they compete in prices. We show, quite generally 
that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this game. We compute a mixed strategy 
equilibrium for a specific example.  
Section 1.2 presents the basic model. Section 1.3 analyzes the extensive form game; 
where each firm observes her rival’s information partition so that the information  
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acquisition decisions are common knowledge. Section 1.4 studies the game where 
information acquisition decisions are private. Section 1.5 compares our benchmark 
model with a multi-store retailers’ example. Section 1.6 summarises and concludes. The 
appendices 1.A and 1.B contain all the proofs. 
1.2. The Model 
The model is based on a simple linear city (Hotelling model) where two firms (A 
and B) compete to sell their product to customers located between them. Both firms 
have identical marginal costs, normalised to zero. The distance between two firms is 
normalized to one; firm A is located at 0 and firm B at 1. The customers are uniformly 
distributed on the interval [0,1] and the total mass of them is normalized to one. Each 
customer, depending on her location and the prices charged by firms, decides to buy one 
unit from any of the firms or does not buy at all. The utility of buying for each customer 
has a linear representation  TC P V U - - =  where P stands for price, and TC represents 
the transportation cost to buy from each firm that is a linear function of distance and t is 
the transport cost per unit distance. Assume that V is sufficiently high to guarantee that 
all the market will be served. Then the utility of the customer who is located at  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ x  
is 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ￿
￿
￿
- - -
- -
=
B from buys she if x t x P V
A from buys she if tx x P V
x U
B
A
1
.    (1.1) 
A unit of information enables the firm to split an interval segment of her already 
recognised customers to two equal-sized sub-segments. The information about the 
customers, below and above the mid-point of [0,1] interval, is revealed to the firm if it 
pays a cost  ) 0 ( t . Every unit of more information enables the firm to split an already 
recognised interval, [a , b] to two equal-sized sub-intervals. The cost to the firm is   ) (k t  
where 
k
a b ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = -
2
1  (where  { } 0 U ￿ ˛ k ). The information cost function can be 
represented by the infinite sequence 
¥
0 ) (k t . It seems reasonable to assume that  ) (k t  
is decreasing in k. Intuitively the smaller the interval, the fewer consumers on whom 
information is needed. Then a reasonable assumption for the information cost function 
is that t  is a decreasing function.   
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We assume a decreasing information cost function when the cost of acquiring 
information on an interval [a,b] is: 
k k
2
) (
0 t
t = ,  where    
k
a b ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = -
2
1 ,  (1.2) 
and  0 t  is a constant. Note that because of our information acquisition technology k is 
always an integer.  
By buying every extra unit of information, a firm is acquiring more specific 
information with less information content in terms of the mass of customers.  
The general results of the paper, i.e. the excessive information acquisition, the 
trade-off between information acquisition and tougher competition, and the 
characteristics of equilibrium are consistent for a wide range of information cost 
functions. In appendix 1.B, we extend our results to two other functional formats.  
We analyse two alternative extensive form games. In the first game, each firm 
observes its rival’s information acquisition decision. That is, the information partitions 
become common knowledge before firms choose prices.  
The first game is defined as follows: 
• Stage 1: Information acquisition: Each firm (f˛{A,B}) chooses a partition If of 
[0,1]  from a set of possible information partitions W 
• Observation: Each firm observes the partition choice made by the other firm, e.g. 
firm A observes IB. Note that firm f’s information partition remain If .  
• Stage 2: Price decision: Each firm chooses  [ ] { } 0 1 , 0 : U
+ ￿ ﬁ f P  which is 
measurable with respect to If . Once prices have been chosen, customers decide 
whether to buy from firm A or firm B or not to buy at all.  
The vector of prices chosen by each firm in stage 2 is segment specific. In fact a 
firm’s ability to price discriminate depends on the information partition that she 
acquires in stage 1. Acquiring information enables the firm to set different prices for 
different segments of partition. 
In the second game firms do not observe their rival’s information partition. It means 
that the firms simultaneously choose a partition and a vector of prices measurable with  
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their chosen partition. In order to make it simpler, the two games are called the two-
stage game and the simultaneous move game respectively. 
Following we formally define the information acquisition technology. Intuitively, in 
this setting when a firm decides to acquire some information about customers, it is done 
by assuming binary characteristics for customers. Revealing any characteristics divides 
known segments customers to two sub-segments. We assume that these two sub-
segments have equal lengths. 
Definition: The information acquisition decision for player f is the choice of If 
from the set of feasible partitions W on [0,1]. W is defined using our specific 
information acquisition technology: 
Suppose I is an arbitrary partition of [0,1] of the form [0,a1), [a1,a2),…,[an-1,1] if and 
only if:
3 
[ ] ( ] { }
{ } { }
{ }
[ ] U
I K
K K
K
n
k
k
l k
k l
i
i i i
s
k l n k l s s
a a
a k l n k l n i
n i a a s a a s
1
1 1 0 0
1 , 0
& , , 2 , 1 ,
2
, , , 1 , 0 , 1 , , 2 , 1
, , 3 , 2 , & ,
=
-
=
„ ˛ " =
+
= \ „ ˛ $ - ˛ "
˛ = =
f
.    (1.3) 
A firm’s action in stage 1 is the choice of an information partition from the set of 
possible information partitions. This choice can be represented by a sequence of {Yes, 
No} choices on a decision tree (figure 1.1). The firm begins with no information so that 
any customer belongs to the interval [0,1]. If the firm acquires one unit of information, 
the unit interval is partitioned into the sets [0,0.5] and (0.5,1]. That is, for any customer 
with location x, the firm knows whether x belongs to [0,0.5] or (0.5,1], but has no 
further information. If the firm chooses No at this initial node, there are no further 
choices to be made. However, if the firm chooses Yes, then it has two further decisions 
to make. She must decide whether to partition [0,0.5] into the subintervals [0,0.25] and 
(0.25,0,5]. Similarly, she must also decide whether to partition (0.5,1] into (0.5,0.75] 
                                                 
3   The set of equations in (1.3) are the technical definition of our information acquisition technology. 
Defining each element of the partition as a half-closed interval is without loss of generality, since 
customers have uniform distribution and each point is of measure zero.  
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and (0.75,1]. Once again, if she says No at any decision node, then there are no further 
decisions to be made along that node, whereas if she says Yes, then it needs to make two 
further choices. The cost associated with each Yes answer is  ) (k t  (see equation (1.2) 
and figure 1.1). A No answer has no cost.  
 
Figure 1.1: The decision tree for each firm regarding the information acquisition  
Acquiring information enables a firm to price discriminate. The prices are segment-
specific. The price component of any strategy (Pf) is a non-negative step function 
measurable with respect to If : 
[ ] { }
( ) ( ) y P x P s y x
P
f f i
f
= ￿ ˛
￿ ￿ﬁ ￿
+
,
0 1 , 0 : U
.    (1.4) 
Then a feasible strategy for player f (Sf) can be written as: 
( ) f f f P I S , =  where Pf is measurable with respect to If . 
Figure 1.2 shows a possible choice of strategy for one of the players.  
Yes              No    Yes              No 
 
Yes              No 
  [0,0.25]                 (0.25,0.5]                 (0.5,0.75]                 (0.75,1] 
  [0,0.5]                                                  (0.5,1] 
[0,1]  k = 0 
k = 2 
k = 1  
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0  8
1   4
1   8
3   2
1      8
5   4
3    8
7    1 
Figure 1.2: A price function consistent with the information acquisition definition 
If firm f acquires n units of information, then her payoff is: 
( ) G - = ￿
˛ f Z x
f f dx x P . p   where    [ ] ( ) ( ) { } x U x U x x Z f f f - > ˛ = , 1 , 0 ,  
and G is the total information cost for the firm, Uf(x) represents the utility of customer 
located at x if she buys from firm f with the general form of (1.1), - f stands for the 
other firm, and Zf represents the set of customers who buy from f.  
Lemma 1: Suppose si ˛ IA and sj ˛ IB , where  „ j i s s I ˘, Then either si is a subset 
of sj or sj is a subset of si. 
Proof: By acquiring any information unit a firm can divide one of her existing 
intervals into two equal-sized sub-intervals. Given si is an element of A’s information 
partition, three possible distinct cases may arise: i) si is al element of firm B’s 
information partition. ii) si is a strict subset of an element of firm B’s information 
partition. iii) si is the union of several elements from B’s information partition.
4 
Figure 1.3 shows these three possibilities where i) si and sj are equal (case 1), ii) si is 
a proper subset of sj (case 2), and iii) sj is a proper subset of si (case 3). 
                                                 
4   It is expected that in each firm’s turf the preferred segmentation scenario of the firm contains smaller 
segments compared with her rival’s preferred segments, but all cases are solved.  
 
P
r
i
c
e
  
 
21 
 
The blue and red lines show the partitions for si and sj respectively (the information 
partition chosen by firm A and firm B).  
Figure 1.3: Three possible segmentation scenarios 
1.3. The Two-Stage Game 
This game can be broken down into four different scenarios (figure 1.4). The first 
scenario relates to the case when neither of the firms acquires information. The second 
scenario represents the case where both firms acquire information. The third and fourth 
scenarios represent the situation where only one of the firms decides to acquire 
information.
  
    Firm B 
    NI  I 
NI  1
st Scenario  4
th Scenario 
F
i
r
m
 
A
 
I
 
3
rd Scenario  2
nd Scenario 
Note: 3rd and 4th scenarios are symmetric 
Figure 1.4: Four different scenarios for the two-stage game  
1.3.1. Scenario One: Neither firm acquires information 
The first scenario (the case of acquiring no information and therefore no price 
discrimination) is easily solvable. In the equilibrium both firms charge uniform prices 
( t P P B A = = ), they share the market equally, and each firm’s profit is 
2
t
.   
Firm A 
Firm B 
Case 2: 
Firm A 
Firm B 
Case 3: 
Firm A 
Firm B 
Case 1:  
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1.3.2. Scenario Two: Both firms acquire information 
In this scenario each firm acquires at least one unit of information that splits the 
interval [0,1] into subintervals ([0,0.5] and (0.5,1]. Let us consider competition on an 
interval that is a subset of [0,0.5] (given the symmetry of  the problem, our results also 
extend to the case where the interval belongs to (0,5,1]).  
Let   ] 5 . 0 , 0 [ ˆ ˝ s  and   A I s˛ ˆ , i.e. assume that  s ˆ is an element of firm A’s 
information partition. Consider first the case where   s ˆ is the union of several elements 
of B’s information partition, i.e.  U
n
i
i s s
1
ˆ
=
= , for i =1,2,…n; This situation corresponds to  
case 3 in figure 1.3. 
 Since firm A’s profits on the rest of the interval do not depend upon  s P ˆ, she must   
choose  s P ˆ aiming to maximise her profit on  s ˆ. By lemma 1, firm B’s profits on the 
components of s do not depend upon her prices on this interval. Therefore, a necessary 
condition for the Nash equilibrium is that: 
a)  A chooses  s P ˆ to maximize her profits on  s ˆ, 
b)  B chooses P1 , … , Pn to maximize her profits on  s ˆ. 
An analogous argument also applies in cases 1 and 2.   
From the utility function (1.1), the indifferent customer xi in each si = (ai-1, ai] is 
located at:  
Case 1: 
t
P P
x
A B
i 2 2
1 -
+ = ,     for i =1;      (1.5) 
Case 2: 
t
P P
x
iA B
i 2 2
1 -
+ = ,     for i =1,2,…,n;    (1.6) 
Case 3: 
t
P P
x
A iB
i 2 2
1 -
+ = ,     for i =1,2,…,n.    (1.7) 
In addition, these values for  i x  must lie in within the interval, i.e. the following 
inequality should be satisfied for each  i x :  
i i i a x a £ £ -1 ,    for i =1,2,…,n.    (1.8)  
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Where  1 - i a  and  i a  are respectively the lower and upper borders of the segment si 
and  5 . 0 0 1 £ < £ - i i a a . 
In each segment  i s , the customers who are located to the left of  i x  buy from firm 
A, and the customers to the right of  i x  buy from firm B. If  i x  (calculated in (1.5) or 
(1.6) or (1.7)) is larger than the upper border ( i a ) all customers on  i s  buy from firm A. 
In this situation to maximise her profit, firm A will set her price for  i s  to make the 
customer on the right border indifferent. Similarly, if  1 - < i i a x , firm B is a constrained 
monopolist on  i s  and will set her price to make the customer on the left border 
indifferent. 
Profits for the firms in each section of case 1 are: 
￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
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-
+ = 0 2 2
1
a
t
P P
P
A B
A A p , and     (1.9) 
￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿ -
- - =
t
P P
a P
A B
B B 2 2
1
1 p .    (1.10) 
In cases 2 and 3, as mentioned before since the profit for each firm over si (i 
=1,2,…,n) can be presented only as a function of the prices over  s ˆ, the maximization 
problem is solvable for  s ˆ independently. In case 2, firms’ profits on  s ˆ are: 
￿ ￿
ł
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￿ ￿
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t
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P p ,     for i =1,2,…,n ;  and    (1.11) 
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Similarly for case 3, the profits can be written as: 
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
-
+ = ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
-
-
+ = ￿
￿
￿
=
-
=
=
-
n
i
i
A
n
i
iB
A
n
i
i
A iB
A A a
t
nP P
n
P a
t
P P
P
1
1
1
1
1 2 2 2 2
1
p , and      (1.13) 
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So for cases 2 and 3, there are n+1 maximization problems on each  s ˆ which should 
be solved simultaneously. 
Let IA and IB be two feasible information partitions for A and B respectively. Let I
* 
be the join of IA and IB, i.e. the coarest partition of [0,1] that is finer than either IA or IB. 
Let s
* be the element of I
* is of the form [a,0.5), i.e. s* is the element that  lies on the 
left and is closest to the midpoint.  
Lemma 2: s
* is the only element of I
* which lies to the left of 0.5 such that both 
firms share the market. On every other element of I* which lies to the left of the 
midpoint, all customers buy from firm A.
5 
Proof: See appendix 1.A. 
So both firms sell positive quantities only in the most right hand segment of firm 
A’s turf and the most left hand segment of firm B’s turf.  
This lemma has the following important implication. A firm has no incentive to 
acquire information in its rival’s turf. For example if firm A acquires some information 
on interval (0.5,1]; then firm B can choose a set of profit maximising prices where only 
she shares this part of the market with firm A only on the very first segment on this 
interval. So acquiring information on the interval (0.5,1] makes no difference on firm 
A’s ability to attract more customers. 
As a result of lemma 2, each firm sets a uniform price for all customers located in 
her rival’s turf. Let us call these prices PRA and PLB. PRA is the price firm A sets for 
[0.5,1] and PLB is the price firm B sets for [0,0.5). This price is set to maximize firm’s 
profit in the only segment in the opposite turf that firm sells positive quantity in it. This 
uniform price affects the rival’s price in her constrained monopoly segments. Thus the 
pricing behaviour of firm A can be explained by these rules:  
- In all segments on [0,0.5] except the very last one, s
*, firm A is a constrained 
monopolist. She sets her prices to make the customer on the right hand border of each 
segment indifferent.  
- On s
*, the last segment to the right hands side of [0,0.5], firm A competes against 
the uniform price set by firm B for the [0,0.5] interval. 
                                                 
5  The solution for the interval [0,0.5] can be extended to interval (0.5,1] where the solution is the mirror 
image of the result on [0,0.5].   
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- On (0.5,1] she only can sell on the very first segment then sets her uniform price 
for  (0.5,1] in order to maximise her profit on that very first segment. 
So, firm A’s partition divides [0,0.5] into n segments and she acquires no 
information on (0.5,1]. Equivalently, firm B acquires no information [0,0.5] and has m 
segments in her partition for (0.5,1].  
We now solve for equilibrium prices. The prices for loyal customers in each side 
would come from: 
( ) i LB i iA a t P ta P - + = + 1 , for  1 , , 2 , 1 ; 1 - = £ £ - n i a x a i i L , and 
( ) 1 1 1 - - - + = + i iB i RA a t P ta P , for  m n n i a x a i i + + = £ £ - , , 2 ; 1 L . 
The prices for two shared market segments are represented by (recall from (1.A1) 
and (1.A2)): 
( ) 1 2 1
3
2
- - = n nA a
t
P      and    ( ) 1 2
3
2
1 , 1 - = + + n B n a
t
P . 
And the uniform prices for the opposite side could be written as: 
B n RA P P , 1 2
1
+ =     and     nA LB P P
2
1
= . 
Then given the prices for these two segments prices for other segments can easily 
be calculated as:  
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The associated gross profits are (market shares for border segments are calculated 
using the prices by (1.5)): 
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After simplifying, the net profits are represented by (Note that each firm pays only 
for the information in her own turf): 
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where GA, GB are the information costs paid by firms A and firm B in order to acquire 
information. 
If we want to follow the firm’s decision making process we can suppose that the 
firm starts with only one unit of information and splitting [0.1] interval to [0,0.5] and 
(0.5,1]. This first unit enables the firm to start discriminating on their half. Paying for 
one more unit of information on their own half means that firm is now a constrained 
monopolist on one part and should share the market on the other (i.e. for firm A, the 
customers on [0,0.25] are her loyal customers and she shares the market on (0.25,0.5] 
with firm B). In the loyal segment the only concern for the information acquisition 
would be the cost of the information. Firms fully discriminate the customers depending 
on the cost of information.  
But there is a trade off in acquiring information to reduce the length of shared 
segment. On one hand, this decision increases the profit of the firm through more loyal 
customers. On the other hand, since her rival charges a uniform price for all customers 
in the firm’s turf, the firm should lower the price for all of her loyal segments. Therefore 
the second effect reduces the firm’s profit. These two opposite forces affect the firm’s 
decision for acquiring a finer partition in the border segment. Proposition 1 shows how  
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each firm decides on the volume of the customer-specific information she is going to 
acquire.  
Proposition 1: Firm A uses these three rules to acquire information:  
1-1. if 
16
1 0 £
t
t
, then firm A fully discriminates on [0,0.25]. The equal-size of the 
segments on this interval in the equilibrium partition is determined by the information 
cost.  
1-2. Firm A acquires no further information on (0.25,0.5]. 
1-3. Firm A acquires no information on (0.5,1]. 
Proof: In order to avoid unnecessary complications, the first part of the proof has 
been discussed in appendix 1.A. It shows that firm A should make a series of decisions 
regarding to split the border segment (see figure 1.1). Starting form the pint of acquiring 
no information on the left hand side, firm A acquires information in her own turf as long 
as this expression is non-negative: 
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1  is the length of the border segment,   
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2
1
2
0 k r
k
t
 is the total information cost. 
We follow this chain of decision makings, starting with n =1 (i.e. no initial loyal 
segment for firm A). The procedure is that firm A starts with k = 1, if equation (1.19) is 
non-negative then she decides to acquire information on [0, 0.5], splitting this interval 
to [0, 0.25] and (0.25,0.5]. After this he is the constrained monopolist on [0, 0.25] and 
the preferred length for all loyal segments is: 
                                                 
6   º ß notation represents the floor function (or the greatest integer).  
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After buying the first unit of information on [0, 0.5] (and consequently the preferred 
units of information on [0, 0.25]) then firm A checks non-negativity of (1.19) for k = 2 
and so forth.  
Table 1.1 shows the chain of the first two decision statements. As it is clear the 
value of the decision statement on the second row (and also for every k > 1) is always 
negative.  
Table 1.1: Firm A’s chain of decision statements 
1 - n a   n a   k  Decision statement 
0 
2
1   1  0
4 2
1 1
16
0 ‡ œ
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The minimum value for r is 2 (the biggest possible length for a loyal segment is 
1/4). It can be shown that the value of decision statement (equation (1.19) for k = 1) is 
non-negative if and only if 
16
1 0 £
t
t
. It is clear the second row’s decision statement is 
always negative. That means the length of the shared segment, regardless to the 
information cost, equals 0.25. Assuming 
16
1 0 £
t
t
, then the preferred segmentation 
scenario for firm A is to fully discriminate between [0,0.25] (the preferred segment 
length in this interval is a unction of information and transportation cost) and acquiring 
no information for (0.25,0.5]. ¤ QED 
Each firm prefers to just pay for information in her own turf, and the segmentation 
in the constrained monopoly part depends on the transportation and information cost. 
The only segment in each turf that may have a different length is the border segment 
and firms prefer to buy no information on their rival’s turf. 
One of the findings in the proof of proposition 1 is the functional form of firms’ 
marginal profit of information in loyal segment. Equation (1A.16) shows that the 
marginal profit of information in a loyal segment (dividing a loyal segment to two) is  
 
29 
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t
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t
 where ai and ai-1 are the boundaries of the loyal 
segment and  k i i a a
2
1
1 = - - . As it is clear the marginal profit of information is 
decreasing. Decreasing marginal profit guarantees that if the firm decides not to split a 
loyal segment, there is no need to worry about the profitability of acquiring a finer 
partition.  
When the information cost is insignificant (t0 =0) the preferred length of a loyal 
segment goes to zero. In other words firms acquire information for every individual 
customer on [0,0.25] and charges a different price for each individual based on her 
location. In this case, in equation (1.19) kﬁ ¥, starting with an-1 = 0 and an = 0.5 and 
based on the proposition 1 the chain of decisions for t =0 is:  
i) On [0,0.5],  an-1 = 0 then equation (1.19) turns into   0
16
>
t
 and the result is to 
acquire the first unit of information, and consequently acquire full information on 
[0,0.25].   
ii) On (0.25,0.5],  an-1 = 0.25 then  0
192
< -
t
 and the result is to acquire no further 
information on (0.25, 0.5]. That means even when the information cost is insignificant, 
the positive effect of acquiring more information in the interval of (0.25,0.5] is 
dominated by the negative effect of  falling the constrained monopolistic prices on 
segments on [0,0.25].  
Figure 1.5 shows an example for an equilibrium strategy for firm A. Firm B’s 
preferred strategy will be a mirror image of this example.  
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Figure 1.5: An example of the equilibrium strategy for firm A in the second scenario 
Figure 1.6 shows the preferred number of segments by firm A in her turf against the 
ratio of information cost to transportation cost. This figure also shows the net profit of 
the firm in her own turf as a multiplication of transportation cost. 
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Figure 1.6: The preferred number of segments and the profit of each firm  
as a function of the ratio of information cost over transportation cost 
Figure 1.7 represents each firm’s preferred length for shared and loyal segments as 
a function of the information and transportation costs. Having the results we have seen 
so far proposition 1 can be rewritten as (it is another interpretation on proposition 1 and 
equivalent to what we had before):  
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Figure 1.7: The length of shared and loyal segments  
as a function of the ratio of information cost over transportation cost 
Figure 1.7 also shows that if the cost of first information unit
7 is less than 
16
t  then 
firm A would be better off by discriminatory pricing in her own turf.  
In appendix 1.B we show that proposition 1 is also true for tow other information 
cost functional forms. However, the upper limit on t0 and the preferred length of loyal 
segments are different for each case.  
1.3.3. Scenario Three: Only firm A acquires information 
This scenario is symmetric with scenario 4 (only firm B acquires information).  
Proposition 2: When firm B acquires no information, firm A uses these two rules 
to acquire information:  
2-1. In her own turf: prefers to fully discriminate her own turf (subject to 
information cost). 
2-2. In her rival’s turf: acquires no information. 
                                                 
7   This condition comes from (1.19) and (1.20). If the information cost is higher than this upper limit then 
firm A decides to acquire no information in her own turf at all.   
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Proof: See appendix 1.A. 
In this case firm B is not able of any discrimination and charges a uniform price for 
all customers. If 
8
1
16
1 0 £ <
t
t
 then firm A would prefer to acquire just one unit of 
information in the left hand side [0,0.5] and the unique equilibrium prices are:  
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t
, then the proof of proposition 2 shows that firm B has no share from the 
left hand side (even in the one next to 0.5 point) and only chooses her unique price to 
maximize her profit on (0.5,1] interval. On the other hand, firm A would prefer to fully 
discriminate the left hand side [0,0.5] and the preferred length of the segments are 
determined by equation (1.20):  
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Figure 1.8 shows a possible solution for this sub-game. As it is clear the indifferent 
customer on [0,0.5] is the customer who is located exactly on 0.5. Then all the left hand 
side customers buy from firm A. On the right hand side firm A’s market share is 1/3 and 
the rest buy from firm B.  
  
 
33 
 
0  8
1   4
1   8
3   2
1    8
5   4
3    8
7    1 
Figure 1.8: An example of the equilibrium strategy for the firms in the third scenario 
1.3.4. Outcome of the Two-Stage Game  
Figure 1.9 shows the strategic representation of the game when the information cost 
is insignificant ( 0 0 ﬁ t ). As it can be seen the game is a prisoners’ dilemma. 
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Figure 1.9: The outcome of the game when  0 0 ﬁ t  
Figure 1.10 represents firm A’s profit as a function of 
t
0 t
. In each pair of strategies 
the first notation refers to firm A’s strategy and the second one to firm B’s. If firm B 
acquires information, firm A’s best response is to do so, irrespective of the information 
cost. If the other firm acquires no information, the best response is to acquire 
information if the information cost is sufficiently low. So if the information cost is 
sufficiently low, the game becomes a prisoners’ dilemma and both firms would have a 
dominant strategy to acquire information. This threshold is  039 . 0
0 »
t
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Figure 1.10: Firm A’s profit for four different scenarios versus  
the information / transportation cost ratio 
Then if  039 . 0
0 >
t
t
 the game has two Nash equilibria: i) both firms acquire 
information and ii) neither of the firms acquire information. If  039 . 0
0 £
t
t
, the game is a 
prisoners’ dilemma where information acquisition is the dominant strategy for both 
firms. In this case we have excess information acquisition from the firm point of view. 
Acquiring more information will lead to tougher competition and even in the limit, 
when  0 0 ﬁ t , will lead to about 40% decrease in firm’s profits. 
Acquiring information has two opposite effects on firm’s profit. It enables the firm 
to price discriminate and on the other hand toughens the competition. The latter effect 
dominates the former and when both firms acquire information, they both worsen off. 
Fixing the partitions for both firms, then pricings are strategically complement.  
Given the outcome of this game, one might ask why do the firms not freely give 
each other information about customers on their own turfs? The issue of collusion in 
sharing the information in this game can be looked at from two different points of view. 
Firstly, in the real world situation that our setting might be applied to sharing the 
customer information with a third party is usually illegal. Fro example, Tescos –the 
biggest supermarket in the UK with almost one third of the market share- has a huge  
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pool of specific information about its customers via its club-card scheme. However, it is 
illegal for Tescos to share this information with other supermarkets. 
Secondly, as it is showed in this section, information about the customers in the 
other side of market has no strategic importance for the firm. Then even if the 
information is available it makes no vital part in pricing decision. Since the outcome of 
the game shows excessive information acquisition, one possibility for collusion is to 
collude and not acquire information. However, as it was showed firms have incentive to 
deviate from this agreement and acquire information. 
1.4. The Simultaneous Move Game 
In this game, firms cannot observe their rival’s information partition. It seems that 
the two-stage game is able to offer a better explanation of the information acquisition 
decision in a competitive market. Firms (especially in retailer market) closely monitor 
their rival’s behaviour. Then it seems a reasonable assumption to consider that while 
competing via prices, they are aware of the information partition chosen by their rival. 
We will show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this game. Remember 
that every strategy has two parts, the segmentation scenario and the prices for each 
segment. To prove non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium, we show that for 
different cases (regarding the information acquisition decision), at least one of the firms 
has incentive to deviate from any assumed pure strategy equilibrium.  
1.4.1. Case 1: None of the firms acquire information 
The proof for the situation that none of the firms acquire information is trivial. 
When both firms decide to buy no information, the outcome would be charging a 
uniform price of t for both firms. It is clear that a firm has incentive to deviate from this 
strategy and acquire some information when t0 is sufficiently small. 
1.4.2. Case 2: Both firms acquire information 
Suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium where both firms acquire some 
information. Firstly we will show that in this equilibrium firms acquire no information 
on their rival’s turf. Assume firm B acquires some information on [0,0.5]. In the 
equilibrium every firm can predict her rival’s partition accurately. Therefore, based on 
lemma 2, firm B makes no sale on every interval expect the final right segment on  
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[0,0.5]. Then the information on this interval is redundant for firm B. She can profitably 
deviate, acquire no information on [0,0.5], and charge the same price for the entire 
interval. Then in any pure strategy equilibrium firm B acquires no information on firm 
A’s turf. We will therefore consider all different possibilities for firm A to acquire 
information on [0,0.5]. Then we will show that in any candidate equilibrium at least one 
of the firms has incentive to deviate (the fact that in the equilibrium each firm can 
predict her rival’s strategy accurately is used).  
i) No further information in [0,0.5]: The corresponding equilibrium prices at this 
interval are  
3
2
) (
t
x P A =   and   
3
) (
t
x P B = ;    for   [ ] 5 . 0 , 0 ˛ "x . 
It is trivial that firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire some information on the 
left hand side. The information cost is not a binding constraint here. It has been shown 
in the proof of proposition 1 that the constraint on whether to acquire some information 
on [0,0.5) is more relaxed than acquiring any information in the first place (acquiring 
information on [0,1]). 
ii) Partial discrimination on [0,0.25]: This means firm A acquires the information 
which splits [0,0.5] interval to [0,0.25] and (0.25,0.5] and some information (but not 
fully discrimination) on [0,0.25] (and possibly some information on (0.25,0.5]). In the 
equilibrium firm A knows that firm B sets a uniform price on the left hand side to 
maximise her payoff from the very last segment on the right hand side of (0.25,0.5] 
interval. Responding to this, as shown in proof of proposition 1, firm A has incentive to 
fully discriminate on [0,0.25]. So a strategy profile like this cannot be an equilibrium.  
iii) Full discrimination on [0,0.25] and no further information on (0.25,0.5]: As the 
results of  lemma 2 and proposition 1 show, if the information cost is sufficiently low in 
equilibrium, firm A fully discriminates customers between [0,0.25] (subject to 
information cost) and charges a uniform price for the section (0.25,0.5], and firm B 
charges a uniform price for all customers on the left hand side in order to gain the most 
possible profit from the customers on (0.25,0.5]. Now we want to investigate the 
players’ incentive to deviate from this strategy profile. 
Firm A has incentive to deviate from this strategy and acquire more information in 
the information acquisition stage. Unlike the two-stage game, deviation from this  
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equilibrium and acquiring more information in the very last segment of the left hand 
side (shared segment) doesn’t affect firm B’s price for the left hand side. Recalling 
(1.A17) from the proof of proposition 1, firm A decides to acquire more information in 
(0.25,0.5] if 
t
t
2
4
1
2
1
‡ -  or 
64
1
£
t
t
. This is exactly the same upper bound for information 
cost that satisfies firm A’s decision to acquire any information in the left hand side in the first 
instance. That means if information cost is small enough to encourage firm A to acquire some 
information in [0,0.5] interval, then firm A also has incentive to deviate from the 
proposed strategy profile.  
iv) Full discrimination on [0,0.5]: The corresponding equilibrium prices for the left 
hand side are ((an-1,0.5]  is the very last segment on the right where firm A  acquires 
information): 
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Firm B has incentive to deviate and acquire some information on the left hand side. 
If firm B buys one unit of information on the left hand side then she can charge a 
different price ( B P ˆ ) for [0,0.25]. The extra profit which she can achieve will be: 
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an , which (considering the upper bound on information 
cost for acquiring information in a firm’s own turf) gives firm B incentive to acquire at 
least one unit of information of the left hand side.  
Then the game has no equilibrium when both firms acquire information. 
1.4.3. Case 3: Only firm A acquires information 
Suppose this case has an equilibrium. In the equilibrium each firm can predict her 
rival’s strategy including preferred partition; so firm A knows that in the equilibrium, 
her rival can predict her chosen partition. We try to construct the characteristics of this  
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equilibrium. Since in the equilibrium firm B can predict her rival’s partition accurately, 
then we can use some of the results that we had from the first game. 
As seen in lemma 2, firm A knows if she acquires information in the right hand 
side, firm B can prevent her of selling to any customer in the right hand segments 
except the very first segment. Then firm A has no incentive to acquire information in 
the right hand side.  
As for the left hand side, proposition 2 shows that firm B knows that firm A can 
gain the most possible profit by fully discriminating. So firm B sets her price to just 
maximise her profit from the only segment in her turf and firm A fully discriminate the 
left hand segment. 
An equilibrium for this case should have these two characteristics: 
1- In the right hand side, firm A (the only firm who acquires information in this 
scenario) buys no information. Then there is only one segment (0.5,1] and the prices 
would be 
3
2t
P
RHS
A =  and 
3
4t
PB = . 
2- in the left hand side, firm A fully discriminates subject to information cost given 
the firm B’s uniform price. 
Now we want to investigate firm A’s incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. 
Given firm B’s uniform price, if firm A deviates and acquires just one unit of 
information in the right hand side his marginal profit would be the difference between 
his equilibrium profit over (0.5,1] and the deviation strategy profit over (0.5,0.75] and 
(0.75,1]. Then the deviation profit can be written as (
L
A P  the price charged for the left 
sub-segment and 
R
A P  the price for the right sub-segment): 
t p -
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
-
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿ -
=
4
1
2
3
4
2
3
4
t
P
t
P
t
P
t
P
R
A
R
A
L
A
L
A
RHS
A .    (1.21) 
Solving the FOCs, the first part of (1.21) exactly gives firm A the same profit as the 
supposed equilibrium. If the second part of the profit is greater than the information 
cost, then firm A has incentive for deviation. From the FOC 
12
5t
P
R
A =  , the marginal 
profit of deviation is:  
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 firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire at least one unit of 
information in the right hand side. This condition is more relaxed than the condition 
calculated in section 1.3.2 for acquiring information in her turf at all. That means if the 
information cost is low enough that firm A decides to acquire information in the left 
hand side, in the first place, she has incentive to deviate from any equilibrium strategy 
that constructed for this case. 
1.4.4. Outcome of the Simultaneous Move Game 
The major result of studying the simultaneous move game is the non-existence of 
equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore the only possible equilibrium of this game 
would be in mixed strategies. Considering that each pure strategy consists of an 
information partition and a pricing function measurable with the chosen information 
partition, one can imagine that in general there are many possible pure strategies. This 
makes finding the mixed equilibrium of the game a difficult task. In appendix 1.C, we 
investigate the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium through a simple example 
where the number of possibilities are exogenously restricted. 
1.5. Comparing the Two-Stage Game with the Multi-Store Example 
In this section we compare our model with the spatial competition among multi-
store retailers. The spatial competition model has been studied in several papers (Teitz 
(1968), Martinez-Girlat & Neven (1988), Slade (1995), Pal & Sarkar (2002)). Consider 
two retailers, initially each with one store located at the two ends of [0,1] interval. They 
have the option to open new stores alongside the line. Opening a new store enables the 
firm to price discriminate, by charging different prices at different stores. In a two stage 
setting, first each firm decides whether to open their new branch and then firms compete 
via prices.  
Spatial competition models can also be described as introducing new models in a 
differentiated market where customers have different tastes. Assume there are two 
brands of car (say Honda and Toyota) and the customers are uniformly located on the 
interval between these two brands based on their tastes. If a customer’s location is  
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closer to Honda, he likes Honda more. The customer who is located at the mid-point is 
indifferent between two brands.  
So the problem for car makers is to produce different models alongside the line to 
be able to price discriminate. For example, Toyota might want to make some changes to 
their existing model and making a new model more like Honda products to attract some 
of Honda customers. Making these changes for the car maker bears a relatively small 
cost. In a two stage setting, firms first choose their models and then compete via prices.  
The information acquisition model is different from this model. In the information 
acquisition model the products offered to all customers are identical; but in the multi-
store model, firm is able to charge different prices by offering different products. In case 
of considering the model in a spatial context, the difference is the location of stores. In 
the information acquisition game the pattern of transportation cost was unaffected by 
the price discrimination practice. In the multi-store model, opening each store 
potentially reduces the transportation cost for some of the customers who shop at new 
stores. 
In order to demonstrate this we illustrate an example of spatial competition which 
has similarities to our model. Assume two retailers A and B each with one store located 
at points 0 and 1 respectively. In the first stage they each might decide whether to open 
a new store or not. Retailer A has the option to open her new store at 0.25 and retailer B 
can open her new store at 0.75. After making this decision, both firms observe their 
rival choice. The game proceeds to the next stage where firms compete in prices. 
Customers are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Each customer buys at most one unit of 
good and her utility is  td P V U - - =  where V is her reservation price, P is the price 
she paid, t is the unit cost of transport, and d is the distance to her chosen store. Firms’ 
marginal costs are equal, normalised to zero and the cost of opening a new store is c. 
Note that in this game each firm charges a uniform price for all customers at each 
store. The only option for a firm to price discriminate is to open a new store.  
The game has four sub-games as it is shown in figure 1.11. We solve each sub-
game and then characterise the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
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    Firm B 
    Not Open   Open B2 @ 0.75 
Not Open   1
st sub-game  4
th sub-game 
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A2 @ 0.25  3
rd sub-game  2
nd sub-game 
Third and forth Sub-games are symmetric. 
Figure 1.11: The multi-store retailer game  
1.5.1. First sub-game; None of the firms opens a new store  
The equilibrium in this sub-game is trivial. Both firms charge uniform prices 
( t P P B A = = ), they share the market equally, and each firm’s profit is 
2
t
.   
1.5.2. Second sub-game; Both firms open a new store  
Figure 1.12 shows the spatial representation of this sub-game. We call stores 
located at 0 and 0.25, A1 and A2 respectively. Similarly stores located at 1 and 0.75 are 
called B1 and B2. 
 
Figure 1.12: The 2
nd sub-game of the multi-store retailer game 
The utility of the customer who is located at x is (Pi is the price charged by store i):  
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.    (1.22) 
We restrict our search for equilibrium to symmetric equilibria. In any symmetric 
equilibria  1 1 B A P P =  and  2 2 B A P P = . Based on this, we can conclude that in the 
equilibrium customers in each of the segments ([0,0.25], (0.25,0.75], and (0.75,1]) shop 
at one of the two stores located at the two ends of that segment. For example customers 
on [0,0.25] shop either at A1 or A2. It is trivial that customers on this interval have no 
incentive to shop at either of firm B’s stores, since it only increases their transportation 
 A1  A2   B2  B1 
 0  x1  0.25  x2  0.75  x3  1  
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cost. The same argument is true for interval (0.25,0.75], if in the equilibrium 
4
2 1
t
P P A A - ‡ . This condition guarantees that customers located on (0.25,0.75] has no 
incentive to travel to either of stores located at 0 and 1. 
Assume x1, x2, and x3 (see figure 1.12) are the location of indifferent costumers in 
each segment. Considering our assumption and equations (1.22), the locations of 
indifferent customers are:  
t
P P
x
A A
2 8
1 1 2
1
-
+ = ,    (1.23) 
t
P P
x
A B
2 2
1 2 2
2
-
+ = , and    (1.24) 
t
P P
x
B B
2 8
7 2 1
3
-
+ = .    (1.25) 
Firm A’s total profit from both stores is:  
( ) c x x P x P A A A - - + = 1 2 2 1 1 p .    (1.26) 
Substituting from (1.23) and (1.24) into (1.26); and calculating the first order 
conditions, the best response prices for firm A are
8:  
t P P A A 8
1
2 1 + =    and   
2 2
1
2 2
t
P P B A + = . 
Following a Similar procedure for firm B the best responses for firm B are:  
t P P B B 8
1
2 1 + =    and   
2 2
1
2 2
t
P P A B + = . 
Solving these two set of best responses together, the location of indifferent 
customers (x1, x2, and x3) are 
16
1
, 
2
1
, and 
16
15
. The equilibrium prices are:  
t P P B A 8
9
1 1 = =    and     t P P A B = = 2 2 .   (1.27) 
And the firms’ equilibrium profit is:   
c t B A - = =
128
65
p p .    (1.28) 
                                                 
8  The second order condition satisfies the maximum that this solution is a maximum.  
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Prices in (1.27) satisfy the condition that we need for this equilibrium 
(
4
2 1
t
P P A A - ‡ ). As it can be seen in (1.27) in this sub-game the competition is limited 
to the middle segment. The competition on this segment has the same pattern as the 1
st 
sub-game and the outcome in this segment is similar to the outcome of the 1
st sub-game 
where the prices are equal to t and firms share the market equally. 
The possibility of a global deviation by firms should be investigated. The possible 
deviation strategies for firm A are (given firm B’s prices are fixed as (1.27)): 
i)  Reduce PA2 (and consequently PA1) in order to capture a higher share from the 
right hand side with the possibility of attracting some of the customers on 
(0.75,1] interval. 
ii)  Increase PA2 (and consequently PA1) in order to increase her profit on [0,0.25] 
interval. 
iii)  Ignore A2 store and try to maximise her profit only through A1. 
It is investigated and none of the above alternative strategies increases firm A’s 
profit. Then the equilibrium discussed here is the unique symmetric equilibrium of this 
sub-game.  
1.5.3. Third sub-game; Only firm A opens a new store 
Figure 1.13 shows the spatial representation of this sub-game. In this sub-game firm 
A has two stores located at 0 and 0.25 and firm B has one store located at 1.  
`  
Figure 1.13: The 3
rd sub-game of the multi-store retailer game 
We assume that in the equilibrium customers in each of the segments ([0,0.25] and 
(0.25,1]) shop at one of the two stores located at the two ends of that segment. After 
finding this equilibrium we prove that this is a global equilibrium.  
Assume x1 and x2 (see figure 1.13) are the location of indifferent costumers in each 
segment. Considering our assumption and equation (1.22), the locations of indifferent 
customers are  
 A1  A2     B 
 0  x1  0.25            x2      1  
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t
P P
x
A A
2 8
1 1 2
1
-
+ =  and    (1.29) 
t
P P
x
A B
2 8
5 2
2
-
+ = .    (1.30) 
Firm A’s total profit has the same form as (1.26). By substituting from (1.29) and 
(1.30) into (1.26); and calculating the first order conditions, the results are (these are the 
best response function for firm A) 
t P P A A 8
1
2 1 + =     and    t P P B A 8
5
2
1
2 + = . 
Firm B’s total profit is:  
( ) 2 1 x P B B - = p .    (1.31) 
Substituting from (1.30) into (1.31); and calculating the first order condition, the 
result for firm B is  
t P P A B 8
3
2
1
2 + = . 
Solving these two set of best responses together, the location of indifferent 
customers are 
16
1
 and 
24
13
. The equilibrium prices are:  
t P A 24
29
1 = ,    t PA 12
13
2 = ,   and  t P B 12
11
= .    (1.32) 
And the firms’ equilibrium profits are:   
c t A - =
1152
685
p   and  t B 288
121
= p .    (1.33) 
Prices as it can be seen in (1.32) show that in this sub-game, the competition 
between the firms are limited to [0,0.75]. 
The deviation possibilities for the firms again fail to improve the profit. Then it is 
the unique equilibrium of this sub-game. 
1.5.4. Outcome of the multi-store game 
Figure 1.14 summarises the outcome of the four sub-games. For different values of 
c the sub-game perfect equilibrium has different characteristics:   
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i.  If  t c
128
1
£ , then both players have a dominant strategy to open the new store. 
But the game is not a prisoners’ dilemma. Opening the new stores by both 
firms improves the profit for both firms.  
ii.  If  t c t
1152
101
128
1
£ < , then it is still a dominant strategy to open the new store for 
both firms; however the game is a prisoners’ dilemma.  
iii.  If  t c t
1152
109
1152
101
£ < , then the game has two asymmetric equilibria, when one 
firm opens the new store and her rival does not.  
iv.  If  c t <
1152
109
, then each firm has a dominant strategy not to open the new store.  
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    Not Open   Open B2 @ 0.75 
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A2 @ 0.25  c t -
1152
685
 ,  t
288
121   c t -
128
65
 ,  c t -
128
65  
Figure 1.14: The payoffs in the multi-store retailer game  
This game - like the information acquisition game - has a dominant strategy of 
opening the second store conditional on  t c
1152
101
< . However, the game is not a 
prisoners’ dilemma. In fact for different values of c, the game has different 
characteristics. Note that in the information acquisition game if information cost was 
less than a threshold, game was a prisoners’ dilemma.  
We now try to explain intuitively what happens as the number of firms rises in this 
model. 
Assume that firm A can open stores in the interval [0,0.5), while firm B can open 
stores in the interval (0.5,1]. We define the mid-interval as [a,b] where a and b are the 
location of the two closest stores to the mid-point respectively belonging to firm A and 
firm B. As our previous example of four stores (two stores for each firm) showed, the 
pattern of competition on the mid-interval is similar to the game with only one store for  
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each firm. That is, the two stores on both sides of the med-interval compete for 
customers, just as the two stores located at 0 and 1 did in the original game. Thus, 
similar intuition suggests that when firms can open many stores, competition is 
restricted to the mid-interval. Other stores located on other intervals are able to charge a 
higher price. One can solve a free entry equilibrium in this case where firms can open 
many stores, but each additional store incurs a fixed cost. 
Intuitively, this setup seems different from the information acquisition game. Since 
stores away from the mid-interval are able to charge a higher price. Therefore in one 
hand, firms would like to open stores closer to mid-point to push the competition further 
away from the segments they are constrained monopolist on. On the other hand, firms 
would like to open stores away from the mid-interval and where they have more 
monopoly power to increase their profit. The factor that limits the number of stores is 
the cost of a running new store. Thus opening new stores may allow firms to relax 
competition, unlike in the information acquisition case, where competition is increased. 
1.6. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed a model of information acquisition by firms, where 
information allows firms to price discriminate. Our benchmark model is one where 
information acquisition decisions are common knowledge at the time that firms compete 
via prices. We show that information acquisition increases price competition and 
reduces profits, so that we have an outcome similar to a prisoners’ dilemma. Our second 
main finding is that firms acquire less information as compared to a monopoly situation, 
since this softens price competition.  
By introducing information cost (and as a consequence segmentation scenario), the 
third-degree price discrimination problem can end up neither on fully discrimination 
policy nor on non-discrimination decision. Depending on the cost of every unit of 
information, every firm needs to answer two questions: how should I discriminate (what 
is the preferred length of every segment) and what is the best price to charge for every 
specified customer. The result would be a partially discrimination policy. 
The two-stage game is a prisoners’ dilemma which in equilibrium, firms acquire 
excessive information. Firms also prefer to discriminate partially. Our results show that 
there is a trade-off in acquiring more information. It improves firms’ performances in  
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terms of profit by enabling them to price discriminate. On the other hand, acquiring 
more information tends to make the competition between the firms more fierce. 
Tougher competition drives the prices down and ultimately decreases firms’ profits. 
Our results demonstrate how decreasing marginal profit of information limits firms’ 
willingness to acquire more information. Furthermore, in equilibrium –regardless of the 
cost of information- firms do not have incentive to acquire information on their rival’s 
turf. Acquiring information in a firm’s own turf is also restricted. Extra information in 
this area makes firms profit to fall as result of tougher competition.  
We have also analysed a model where information acquisition decisions are not 
observed by the rival firm. In this game, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. We solve 
for a mixed strategy equilibrium for a simple example, where firms have restricted 
information acquisition possibilities 
Appendix 1.A 
Proof of lemma 2: Since the firms’ profit on  s ˆ  can be written as a function of the firms’ 
prices on  s ˆ and the segments associated with that (si ; i =1,2,…,n), firms solve the 
maximization problem for  s ˆ independently of its compliment. We solve the problem for 
each possible segmentation situation  
Case 1: 
By solving the first order conditions ( 0 =
¶
¶
A
A
P
p
,  0 =
¶
¶
B
B
P
p
),  market shares, prices, and 
profit of firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to (1.9) and (1.10) and solving them 
simultaneously, firms’ prices are: 
( ) 1 4 2
3
0 1 + - = a a
t
PA , and     (1.A1) 
( ) 1 2 4
3
0 1 - - = a a
t
P B .     (1.A2) 
By substitution the prices from (1.A1) and (1.A2) into (1.5), the location of marginal 
customer in every segment is derived:  
( ) 1 2 2
6
1
0 1 + + = a a x .    (1.A3)  
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In the segments that both firms sell positive quantities, the prices should be non-negative 
( 0 ‡ A P  ,  0 ‡ B P ) and the marginal customer should be located within the segment 
( 1 0 a x a £ £ )
9. From the information acquisition technology at the definition of the model, 
every two consecutive breaking points (the borders of each segment) have the following form: 
p
k
a
2
1 2
0
-
=  , 
q
l
a
2
1 2
1
-
=  where  ￿ ˛ q p l k , , , .     (1.A4) 
And also the length of segment is represented as
10:  
r a a
2
1
0 1 = -  where  { } q p r , max = .     (1.A5) 
Solving the restrictions, the results are: 
i) If  q p >  then the restrictions hold only for 
2
1
1 = a ; both firms sell positive quantities in 
the segment located exactly at the left hand side of the middle point
11. 
ii) If  q p <  then the restrictions hold only for 
2
1
0 = a ; both firms sell positive quantities in 
the segment located on the right side of the middle point. 
iii)  q p =  is impossible, it is equivalent with a segment of length zero.  
In this case, market sharing takes place only for two segments located around 
2
1
.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9  Obviously, the price restrictions and the location restrictions are equivalent. 
10  This definition covers all amounts of 
0 a  except  0
0 = a . That can be solved as: 
1 1 6 1 2 0 a a < + <  then 
1 4
1
a < . Since 
4
1
2
1
0 1 > = -
r a a  and  0
0 = a  then 
2
1
1 = a  is the only possible upper border of a 
segment with positive demand for both firms. 
11  Proof: 
p p
k
a a
2
2
2
1
0 1 = + = .  Substitute in (1.A1) and (1.A2), and apply in the price restrictions: 
2
1
2
2 - >
- p k , and  1 2
2 + <
- p k . Since  ￿ ˛ k  then 
2 2
- =
p k , and 
2
1
1 = a . The proofs of other two cases 
are quite similar.   
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Case 2: 
In case 2 by solving the first order conditions on  s ˆ  ( 0 =
¶
¶
iA
iA
P
p
 ,  0 =
¶
¶
B
B
P
p
 ;  n i , , 2 , 1 L = ) 
market share, prices, and profit of firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to (1.11) and (1.12) 
and solving them simultaneously the firms’ prices are: 
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ -
- +
= -
-
= ￿
1 3
2
3
1
0
1
1
i
n
i
i n
iA a
n
a a a
t
P  for  n i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and     (1.A6) 
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - - + = ￿
-
=
n a a a
n
t
P
n
i
i n B 0
1
1
2 2 4
3
.     (1.A7) 
The solution is started from the first segment (s1 which is the first segment in the very left 
hand side of s ˆ ) and shows that the location for indifferent customer does not satisfy 
1 1 0 a x a £ £  then the maximization problems are reduced to n. This procedure continues to the 
most right hand side segment with a couple of FOCs and problem reduces to the problem solved 
in case 1. 
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - + + - + =
-
+ = ￿
=
n na a a a
n t
P P
x
n
i
i n
A B 2 3
6
1
2
1
2 2
1
0
1
0
1
1 . 
Define  0 a ai i - = l  then: 
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ + + + = ￿
=
n
i
i n n
a x
1
0 1 6
1
3
2
6
1
l l . 
To be credible we should have  1 0 1 l + < a x  and simultaneously  0 > B P  then: 
1 0
1
0 6
1
3
2
6
1
l l l + < ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ + + + ￿
=
a
n
a
n
i
i n ,    (1.A8) 
and from (1.A7):  0
2
0
1
> - + +￿
=
n
na
n
i
i n l l      (1.A9) 
After simplifying (1.A8):  
0 3
2
1
2
1
1
1
0 < - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ + + - ￿
=
l l l
n
i
i n n
a .     (1.A10) 
And from (1.A9):   
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￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - > +￿
=
0
1 2
1
a n
n
i
i n l l . 
Define  0
2
1
‡ = - g n a : 
RHS of (1.A10)  ( ) 1 1 0 0 3
2
3
3
2
1
2 2
1
l g l l - + = - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - + - > n a
n
n
a . 
For every n>1;  1 2l l ‡ n  then (1.A8) and (1.A9) cannot be held simultaneously.  
Then we showed for every n>1 in the first segment firm A is a constrained monopolist. For 
the ith step if n>i it is easy to show that these two constraints turn to this form (with  i n - +2  
FOCs): 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i
n
i j
j i n
iA B
i a i n a i n a a a
i n t
P P
x < ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
- + - - + + + -
- +
+ =
-
+ = -
=
- ￿ 1 2 1 3
1 6
1
2
1
2 2
1
1 1 , 
and   0 > B P  Ł  0
2
1
1 >
- +
- - +￿
=
-
n
i j
i j n
i n
a a a . 
After simplifying: 
( )
0
1 2
1
3
2
3
2
1
1 1 0 < ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
+ -
- +
+ - + - ￿
=
- -
n
i j
j i n i i i n
a l l l l l ,   (1.A11) 
and   ( ) ￿
=
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - - + > + -
n
i j
j i n a i n 0 1 2
1
1 l l l .     (1.A12) 
Then  
The RHS of (1.A11)  ( ) ( ) g l l l l l + + - = - - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - > - - 1 1 0 2
2
3
2
2
3
2
1
2
3
i i n i i a . 
For i<n;  ( ) 1 2
1
- + £ i n i l l l  Then (1.A11) cannot be hold, supposing (1.A12) holds. 
This procedure continues until the FOCs reduce to 2 conditions and the problem transforms 
to the problem has been solved in case 1. 
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Case 3: 
In this case by solving the first order conditions for each segment ( 0 =
¶
¶
A
A
P
p
,  0 =
¶
¶
iB
iB
P
p
; 
n i , , 2 , 1 L = ) market shares, prices, and profit of firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to 
(1.13) and (1.14) and solving them simultaneously the firms’ prices are: 
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- - + = ￿
=
0
1
4 2 4
3
a a a n
n
t
P
n
i
i n A  and     (1.A13) 
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- -
+ - =
￿
=
n
a a a
a
t
P
n
i
i n
i iB
0
1
2 2
1 3
3
 for  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = .    (1.A14) 
Again for the first segment:  
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- + + + - + =
-
+ = ￿
=
n na a a a
n t
P P
x
n
i
i n
A B 2 3 2 2
6
1
2
1
2 2
1
1
1
0
1
1 . 
Then we should have: 
1
1
0
1
1 2 2
6
1
2 6
1
a a a a
n
a
x
n
i
i n < ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ - + + = ￿
=
. 
Or equivalently:  
0 2 2
6
1
2 6
1
1
0
1
1 < ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ - + - = ￿
=
n
i
i n a a a
n
a
x . 
Again consider  0 a ai i - = l  then: 
0 2
2
1
2
3
2
3
2
1
0
1
1 0 < ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ + - + - - ￿
=
na
n
a n
i
i n l l
l
, 
or: 
0 2
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
0 < ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ - + - - ￿
=
n
i
i n n
a l l
l
.     (1.A15)  
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Now, we show that the minimum amount the right hand side is not negative. It is easy to 
show that the minimum of  ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ - ￿
=
n
i
i n
1
2 l l  is  n n l
1 2
1
- -  and the maximum amount of  1 l  is 
2
n l
 then (recall  0
2
1
‡ = - g n a ): 
The RHS of (1.A15)  )
2
1
4
1
(
2 2
3
2
1 1
0 n n n
n
n n
a - + = - - - ‡ l g
l l
. 
Then as long as n > 1 (1.A15) is not valid and in the first segment firm A is a constrained 
monopolist. For the ith step if n > i it is easy to show that firms’ preferred price for each section 
turn to this form: 
( )
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- - + + -
+ -
= ￿
=
0 4 2 4 1
1 3
a a a i n
i n
t
P
n
i k
k n A  and  
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
+ -
- -
+ - =
￿
=
1
2 2
1 3
3
0
i n
a a a
a
t
P
n
i k
k n
j jB  for  i j ,..., 2 , 1 = . 
The location of indifferent customer for the last segment could be calculated as follow 
(with  i n - +2  FOCs): 
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- + - - + + + + -
- +
+ =
-
+ = ￿
=
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 3 2 2
) 1 ( 6
1
2
1
2 2
1
0 i n a i n a a a
i n t
P P
x i
n
i k
k n
A iB
i . 
By following a procedure as before it could be shown that  i i a x ‡  as long as n > i and 
0 ‡ g . It means in this case we again end up with a problem similar to case 1 and firms share 
the market in only the very two extreme segments in the middle. ¤ QED 
Proof of proposition 1: Firm A’s decision to acquire one more unit of information to split the 
segment between any two already known consequent points can be considered as one of these 
two cases (note it is already proved that firm A has no incentive to acquire information on the 
right hand side). 
i) Acquisition of one more information unit for dividing one of the first n-1 segments to two 
equal sub-segments. Since firm A splits one of her loyal segments to two loyal sub-segments, 
then the marginal profit of this segmentation for the firm A is (
k
i i a a ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = - - 2
1
1  where k > 1):  
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( ) ( ) k a a a a
a a a a a a
a a t i i i i
i i i i i i
i i A t p - ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
- + ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ -
+
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
- - = D - -
- - -
1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
2 . 
Where the first two parts are the amounts of extra profit that firm gets from the two sub-
segments and the third part represents the similar amount for the original segment that should be 
subtracted. After simplifying: 
( ) ( ) k a a
t
i i A t p - - = D -
2
1 4
.     (1.A16) 
This shows that firm A’s demand for more information and consequently more precise 
price discrimination in this part (the first n-1 segments) continues as far as the length of pre-
final segments satisfies: 
( )
t
k
a a i i
t
2 1 ‡ - - . 
or equivalently (by substituting 
k
i i a a ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = - - 2
1
1  and  ( ) k k
2
0 t
t = ): 
0
2 4
log
t
t
k £ .     (1.A17) 
This result means the firm has incentive to split a loyal segment, if k satisfies this 
inequality. This is equivalent of minimum length which the firm has incentive to split the 
interval if the loyal interval is bigger than this minimum length. Therefore, the preferred length 
of a loyal segment is 
1
2
1
+
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
k
. 
We also can conclude that the preferred length for every firm’s loyal segment in her turf 
does not depend on the location of the segment and depends only on the transportation and 
information costs and considering (1.A17) and the fact that  { } 0 U ￿ ˛ k  then the preferred 
length for a loyal segment is: 
r
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1          where         œ
ß
œ
Œ
º
Œ
=
0
2 2
log
t
t
r .     (1.A18) 
º ß notation represents the floor function (or the greatest integer). It is clear since it is about the 
length of a loyal segment then the minimum acceptable value for r is 3.  
ii) Acquisition of one more information unit for dividing the nth segment to two equal sub-
segments. Since firm A splits one shared segment to two sub-segments which the left one will  
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be a loyal segment and the right one is a shared segment with her rival, then the marginal profit 
of such segmentation for the firm A is (
k
n a ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = - - 2
1
2
1
1 ): 
( ) k a
t a t a
a
a
t
a
a t
a
a t
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
A
t
p
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - -
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
- + ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
+
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
-
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
+
= D
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
9
8
2
2
1
2
1
9
8
2 4
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
3
2
2
2
1
3
4
, 
or      ( ) k
t
a
t
a
t
k k k n n A t t p - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ -
·
= - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - = D - - 2
1
2
1
2 3 2
1
6 2
1
3
1
2
1 . 
For "k, this marginal profit is negative and shows the firm A’s profit reduces by acquiring 
one more unit of information in this part regardless of information cost. But we should consider 
that the left sub-segment created after this information acquisition all are loyal customers now 
and the possibility of making extra profit by using constrained monopoly power on this sub-
segment should be considered. This possibility can be investigated. Consider (1.A18), assume 
the preferred length of loyal segment is 
r
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1  where  3
2
log
0
2 ‡ œ
ß
œ
Œ
º
Œ
=
t
t
r . It is clear acquiring 
information in this interval is only profitable if r > k; however the following result is true for 
any value of r. By adding the profit of this chain of segmentation the net profit of segmentation 
in the nth segment, (an-1,½], is: 
G - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - -
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
- +
￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - + ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - -
￿
￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
-
￿ ￿
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
-
+
= D
-
-
=
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
￿
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
9
8
2
2
1
2
1
9
8
2 4
1
2 2 4
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
3
2
2
2
1
3
4
n
n
i
n
r n
n
r
n
n
n
n
A
a
t a t
a i
a
a
t
a
a t
a
a t
r
p
,  
or  
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œ
œ
ß
ø
Œ
Œ
º
Ø
G - ￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - = D - - + 1
2
1 2 2
1
6
1
2
1
2
1
12
7
n n r A a a t p ; 
and finally  
œ
ß
ø
Œ
º
Ø
G - ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - = D + 6
1
2
1
12
7
2
1
2
2 r k k A
t
p    (1.19) 
where the information cost is  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ + -
= + = + = G ￿ ￿
-
+ =
+ - -
+ =
+ -
2
1
2 2
2
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1 k r
i k k
r
k i
i
k i
k
r
k i
k i t t t
t t , 
k
n a ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = - - 2
1
2
1
1 , and 
œ
ß
œ
Œ
º
Œ
=
0
2 2
log
t
t
r . 
If the net profit calculated by (1.19) is negative then the segmentation in the nth segment is 
not profitable for firm A. Then the segmentation in the shared segment in firm A’s turf is 
preferred by her as far as (1.19) is non-negative which because of it is importance is discussed 
in the main body of paper. ¤ QED 
Proof of proposition 2: 
We know that the firms only share the customers on the two border segments. Suppose 
Firm A acquires information in her own side such that the last left hand segment is (a,0.5], and 
as it has been proved in proposition 1 she has no incentive to pay for information in the right 
hand side. Then the maximization problems that should be solved simultaneously are: 
Firm A’s profit for (a,0.5]:    ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ -
-
+ = a
t
P P
P
LA B
LA LA 2 2
1
p .   
Firm A’s profit for (0.5,1]:      ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ -
=
t
P P
P
RA B
RA RA 2
p . 
Firm B’s profit for (a,1]:   ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - -
- =
t
P P P
P
RA LA B
B B 2
2
2
1
p . 
Solving the FOCs and the results are: 
t
a
PB ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - =
3 2
1
,    t
a
PLA ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - =
6
7
4
3
, and    t
a
PRA ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - =
6 4
1
. 
And the locations of indifferent customers in these two segments are: 
12
5
8
3 a
xL + =     and    
12 8
5 a
xR - = .  
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These values should satisfy  0 > i P , 
2
1
< < L x a , and  1
2
1
< < R x . 
Since if  3 . 0 > a , then xL will not satisfy its condition. Therefore, for  3 . 0 > a , firm B cannot 
gain from the left hand side. That means if firm A decides to split up (0.25,0.5] then firm B just 
set her price to gain the most possible profit from the right hand side. 
Then we compare the profit of firm A for different possible decisions (the profits are easily 
calculated similar to the result of lemma 2)
12:  
1- No information in left hand side:    0 16
5
t p - =
t
A , 
2- Fully discriminate  œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø
4
1
, 0 :    ( )
2
3
2
1
576
241 0
2
t
p
+
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - = +
r
t r A , and 
3- Fully discriminate  œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø
2
1
, 0 :    ( )
2
3 2
2
1
36
25 0
2
t
p
+
- ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ - = +
r
t r A ; 
where  œ
ß
œ
Œ
º
Œ
=
0
2 2
log
t
t
r . 
If 
r t 96
53 0 £
t
 then the third one provides the largest profit for firm A (the profit on the first 
case exceeds the third one only when 
576
101
‡
t
t
 which is larger than 
16
1
 the upper bound of 
information acquisition decision calculated in proposition 1); then she prefers to fully 
discriminate all the left hand side. In this case firm B’s profit equals to 
9
2t
. ¤ QED 
Appendix 1.B 
In this appendix we replace our assumed form of information cost function with two 
alternative functional forms. Then we represent the changes to the outcomes of the model as a 
result of these changes. Note that lemma 1 and lemma 2 are true regardless of the information 
cost sequence. We focus on how the changes to equation (1.2) changes proposition 1, 
proposition 2, and the outcome of two-stage game. The result is that firms strategically behave 
in the same way. Only the length of the loyal segments and the thresholds on information cost 
calculated in the proofs are different. 
Our two alternative information cost functions are:   
                                                 
12  The length of the loyal segments is calculated with the same rule as equation (1.20).  
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i)  constant information cost:   t t = ) (k  for "k.  
ii) information cost with general functional form of:  
0 ) ( t a t
k k = ,   for   "k.   (1.B1) 
The other two information cost functions (equation (1.2) and the constant information cost) 
are specific cases of (1.C1).
13 
In order to emphasis the changes, we add notations c and g to each equation number that 
changes for constant and general information cost functions respectively. 
Constant information cost:  
Assume equation (1.2) is replaced by:  
t t = ) (k      for     "k. 
Proposition 1: 
The proposition 1 is true for this case. Only because of the change in information cost 
function to a linear cost function the limit on the first rule is different:  
Recall equation (1.A16) the marginal profit of acquiring a unit of information in a loyal 
segment:  
( ) ( ) k a a
t
i i A t p - - = D -
2
1 4
.     (1.A16) 
This equation gives us the limit to the which is now (by substituting 
k
i i a a ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ = - - 2
1
1  and 
( ) t t = k ) equation (1.A17) changes to: 
k
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1
    where   
t 4
log
2
1
2
t
k £ .      (1.A17.c) 
Then the preferred length for a loyal segment is: 
r
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1
         where         œ ß
œ
Œ º
Œ =
t
t
r 2 log
2
1
.    (1.20.c). 
                                                 
13   We decided to have the special case of 
2
1
= a  in the main body of paper, since calculating the closed 
form of some equations which helps to demonstrate our results is more complicated for the general 
functional form of (1.3).  
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The marginal profit of a unit of information on the shared border segment with the length of  
k
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1
 is (note the marginal profit has the same format and only the information cost and the 
preferred length of the loyal segment are different): 
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Then the chain of decision statements in table 1.1 changes to table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Firm A’s chain of decision statements with a constant information cost 
1 - n a   n a   k  Decision statement 
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As it can be seen the information acquisition rules set out in proposition 1 is still true and 
only the upper limit on the information cost changes to 
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1
£
t
t
.  
Proposition 2: 
The first part of the proof to proposition 2 is the same. We have to continue the proof form 
the point where the profits should be compared. We compare the profit of firm A for different 
possible decisions: 
1- No information in left hand side:    t p - =
16
5t
A  
2- Fully discriminate  œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø
4
1
, 0 :    t p ) 1 2 (
2
1
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Obviously the third one provides the largest profit for firm A (the profit on first case 
exceeds the third one only when  14 . 0 ‡
t
t
 that it is larger than the upper bound of information 
acquisition decision calculated on 3.2); then she prefers to fully discriminate all the left hand 
side. In this case firm B’s profit would be equal to 
9
2t
.  
If the constant information cost is considered to be equal to the cost of first unit of 
information in the equation (1.2) ( 0 t t = ) then switching to a constant information cost 
increases the information cost and as a result the limit on the information would be tighter to get 
the same equilibrium outcome. 
Outcome of the game: 
Again similar to the benchmark functional from in the paper; If firm B acquires 
information, firm A’s best response is to do so, irrespective of the information cost. If the other 
firm acquires no information, the best response is to acquire information if the information cost 
is sufficiently low. So if the information cost is sufficiently low, the game becomes a prisoners’ 
dilemma and both firms would prefer to acquire information. This threshold is  024 . 0 =
t
t
.  
Then if  024 . 0 >
t
t
 the game has two Nash equilibria; i) both firms acquire information and 
ii) neither of the firms acquire information. If  024 . 0 £
t
t
, the game becomes a prisoners’ 
dilemma where information acquisition is the dominant strategy for both firms. It is clear form 
the profits that in this case we have excess information acquisition from the firm point of view. 
General information cost function:  
Assume equation (1.2) is replaced by:  
0 ) ( t a t
k k =      for     "k.       (1.3) 
The only restriction that we need to impose on a  is 
4
1
> a  which we will discuss this 
shortly. Note that if 
2
1
= a  then this case is equivalent to (1.2); and if  1 = a , then this 
functional form is equivalent to constant information cost.  
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Proposition 1: 
The proposition 1 is true and only because of the change in information cost function to a 
general cost function the limit on the first rule is different. Recall equation (1.A16) the marginal 
profit of acquiring a unit of information in a loyal segment:  
( ) ( ) k a a
t
i i A t p - - = D -
2
1 4
.     (1.A16) 
Before we go any further, we impose the restriction on this marginal profit to make it a 
decreasing function on k. It is necessary, because it guarantees that when the firm discovered 
that the marginal profit of splitting a loyal segment gets to zero, there is no need to investigate 
the profitability of any finer partition. It can be shown that the sufficient condition for 
decreasing marginal cost is 
4
1
> a . 
This equation gives us the limit to the which is now (by substituting 
k
i i a a ￿
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The marginal profit of a unit of information on the shared border segment with the length of  
k
￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
2
1
 is (note the marginal profit has the same format and only the information cost and the 
preferred length of the loyal segment are different) 
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Then the chain of decision statements in table 1.1 changes as it is demonstrated in table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3: Firm A’s chain of decision statements with a general information cost function 
1 - n a   n a   k  Decision statement 
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As it can be seen the information acquisition rules set out in proposition 1 is still true and 
only the upper limit on the information cost depends on the value of a .  
Proposition 2: 
The first part of the proof to proposition 2 is the same. We have to continue the proof form 
the point where the profits should be compared. We compare the profit of firm A for different 
possible decisions: 
1- No information in left hand side:    0 16
5
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t
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In order to have a result similar to proposition 2 the following inequality must hold: 
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It showed that this inequality holds as long as information cost is small enough that firm 
acquires some information in the first place.  
Appendix 1.C 
Example: Suppose that only one unit of information is available for the firms which costs 
t. This means the only possible strategies for firms are:  
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s1: No information acquisition and charging a uniform price of  1 i P ,  B A i , =  
s2: Acquiring one unit of information and charging 
L
i P2  for [0,0.5] and 
R
i P2  for (0.5,1], 
B A i , =  
We showed that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in general when there was no exogenous 
limit on the number of information units a firm can acquire. But since in this example we 
restrict available information units to one, we need to investigate this matter again. Three 
different cases should be considered. 
Case 1: Both firms choose s1: In this case (no information acquisition) by solving the first 
order condition the equilibrium candidate is  t P P B A = = 1 1  and the profits are  2 / t B A = =p p . 
Firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire information if 
2 2 2 2
1 2
2
2
2
t
t
P t
P
t
P t
P
R
A R
A
L
A L
A
D
A ‡ - ￿ ￿
ł
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￿ ￿
Ł
￿ -
+ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿
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￿ -
+ = t p .    (1.C1) 
The deviation strategy for firm A would be to choose s2 and charge  t P
L
A = 2  and 
2 / 2 t P
R
A =  which gives her the deviation profit of  t p - = 8 5t
D
A . Therefore firm A has 
incentive to deviate in this case if 
8
t
£ t .      (1.C2) 
Case 2: One firm (say A) chooses s1 and the other chooses s2: In this case, by solving the 
first order condition the equilibrium candidate is  2 / 1 t PA =  and  4 / 3 , 4 / 2 2 t P t P
R
B
L
B = =  and 
the profits are  4 / t A = p  and  t p - = 16 / 5t B . We will investigate both firms incentive to 
deviate in this case. 
Firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire information if 
4 2
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+ = t p .    (1.C3) 
The deviation strategy for firm A would be choosing s2 and, by solving (1.C3) for the fist 
order condition, the deviation prices are  8 / 5 2 t P
L
A =  and  8 / 3 2 t P
R
A =  (the boundary conditions 
will be held for these values) that gives her the deviation profit of  t p - = 64 / 17t
D
A . Therefore 
firm A has incentive to deviate in this case if:  
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64
t
£ t .       (1.C4) 
Firm B’s incentive to deviate and choosing s1 depends on whether the following inequality 
holds or not: 
t p - ‡
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B .    (1.C5) 
By solving (1.A23) for the first order condition, the deviation price is  4 / 3 1 t P B =  which 
gives her the deviation profit of  32 / 9t
D
B = p . Therefore firm B has incentive to deviate in this 
case if: 
32
t
‡ t .       (1.C6) 
So if  32 / 64 / t t £ £t  this case has a pure strategy equilibrium and for every other value 
of t  at least one of the firms has incentive to deviate. It worth mentioning that in general when 
there is no external limits on information acquisition (despite this example that only one unit of 
information is available) these two boundaries move towards each other and there will be no 
pure strategy equilibrium. 
Case 3: Both firms choose s2: in this case by solving the first order conditions the 
equilibrium candidate is  3 / , 3 / 2 2 2 t P t P
R
A
L
A = =  and  3 / 2 , 3 / 2 2 t P t P
R
B
L
B = =  and the 
profits are  t p p - = = 18 / 5t B A . Firm A has incentive to deviate, acquire no information and 
charge a uniform price if 
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By solving the first order condition for (1.C7), the deviation price would be calculated as 
2 / 1 t PA =  (the boundary conditions will be satisfied for this value) that gives her the deviation 
profit of  4 / t
D
A = p ; therefore firm A (or firm B) has incentive to deviate in this case if: 
36
t
‡ t .       (1.C8)  
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Summarising our finding ((1.C2), (1.C3), (1.C4), and (1.C8)) from these three cases, we 
can claim that for this example: 
i)  If  8 / t > t  then there is a pure strategy equilibrium of acquiring no information. In other 
words in this case information is too expensive to acquire. The similar condition has 
been shown for the two-stage game in general. 
ii) If  8 / 36 / t t £ £t  then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
iii) If  36 / t < t  then there is a pure strategy equilibrium of acquiring the only unit of 
information available.  
If  8 / 36 / t t £ £t  then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The lower limit on this 
condition is a result of having an exogenous limit on the number of information unit available. 
As it has been shown earlier having this limit removed in general case this lower limit will 
vanish. 
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: If firm B randomises between two strategies with 
probability  1 b  and  2 b  respectively then 
1 2 1 = +b b .       (1.C9) 
So firm A’s profit related to strategies s1 and s2 respectively are: 
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If we concentrate on the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium then we have
14: 
1 1 B A P P = ,   
R
B
L
A P P 2 2 = , and 
L
B
R
A P P 2 2 = . 
Considering these, after some simplifications and solving (1.C10) to (1.C12) 
simultaneously we will get:  
2
1 1
1 1 4
2
b b - -
= =
t
P P B A ,     1
1
1
2 2 3
2 4
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L
A P P P
b
b
-
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= = , and  
1
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1
2 2 3 3
2 4
b b
b
-
-
-
-
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t
P P P A
L
B
R
A . 
Also the mixed strategy equilibrium should make firm A indifferent between two strategies, 
this means: 
2 1 A A p p = .       (1.C13) 
By solving these four equations, the mixed strategy of ( )
R
A
L
A A P P P 2 2 1 1 , , , b  can be 
calculated.
15 
Figure 1.15 shows the value of  1 b  for different ratios of information cost over 
transportation cost. The figure shows that when the information cost is higher, it is significantly 
more likely for the firms to acquire the information in the mixed strategy equilibrium.  
 
                                                 
14  If we want to investigate the existence of asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, different 
probabilities for choosing S1 and S2 should be considered for firm A and for this simple example we 
will end up with 10 equations and 10 unknowns. 
15  To solve for these four equations to find the four unknowns, we use numerical methods and these 
results are the unique possible outcomes.  
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Figure 1.15: The probability of choosing the non-information acquisition strategy  
in the mixed strategy equilibrium 
Figure 1.16 plots the trend of prices and profit as a multiplication of t. As it can be seen, the 
prices are stable for a wide range of information costs; it could be because in this simple 
example only one unit of information is available. By increasing the information cost all prices 
tend to increase, this means the lower the information cost, the more intense the competition. 
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Figure 1.16: The prices and profit in the mixed strategy equilibrium  
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
National Pricing versus Regional Pricing; 
An Investigation into the UK Egg Market 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The theoretical literature suggests that a firm with monopoly power can increase its 
profits through price discrimination when it has sufficient information about customers' 
preferences (Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Varian, 1989; Hamilton and Slutsky, 
2004; and Armstrong, 2006). Predictions are ambiguous about whether third degree 
price discrimination is beneficial or detrimental to consumers; and in general there will 
be some consumers who benefit while others lose out.  
Large supermarket chains that operate at the national level may have considerable 
market power in local markets. Variation in consumer preferences and in the 
demographics of consumers across regions mean that discriminatory pricing is likely to 
be profitable for the firm. The profit maximising price in each region will depend on the 
price and income elasticities of demand in that region, and these may vary substantially. 
It is not clear whether regionally varying prices will be beneficial or detrimental to 
consumers. However, competition authorities have frequently viewed price 
discrimination by firms as detrimental to consumers. For example, in an investigation 
into the UK supermarket industry in 2000 the Competition Commission (CC) suggested  
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that firms should move to uniform pricing. The largest supermarket chain in the UK - 
Tesco - received considerable attention in the CC's investigation. Prior to the 2000 
investigation Tesco practiced regional pricing policy (CC, 2000). Tesco switched to a 
uniform national pricing policy (CC, 2008) at least in part to concerns raised by the 
competition authorities.
1 
In this chapter we consider pricing of a differentiated product, eggs, and estimate 
the impact that a move from regional to uniform pricing would have on Tesco’s prices, 
profits and on consumer surplus in different regions. We consider Tesco as a multi-
product monopolist over eggs. We estimate the degree of substitution between eggs and 
other goods, and between categories of eggs using an AIDS model of consumer 
expenditure, which allows for flexible substitution patterns between different egg 
products, and we allow these to vary across regions. We use farm gate prices as 
instruments for retail prices to allow us to control for the possible endogeneity of prices. 
We hold consumers' choice of supermarket fixed, so assume that it is not influenced by 
the prices of eggs; this gives the supermarket effective monopoly power over the good.  
Our works is related to several lines of research in the literature. Gorman (1980) 
sets out a framework to study the demand for differentiated products, using eggs as an 
example. The discriminatory pricing behaviour of a monopolist with differentiated 
products has also been studied in a number of papers including Pigou (1920), Spence 
(1976), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1989), Schulz and Stahl (1996), and Hamilton and 
Slutsky (2004). Mussa and Rosen (1978) show how the consumer’s choice will be 
affected by firm’s discriminatory pricing policy.  
Another related line of research is the study of effects of regional and national 
pricing on firm’s profit and consumer welfare and behaviour. This has attracted 
attention in both the economics and marketing literatures (i.e. Shepard, 1991; Hoch et 
al, 1995; Slade, 1998; Leslie, 2004; Montgomery, 2004). 
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we describe the theoretical 
framework and the econometric model. Section 2.3 contains a description of data and 
                                                 
1   Our focus in this paper is on Tesco supermarkets. Tesco also operates a chain of smaller convenience 
stores - Tesco Metro and Tesco Express. These also operate a national pricing policy, but at a different 
price level to the supermarkets.  
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some descriptive analysis. Section 2.4 presents our results and section 2.5 summarises 
and concludes. 
2.2. Theoretical Model 
2.2.1. Firm pricing 
We consider a supermarket, Tesco, that operates in r =1,...,R regional markets and 
offers j=1,...,J different products (types of eggs) in each market.
2 The firm's profits at 
period t =1,...,T are given by 
( ) ( ) ￿￿ - - = P
r
rt
j
rt jrt jt jrt t C P q mc p ,   (2.1) 
where pjrt  is the price of product j in region r at period t, 
  mcjt is the marginal cost of product j at period t, 
  qjrt  is the quantity of product j sold in region r at period t, 
  Prt (J · 1) is the vector of prices in region r (jth element is the price of product j) 
at period t, and 
  Crt  is the firm’s fixed cost in region r at period t. 
We assume that the marginal cost of each type of egg is the same across regions. 
Furthermore, regions are considered as separate markets, where the quantity demanded 
in each region is a function of only the prices in that region.  
National pricing 
Tesco currently operates a national pricing policy, which means that pjrt = pjt ; "r,j. 
We consider the firm to act as a monopolist when pricing eggs. The firm sets j prices to 
solve the first-order condition for each of the J products, given by:  
( ) 0 =
¶
¶
- + =
¶
P ¶ ￿￿ ￿
r k j
kr
k k
r
jr
j p
q
mc p q
p
  for   j=1,…,J.  (2.2) 
The economic interpretation of these equations is that an increase in the price of 
product j affects the firm’s profit by (i) decreasing quantity demanded of product j and 
                                                 
2   The number of products offered could differ across regions, but without loss of generality we assume 
that all products are offered in all regions.  
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thus decreasing profits, (ii) increasing the profit margin on each unit of product j sold 
and thus increasing profits, and (iii) increasing the demand for other products and thus 
increasing profits.  
Defining  ￿ =
r
jr j q Q   equation (2.2) can be rewritten as 
( ) 0 =
¶
¶
- +￿ ￿
k r j
kr
k k j p
q
mc p Q     for   j=1,…,J,  (2.3) 
multiplying both sides by  ￿
k
k k
j
Q p
p
 and defining the expenditure share on product j 
over all regions as  ￿
=
k
k k
j j
j Q p
Q p
s , we can write 
( )
0 =
-
+￿ ￿
k r
kjr kr k
k
k k
j s
p
mc p
s l w     for j = 1, …,J ,   (2.4) 
where 
j
jr
jr Q
q
= w  is the quantity share of region r between all regions for product j, and 
 
j kr
kr j
kjr p q
q p
¶
¶
= l  is the jth price elasticity of demand in region r for product k . 
Given estimates of  kjr l , and under the assumption that marginal cost does not vary 
across regions we can solve these to recover marginal costs for each of the j products. 
Regional pricing 
If the firm can price discriminate across regions, then the firm sets j·r prices to 
solve the first-order condition for each of the j products in each of the r regions, given 
by:  
( ) 0 =
¶
¶
- + =
¶
P ¶ ￿
k jr
kr
k kr jr
jr p
q
mc p q
p
    for   j =1,…,J and r =1,…,R.  (2.5) 
As above, these can be rewritten as:  
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( )
0 =
-
+￿
k
kjr kr
kr
k kr
jr s
p
mc p
s l   for   j = 1,…,J and r =1,…,R  (2.6) 
where ( ￿
=
k
kr kr
jr jr
jr q p
q p
s ). We can solve this set of simultaneous equations for the profit 
maximising prices if the firm operated a regional pricing policy (note that this is 
possible because we have assumed that marginal cost is constant across regions). In 
order to do this we need estimates of  kjr l , and in particular of 
j
kr
p
q
¶
¶
. We now turn to 
consider how we obtain estimates of these parameters of consumer demand. 
2.2.2. Consumer behaviour 
We base our model of consumer demand on the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) (see Gorman, 1980; Deaton and Muellbaeur, 1980; Hausman et al, 1994; 
Housman and Leonard, 2007). We estimate a demand system using a three-level 
budgeting model, where the top level corresponds to overall demand for eggs, the 
middle level represents the choice between the two main categories of eggs, and the 
bottom level represent the choice of specific type and size of egg (see figure 2.1 and 
table 2.2). The different categories of eggs are partitioned based on their characteristics.  
This structure implies that the utility that consumers get from the two categories of 
eggs (caged/barn and free-range/organic) are separable, i.e. consumer’s demand for 
eggs within one category is not affected by the level of consumption of eggs within the 
other category. The substitution between goods in one category depends only on the 
prices of goods of that category.    
The multi-stage budgeting model implies that at the top level, the consumer decides 
how much to spend on eggs as a function of income and a price index for eggs. At the 
middle level, the consumer decides how much to allocate to each of two categories as a 
function of the price indexes for each category. Having decided on the allocation of 
expenditure on each category, at the bottom level the consumer decides how to allocate 
this to different eggs in the category as a function the individual prices of all eggs 
within that category.   
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Figure 2.1: The three-level budgeting model 
We consider the utility of a representative consumer from purchasing eggs as a 
separable utility function for the two different categories of eggs, indexed by G = 
caged/barn, free-range
3 
￿ =
G
Grt Grt Grt rt E p v U ) , (     (2.7) 
where  rt U  is the total utility from eggs for region r at period t,  
  Grt v  is the sub-utility from category G eggs for region r at period t,  
  Grt E  is the overall expenditure on category G eggs for region r at period t, and 
  Grt p  is the price vector for category G eggs for region r at period t. 
We start at the bottom level and follow Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) by assuming 
that consumers' indirect utility within each category (G) takes the form: 
( )
( ) ( ) Grt G
Grt Grt
Grt Grt Grt p b
P E
E p v
log
log log
) , (
-
= ,   (2.8) 
                                                 
3   Gorman (1959) shows that the functional form consistent with the multi-stage budgeting model is one 
of the following  (assume only two categories): 
U=F[v1 , f(v2 )]        or      U= v1 +  f(v2 ) 
Where F and f are general continuous functions and f is homogenous of degree one. Gorman rules out the 
cases were there are only two categories; Blackorby & Russell (1997) extend Gorman’s results on 
multi-stage budgeting to the two group cases.   
           
    Small/                       Large/                      Small/     Mixed/       X-Large/       
  Medium                     X-Large                 Medium      Large         Organic 
Eggs                     Other  
                           Products 
Caged/                        Free Range/          
Barn                              Organic 
Full details of products included in each subcategory is given in table2.2.  
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where  ( ) ￿￿ ￿
˛ ˛ ˛
+ + =
G k G j
krt jrt jkr
G j
jrt jr r Grt p p p a a P log log
2
1
log log
*
0 d , and 
  ( ) ( ) ￿
˛
=
G j
jrt r Grt G
jr p p b
b b0 log . 
In order to find the demand equation, we use Roy’s identity, which tells us that 
Grt
Grt
jrt
Grt
jrt
Grt
Grt rt jrt
E
v
p
v
p
E
E p q
¶
¶
¶
¶
- =
¶
¶
= ) , ( , 
and find the uncompensated demand equation for each product j. For each product’s the 
expenditure share within the category in each time period and in every region is 
jrt
G k
krt jkr
Grt
Grt
jr jr jrt p
P
E
s e d b a + + + = ￿
˛
) log( ) log( ;  " j ˛ G &" r =1,…,R ,   (2.9) 
where  jrt s  is the expenditure share of subcategory j in category G eggs for region r at 
period t, 
  Grt E  is the overall expenditure on category G eggs for region r at period t, 
  jrt p  is the average price of subcategory j for region r at period t, 
  Grt P  is the price index of category G for region r at period t,  
 
2
* *
kjr jkr
jkr
d d
d
+
= ,  
  jrt e   is an idiosyncratic error term, and   
  jkr jr jr d b a , ,  are parameters to be estimated.  
As discussed before, Tesco uses a national pricing policy; however, the regional 
variations in prices do not arise from differences in the price schedule but instead from 
differences in consumer choices. We will discuss this issue in more detail later in 
section 2.3.2. 
This equation relates the regional expenditure share for product j in a given 
category to the total expenditure in that category and prices of all goods in the category. 
The  jkr d ’s pick up consumers' willingness to substitute between products.  jr a  differs  
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across products - all else equal, some products will have higher shares than other 
products as a result of differing consumer preferences for products.  
The  jr b  coefficients allows for non-homotheticity. If  jr b  = 0 then the preferences 
are homothetic (as category expenditure increases the share spent on each good remains 
constant), in which case we can aggregate to the second stage without worrying about 
the distribution of income. If  jr b  is positive then the share increases with increased 
expenditure, and if negative then it decreases. In this case in order to exactly aggregate 
we would need to account for the distribution of income across individuals. 
The indirect utility defined in (2.8) implies symmetry in consumer substitution 
patterns ( kjr jkr d d = ) which we can test and impose. In addition, the dependent variable 
is expenditure shares, so for each period they should add up to one ( 1 = ￿
j
jrt s  in (2.9)). 
Consequently, the coefficients are linearly related: 
1 = ￿
j
jr a  the constant coefficients in (2.9); 
0 = ￿
j
jr b  the category expenditure coefficients in (2.9); 
0 = ￿
k
jkr d  the price coefficients in (2.9). 
As it is clear from (2.8) to (2.9) that the exact price index is: 
￿￿ ￿ + + =
k j
jrt krt kjr
k
krt kr r Grt p p p P log log
2
1
log log 0 d a a .   (2.10) 
Using the exact price index involves non-linear estimation, because the coefficients 
appear in the price index. Hausman et al (1994) and others suggest using a Laspeyres 
price index instead, in order to avoid the non-linear estimation: 
jrt
G j
jr Grt p P ￿
˛
= qˆ , where 
￿
˛
=
G k
krt krt
jrt
j p q
q
0 0
0 ˆ q    (2.11) 
and t0 is the index for the base period.  
We estimate demand at the bottom level using both the exact price index defined in 
(2.10) and the Laspeyres approximation defined in (2.11) and show that the results do 
not differ significantly. To implement the exact price index, we use the iterated linear  
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least square (ILLE) suggested by Blundell and Robin (1999). In this algorithm, the 
exact price index in each step of iteration is calculated using the coefficients calculated 
in the previous round. The procedure continues until the coefficients converge. Blundell 
and Robin (1999) show that the ILLE estimator is consistent and efficient. 
In the middle level, demand for each category is modeled in log-log form: 
Grt
H
Hrt GHr Ert Gr Gr Grt P Y Q x j b a + + + = ￿ ) log( ) log( ) log( ,  " r =1,…,R ,  (2.12) 
where  Grt Q  is the quantity of category G eggs for region r at period t, 
  Ert Y  is the total expenditure on eggs for region r at period t , 
       Grt P  is the price index of category G for region r at period t, the Laspeyers price 
index is used for this level. 
       Grt x  is an idiosyncratic error term, and 
       GHr Gr Gr j b a , ,  are parameters to be estimated. 
We impose symmetry in the substitution patterns at this level as well ( r HG GHr j j = ).  
The separability assumption, used in multi-stage budgeting described in equations 
(2.9) and (2.11), implies that the expenditure shares within a category depend only on 
the category’s expenditure and the prices in that category. Category expenditure 
depends on the total expenditure on eggs and the prices for all categories through a price 
index. Our model allows a very flexible substitution pattern for different egg products in 
the same category. However, the substitution between categories of eggs in different 
categories is restricted. A price change for one subcategory of eggs affects the 
expenditure share on eggs in another category only through the second level demand 
function. Furthermore, this price change affects the demand for all the eggs in the other 
category the same way. We will discuss the difference between the cross-price 
elasticities for products within the same category and products in two different 
categories in more detail in the next section. 
At the top level we use a log-log demand function: 
rt rt r rt r r rt Y Q z p u g a + + + = ) log( ) log( ) log( ,    " r =1,…,R ,  (2.13) 
where  rt Q  is the total number of eggs sold at region r at period t,  
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  rt Y  is the total expenditure on supermarket goods for region r at period t , 
  rt p  is the price index of eggs for region r at period t with the general form of 
￿ =
G
Grt Gr rt P r p ˆ ; we also use a Laspeyres price index. 
  rt z  is an idiosyncratic error term, and 
  r r r u g a , ,  are parameters to be estimated. 
In this paper we use the total expenditure of households on supermarket goods as 
proxy for income.  
In equation (2.9) the prices of different subcategories of eggs appear on the right 
hand side. This raises possible concerns about endogeneity - prices may be correlated 
with shocks to demand ( ( ) [ ] 0 , log „ jrt rt p E e , where  rt p  is the vector of prices in region 
r). The correlation between prices and shocks might arise because shocks to expenditure 
share for j, which are captured in  jrt e , may also affect the way that other goods are 
priced. For example, there might be an advertising campaign to promote j which may 
also affect the expenditure share of k. If this is the case then OLS estimates of  jkr d  will 
not be consistent. 
The solution is to find instrumental variables ( t z ) that are correlated with  rt p  
( ( ) [ ] 0 , log „ t rt z p E ) but are not correlated with  jrt e , so that  [ ] 0 , = jrt t z E e . In other 
words, we must be able to exclude  t z  from equation (2.9), so it has to be the case that it 
has no direct effect on  jrt s  and its only effect on  jrt s  is through  rt p . 
We use data on the cost of different categories of eggs at the farm gate and time 
dummies as instruments. We implement this by running a first stage regression relating 
price to cost and time dummies, of the form: 
jrt
i
it ijr t jr
Grt
Grt
jr jr jrt c
P
E
p V h h m j + + G + ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
+ = ￿ ) log( log ) log( 0 ,   (2.14) 
where  jrt p  is the average price of subcategory j for region r at period t, 
  it c  is the farm-gate cost of product i at period t ,  
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  t G  is the vector of seasonal and annual time dummies,  
  Grt E  is the overall expenditure on category G eggs for region r at period t, 
  Grt P  is the price index of category G for region r at period t,  
  rt V  is an idiosyncratic error term, and  
  ijr jr jr jr h h m j , , , 0  are parameters to be estimated. 
The projected prices are then used in place of actual prices to estimate the lower 
level demand system.  
As mentioned before, for our instruments (the farm-gate prices of eggs and seasonal 
and annual time dummies) to be valid, we must believe that the expenditure share for 
eggs – and consequently the error terms on (2.9) – are not correlated to these. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the expenditure share of different categories of egg does not 
vary by farm-gate prices but these costs almost certainly affect price. Our data shows 
that the farm-gate prices on average count for about 35% of final prices.   
The instruments that may cause concern are the seasonal and annual dummies. It 
seems obvious that because of the nature of the poultry industry and storage conditions, 
egg prices are seasonally affected. However our data does not show a similar correlation 
between the dependent variable in (2.9) and seasonal and annual dummies. Figure 2.2 
shows the expenditure shares for our bottom level products in the London region. A 
seasonal pattern in these variables is not observed.  Furthermore, we also investigated 
the effect of exclusion of time dummies from (2.12) and including them in (2.9). The 
coefficients for time dummies were not significant. And our results are robust even by 
omitting them from our instruments.   
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Figure 2.2. Trend of egg categories’ expenditure shares over time in the London region 
2.2.3. Price Elasticities 
We start by considering the conditional (on category expenditure) price elasticities 
(these are uncompensated or Marshallian price elasticities). We then calculate the 
unconditional price elasticities, incorporating the parameters from the multi-level 
demand system described in equations (2.9), (2.12), and (2.13). For simplicity we 
ignored the index r for all of the parameters and variables in the equations in this 
section.  
Conditional Price Elasticities 
We find the conditional (on category expenditure) own-price elasticity from 
equation (2.9) and it is given by: 
1
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¶
¶
=
j
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j
j
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q d
l ,      (2.15) 
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Recall that  j s  represents the expenditure share of subcategory j eggs in the category and 
E ˆ  is the overall expenditure of the category. 
The conditional (on category expenditure) cross-price elasticities within a category 
is given by ( j & k˛ G) (taking derivative of equation (2.9)): 
j
jk
k
j
jk s p
q d
l =
¶
¶
=
ln
ln
,    (2.16) 
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k j
j k j j
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. 
Unconditional Price Elasticities 
The unconditional own-price elasticity is given (for j is a sub-category in the 
category G or j ˛ G) by:  
( ) ( )
1
1 ˆ
1
ˆ
- ￿ ￿
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where 
G
j
j Q
q
d =  is the quantity share of subcategory j in category G, and 
 
Q
Q
d
G
G =  is the quantity share of category G in total number of eggs. 
The unconditional cross-price elasticity within a category is given by ( j & k˛ G): 
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The unconditional cross-price elasticities between two categories is given by: ( j˛ G 
& k˛ H):  
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The detailed calculations are presented in appendix 2.A.   
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Equations (2.18) and (2.19) demonstrate the difference between the cross-price 
elasticities for products within a category and between two categories. Equation (2.18) 
has two components: the first term has the same form as the conditional cross-price 
elasticities (equation (2.16)) which represent the flexible pattern of substitution within a 
category, and the second term, which is made up from the middle and top level 
coefficients (the income elasticities and the price elasticities from the middle and top 
level). However, the cross price-elasticity for products in two different categories 
(equation (2.19)) has only one term, which is similar to the second term of (2.18). More 
importantly, holding the j index constant, the cross-price elasticity for all k’s products 
have almost the same representation. 
2.3. Data 
We use data from the TNS Worldpanel
4 on eggs purchased and brought into the 
home by over 20,000 households in the UK over the period December 2001 to 
December 2004. The data include the prices paid, quantities purchased, and product 
characteristics. Participants record purchases using a hand-held scanner in the house. 
Participants are compensated by vouchers which they can spend on durable items. We 
consider the variation in demand behaviour across ten regions of the UK - London, the 
Midlands, the North East, Yorkshire, Lancashire, the South, Scotland, Anglia, Wales 
and the West, and the South West. Eggs are classified by three characteristics: size, 
type, and brand. 
2.3.1. Characteristics 
Size  
Four sizes of eggs are sold in the UK: small, medium, large, and extra large. Eggs 
can be purchased in single sized or mixed size packages. Small eggs weigh less than 53 
grams, medium between 53 and 63 grams, large between 63 and 73 grams, and extra 
large eggs more than 73 grams (BEIS, 2009).  There are also mixed size packages 
which might include eggs from several categories.  
Mixed size packages present a difficulty. While consumers are able to compare the 
size of eggs easily with other eggs available in the store, we do not observe the size of 
                                                 
4    Described at <http://www.tnsglobal.com/market-research/fmcg-research/consumer-panel>.   
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eggs in mixed packages. In the data packages of mixed size eggs appear to be very 
heterogeneous. For example, looking at the price of caged eggs in Tesco, the mixed 
budget eggs have a price that is similar to the small/medium range, however standard 
and private brand mixed eggs seems to be more like large/extra large eggs. Figure 2.3 
shows prices for these different categories. We use this information to inform the way 
we categorise eggs.  
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Figure 2.3. Average price of caged eggs at Tesco 
Type 
One of the main characteristics that defines eggs is the welfare of the chicken and 
the way they are fed. Caged or battery eggs are produced by hens kept in cages. 
Standards are in place regarding the area of cage per bird, number of tiers, food and 
water supply equipments, and dropping passes. Barn eggs are produced by birds kept in 
a hen house which has a series of perches and feeders at different levels. Free range 
eggs are laid by hens that have continuous daytime access to runs which are mainly 
covered with vegetation and with a maximum stocking density of 2,500 birds per 
hectare. Hens producing organic eggs are always free range. In addition, hens must be 
fed an organically produced diet and ranged on organic land. 
Budget or Value Brand 
In general brand names are not very important in the egg market. However, Tesco 
offers a value private brand of egg alongside its own standard brand and other brands. 
Branded eggs sold at Tesco account for 18.7% of the total volume and 24% of total 
value.   
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Cost 
The data on cost of each type of egg comes from the British Egg Association. These 
data shows the average farm-gate price of each type and size of egg for each quarter. 
We use these costs as instruments for prices when we estimate the demand system. The 
marginal cost that we calculate includes not only these costs but also distribution and 
retail costs. 
2.3.2. Descriptive Analysis 
We observe over £1m worth of eggs purchased in Tesco in the three years of data 
that we use. Table 2.1 shows the volume of eggs purchased by type and size. Of all eggs 
sold in Tesco, by far the largest share are caged eggs, followed by free-range, barn and 
then organic. By size the largest category is the mixed size packages, followed by large, 
medium and extra large. Small represent a negligible share of eggs purchased.  
Table 2.1. Distribution of eggs purchased in Tesco, Dec 2001 – Dec 2004  
  Caged  Barn  Free-range  Organic  Total  % 
Small  65  33  21  0  119  0.0% 
Mixed  535385  8124  30582  690  574781  52.3% 
Medium  21605  54393  95609  12404  184011  16.7% 
Large  25592  63854  100923  13600  203969  18.5% 
Extra large  129052  7206  564  0  136822  12.4% 
Total  711699  133610  227699  26694  1099702   
%  64.7%  12.1%  20.7%  2.4%     
Notes: Data are from TNS Worldpanel and include all households observed. The figures are the number 
of eggs purchased at Tesco from Dec 2001 to Dec 2004 in TNS data.  
Based on the characteristics described above, and an inspection of the average price, 
we categorise eggs into five categories, as defined in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2. Categories of eggs  
Caged and Barn   
1) Small / Medium / Mixed (Value)  Caged-Small, Caged-Medium, Cage-Mixed-Value, Barn-Small , Barn-
Medium 
 
2) Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other)  Caged-Mixed-Standard, Caged-Branded, Caged-Large, Caged-XLarge, 
Barn-Mixed, Barn-Large, Barn-XLarge 
 
Free Range and Organic   
3) Small/Medium (Value)  Free Range-Small, Free Range-Medium-Value, Free Range-Medium-
Standard 
 
4) Mixed/Medium (Branded)/ Large  Free Range-Small-Standard, Free Range-Mixed-Standard, Free Range-
Medium-Branded, Free Range-Large 
 
5) Branded/XLarge/Organic  Free Range-Mixed-Branded, Free Range-XLarge, Organic all sizes 
Table 2.3 shows the regional distribution of purchases of eggs at Tesco. London, 
Midlands, and the South regions, which are the most populated areas, have the highest 
level of expenditure on eggs, while the North East has the smallest share with just 1.7% 
share. Looking at the shares of different categories of eggs purchased in different region 
we see that there are significant differences in consumer taste for different categories of 
eggs across the regions. For example, while category 1 eggs (Caged and Barn: Small / 
Medium / Mixed (Value)) account for 24.8% of expenditure on eggs in the North East, 
it accounts for more than twice as much in the South West, where the share is 51.4%. 
For category 5 eggs (Free Range Branded/XLarge and Organic) the expenditure shares 
vary from 6.1% for the South West to 12.7% for London.  
Share 
We aggregate the data on egg purchases across households to construct the regional 
share of each subcategory of egg. The exact expression is 
￿￿
￿
˛
=
G j h
jrht
h
jrht
jrt e
e
s ;    "j˛G    (2.20) 
where  jrt s  is the expenditure share of subcategory j in category G eggs in region r and 
period t, and   
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  jrht e  is expenditure of household h on subcategory j eggs in region r and period t. 
Table 2.3. The summary of Tesco regional egg sales 
Expenditure share (%) 
Caged & Barn  Free Range 
Region 
Volume 
(#) 
Expenditure 
(£) 
Small / 
Medium / 
Mixed 
(Value) 
Large / 
XLarge / 
Mixed 
(Other) 
Small/ 
Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ 
Medium 
(Branded)/Lar
ge 
Branded/ 
XLarge/ 
Organic 
1 : London  243,767  25,790  33.9%  29.5%  9.1%  14.8%  12.7% 
2 : Midlands  168,328  16,829  41.2%  26.1%  8.8%  13.5%  10.3% 
3 : North East  17,434  1,932  24.8%  36.8%  11.1%  15.7%  11.5% 
4 : Yorkshire  69,103  6,766  42.4%  24.0%  7.7%  18.9%  7.0% 
5 : Lancashire  96,270  9,789  39.0%  25.5%  10.1%  14.6%  10.8% 
6 : South  156,300  15,614  39.8%  25.5%  9.4%  15.9%  9.4% 
7 : Scotland  89,459  8,735  39.5%  25.9%  9.8%  18.2%  6.6% 
8 : Anglia  108,725  10,911  40.1%  27.9%  9.1%  12.0%  10.9% 
9 : Wales & West  104,721  10,713  38.0%  26.1%  10.5%  16.6%  8.8% 
10 : South West  45,595  4,116  51.4%  20.3%  11.0%  11.2%  6.1% 
Total  1,099,702  111,195  38.7%  26.8%  9.4%  15.0%  10.1% 
Price  
The average regional price is recovered by dividing the total expenditure on eggs 
over the number of eggs in each subcategory 
￿
￿
=
h
jrht
h
jrht
jrt q
e
p ;    "j˛G    (2.21) 
where  jrt p  is the average price of subcategory j in category G eggs in region r and 
period t,  
  jrht e  is expenditure of household h on subcategory j eggs in region r and period t, 
and  
  jrht q  is the quantity of eggs purchased by household h on subcategory j eggs in 
region r and period t.   
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In 3 cases, for one of the subcategories of the free range eggs we do not observe any 
purchases and we exclude these observations from the sample. Two of these cases are 
for the North East region and the third one is for the South West.
5 
Since Tesco used a national pricing policy for the period of the study we expect that 
the price of eggs should be the same across regions. However some small regional 
variations are observed (see table 2.B1). Variation in prices across regions arises for two 
main reasons. First, stores in different regions might put eggs on sale at different times 
or with different frequency. Promotions are rarely used for the eggs, so this first source 
of variation is not important. Second, each subcategory j includes several different types 
and sizes of eggs, which might also be available in different pack sizes (see table 2.2). 
We aggregate over these products to measure the average price for each subcategory of 
eggs. However, the shares of different products in each subcategory vary over the time. 
One reason for this could be changes in the menu of eggs on offer in Tesco nationwide 
or in some region. For example, Tesco might decide to replace its own brand of large 
caged eggs in packs of 15 with a similar egg in packs of 9. Due to non-linear pricing for 
different pack sizes of eggs this would lead to price variation. The lead to a problem of 
selection bias: if the price of a certain type of egg changes in a given period, then 
consumers might buy this product when it is relatively cheaper. In this case, the average 
price observed in our data is different from the average price of products on shelves. We 
do not tackle this problem here. 
Expenditure 
As discussed above, total expenditure of households on supermarket goods is used 
as proxy for income. In order to calculate this we aggregate all households’ expenditure 
in each region for each period. Table 2.B1 contains summary statistics of all variables 
used in the regressions. 
                                                 
5   The issue of missing observations can be tackled using two different approaches. When no purchase is 
reported for a subcategory in a region in one period it can be because of one of these two reasons:  
     i) The subcategory was not available in that region in the given period. Based on this assumption the 
observation should be excluded.  
    ii) The product was available but none of the consumer actually preferred that over other products. If 
this approach was accepted then the observation should be kept in the sample. 
    In this case, since the aggregation is performed over purchases of a number of households over a 
month, the first approach seems more reasonable.   
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2.4. Results 
In this section we present the results of the demand system estimation and discuss 
the application of these to analyse the impact on firm profits and consumer welfare of 
national and regional pricing policies.  
2.4.1. Demand System Estimates 
We start with the bottom level results. Table 2.4 presents the estimated coefficients 
for equations (2.9) (the bottom level of the demand system) for caged and barn eggs in 
the London region. The estimation is performed twice using two different price indexes. 
The first estimation is performed using a Laspeyres form approximate price index (as 
shown in equation (2.10)). For the second estimation an exact price index, as shown in 
equation (2.11), is used. As discussed above, the second estimation has been performed 
using the ILLE suggested by Blundell and Robin (1999). The results for the other nine 
regions are presented in appendix 2.B in tables 2.B2 and 2.B3. The statistical tests show 
that the results from the two estimations have no significant difference.  
Table 2.4. London: bottom level results for Caged and Barn using two different price indexes 
Price index used:  approximate price index   exact price index  
Dep var: share of 
expenditure on product  
Small / Medium /  
Mixed (Value) 
Large / XLarge /  
Mixed (Other) 
Small / Medium /  
Mixed (Value) 
-0.991  -  -0.973  Constant  (0.305)  -  (0.327) 
0.080  -  0.080  Log (E / P)  (0.034)  -  (0.036) 
-0.697  -  -0.726 
Log (p1)  (0.178)  -  (0.191) 
0.358  -  0.473 
Log (p2)  (0.171)  -  (0.189) 
-2.316  -1.762   
Conditional Price Elasticity  (0.336)  (0.364)   
R
2 = 0.647;          adj-R
2 = 0.602;         Joint significance; F stat (p-value) =  1.67 (0.192)          
Homotheticity test; F stat (p-value) = 5.75 (0.022). 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. Each regression includes 37 observations. (E / P) is the total of 
expenditure caged and barn eggs in each month over the caged and barn price index, p1 is the average 
price of Small / Medium / Mixed (Value) for caged and barn eggs in each month, and p2 is the average 
price of Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other) for caged and barn eggs in each month. 
The standard errors reported in the tables have been corrected for the use of a 
constructed estimator (the two-stage IV estimation) following Davidson and Mackinnon 
(2004). The sign and significance of the coefficients are informative, but the coefficients  
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themselves are not easily interpreted. In the last row we report the conditional (on 
category expenditure) own price elasticities (equation 2.15), which are calculated based 
on the estimated coefficients. Note that the expenditure elasticity in these tables is the 
elasticity of expenditure shares (not quantities) and can be negative or positive. The own 
and cross price elasticities are expected to be negative and positive respectively.  
The tests for homotheticity of expenditure shares have been performed and the 
statistics are reported in table 2.B2 for all regions. The test rejects the null hypothesis of 
preference homotheticity for four out of ten regions. However, even for these four 
regions the coefficients are ranged from 7.1% to 9.5%, which are relatively small. 
The estimation results of the bottom level for free range eggs (equation (2.9)) in the 
London region are reported in Table 2.5. Similarly, the estimation is performed twice 
using the two different price indexes. The results for all ten regions are included in 
appendix 2.B. The statistical tests show no significant difference between the two 
models.  
Table 2.5. London: bottom level results for Free range 
Price index used:  Approximate price index   exact price index  
Dep var: share of 
expenditure on product 
Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
Branded/ 
XLarge/ Organic 
Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
0.145  -0.292  -  0.101  -0.222 
Constant  (0.163)  (0.192)  -  (0.255)  (0.302) 
-0.092  0.112  -  -0.072  0.113  Log (E / P)  (0.029)  (0.028)  -  (0.045)  (0.043) 
-1.048  0.093  -  -1.035  0.090  Log (p3)  (0.159)  (0.130)  -  (0.279)  (0.102) 
0.093  -0.348  -  0.090  -0.324  log (p4)  (0.130)  (0.320)  -  (0.102)  (0.536) 
0.955  0.255  -  0.945  0.234  log (p5)  (0.159)  (0.320)  -  (0.279)  (0.536) 
-5.174  -1.872  -4.457      Conditional Price 
Elasticity  (0.632)  (0.803)  (0.941)     
R
2 = 0.596;          adj-R
2 = 0.560;          Joint significance; F stat (p-value) = 10.5 (0.000). 
Homotheticity test; F stat (p-value) = 6.06 (0.193)          Symmetry test; F stat (p-value) = 1.62 (0.004). 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. Each regression includes 37 observations. (E / P) is the total 
expenditure on free-range and organic eggs in each month over the appropriate free-range and organic 
price index, p3 is the average price of Small / Medium (Budget) for free-range eggs in each month, p4 is 
the average price of Mixed / Medium (Branded) / Large free-range eggs in each month, and p5 is the 
average price of Branded / XLarge for free-range and all Organic eggs in each month. Symmetry in cross-
price coefficients is imposed. 
The results for homotheticity test are included at the bottom of table 2.B4. Only in 
three regions the homotheticity assumptions are rejected. In order to perform test of  
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symmetry for cross-price coefficients (djkr = dkjr) in (2.9), we first estimate this equation 
without imposing symmetry restrictions. Then the statistical tests are performed to 
determine whether these coefficients are significantly different or not. The results show 
that symmetry is rejected only in one out of ten regions, which supports the imposition 
of symmetry restrictions.  
Table 2.6 shows the conditional (on category expenditure) own-price elasticities by 
region. These elasticities are calculated based on equation (2.15). 
Table 2.6. Conditional own price elasticities for bottom level, by region 
Caged & barn    Free range 
Region  Small / Medium /  
Mixed (Value) 
Large / XLarge /  
Mixed (Other) 
  Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
Branded/ XLarge/ 
Organic 
-2.316  -1.762    -5.174  -1.872  -4.457 
1 : London  (0.336)  (0.364)    (0.632)  (0.803)  (0.941) 
-1.624  -2.048    -4.866  -2.099  -4.042  2 : Midlands  (0.330)  (0.466)    (0.935)  (1.195)  (1.185) 
-1.085  -1.714    -5.919  -5.225  -2.740  3 : North East  (0.582)  (0.364)    (1.469)  (1.577)  (1.238) 
-2.305  -2.762    -5.456  -3.138  -5.860  4 : Yorkshire  (0.347)  (0.384)    (1.253)  (0.750)  (1.027) 
-1.596  -2.730    -1.268  -6.704  -8.720  5 : Lancashire  (0.384)  (0.482)    (0.631)  (0.932)  (1.155) 
-2.385  -2.590    -2.425  -4.130  -6.680  6 : South  (0.358)  (0.457)    (0.537)  (0.910)  (0.819) 
-2.764  -4.004    -1.789  -1.495  -1.527  7 : Scotland  (0.356)  (0.460)    (0.886)  (0.438)  (0.632) 
-2.290  -1.582    -2.453  -3.990  -5.034  8 : Anglia  (0.405)  (0.490)    (0.504)  (0.983)  (0.994) 
-1.579  -1.010    -2.605  -2.126  -4.495  9 : Wales & West  (0.340)  (0.504)    (0.377)  (0.341)  (0.605) 
-1.433  -1.415    -2.761  -2.095  -4.138 
10 : South West  (0.276)  (0.725)    (0.934)  (1.260)  (1.073) 
 Note: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. 
The results for the middle level (equation (2.12)) in the London region are presented 
in table 2.7 (the results for other nine region are included in appendix 2.B, table 2.B6). 
Since a log-log specification is used at this level, the estimated coefficients are directly 
interpreted as the own and cross-price elasticities for the two categories. The own-price 
elasticities for caged/barn category are ranged from 0.686 to 1.976 and for free range 
eggs are ranged from 1.021 to 5.144 across the regions. The own-price elasticities are 
significantly higher for free range eggs than caged/barn eggs in seven out of ten regions. 
In the remaining three regions (Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the South West) they are not 
significantly different.   
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Table 2.7. London: middle level results 
Dep var: log of category’s 
quantity 
Caged /  Barn   Free Range 
1.421  1.502 
Constant  (0.196)  (0.206) 
1.083  0.906  Log (Y E)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
-1.100  0.172  Log (PC)  (0.091)  (0.101) 
0.172  -1.966  Log (PF)  (0.101)  (0.254) 
R
2 = 0.972;          adj-R
2 = 0.969;           
Joint significance; F stat (p-value) = 31.04 (0.000) 
Homogeneity Test; F stat (p-value) = 8.23   (0.001)  
Symmetry Test; F stat (p_value) = 0.86 (0.357) 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. Each region’s regression includes 
37 observations. YE is the total expenditure on eggs in each region, PC is the 
price index for caged / Barn eggs in each month, PF  is the price for free-
range / organic eggs in each month.  
The homogeneity test results are included in table 2.B6. The null hypothesis of 
homogeneity is rejected in three of the ten regions. The symmetry assumptions for the 
cross-price elasticities can not be rejected for any of the ten regions, which supports the 
imposition of symmetry restrictions. 
Table 2.8 shows the result of the top level regressions (equation (2.12)) for all 
regions. Since this is a log-log specification the coefficients are directly interpreted as 
the overall income and price elasticities for eggs. All coefficients at this level are 
significant. The income elasticities are around one (ranged from 0.973 to 1.257), the 
null hypothesis of homogeneity is only rejected in one of ten regions (The South West). 
The price elasticities range from 1.353 (Wales) to 3.281 (South West).  
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Table 2.8. Income and price elasticities for the top level 
Region  Constant 
Income elas. 
log (Y) 
Price elas. 
log(p) 
R
2  Adj R
2 
Joint sig-
nificance  
F stat 
(p-value) 
Homo.; 
F Stats 
(p-value)  
-3.597  1.055  -3.026  257.9  1.06 
1 : London  (0.632)  (0.054)  (0.201)  0.938  0.935  (0.000)  (0.310) 
-3.362  1.038  -1.928  274.3  0.65  2 : Midlands  (0.541)  (0.048)  (0.168)  0.942  0.938  (0.000)  (0.426) 
-3.336  1.018  -3.024  60.7  0.04  3 : North East  (0.897)  (0.096)  (0.385)  0.781  0.768  (0.000)  (0.843) 
-2.509  0.954  -2.320  149.7  0.51  4 : Yorkshire  (0.673)  (0.064)  (0.199)  0.898  0.892  (0.000)  (0.480) 
-3.320  1.029  -1.650  285.6  0.38  5 : Lancashire  (0.505)  (0.046)  (0.156)  0.943  0.941  (0.000)  (0.542) 
-2.661  0.973  -2.187  217.7  0.25  6 : South  (0.621)  (0.055)  (0.187)  0.928  0.923  (0.000)  (0.620) 
-3.091  1.011  -2.441  107.1  0.02  7 : Scotland  (0.860)  (0.080)  (0.243)  0.863  0.855  (0.000)  (0.888) 
-2.748  0.980  -2.254  234.9  0.16  8 : Anglia  (0.536)  (0.049)  (0.183)  0.933  0.929  (0.000)  (0.692) 
-3.705  1.064  -1.353  281.9  1.94  9 : Wales & West  (0.503)  (0.046)  (0.172)  0.943  0.940  (0.000)  (0.173) 
-5.366  1.257  -3.281  109.7  6.66  10 : South West  (0.992)  (0.100)  (0.350)  0.866  0.858  (0.000)  (0.014) 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors; for the F test results numbers in ( ) are p-values. Each 
regression includes 37 observations on 10 regions. Dependent variable is the log of quantity of eggs 
bought in region.  
Table 2.9 shows the unconditional own-price elasticities, which are calculated using 
(2.15). The unconditional own-price elasticities for different categories and different 
regions vary between -8.756 and -1.113. These seem high, but note that eggs are highly 
substitutable differentiated products. Two well-known papers studying differentiated 
product demand systems for food products are Hausman et al (1994) and Nevo (2001). 
Hausman et al (1994) uses a similar method to study the beer industry and reports 
unconditional own-price elasticities in the region of -6.205 and -3.763. Nevo (2001) 
studies the ready-to-eat cereals industry using a discrete choice model. His reported 
median own-price elasticities vary between -4.252 and -2.277. Our results are slightly 
higher, but comparable with both papers. 
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Table 2.9. Unconditional own-price elasticities 
  Caged & barn     Free range 
Region  Small / Medium / 
Mixed (Value) 
Large / XLarge 
/Mixed (Other) 
Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
Branded/ XLarge/ 
Organic 
-2.559  -1.905  -5.387  -2.478  -4.808 
1 : London  (0.336)  (0.364)  (0.632)  (0.804)  (0.941) 
-1.520  -1.616  -5.324  -2.715  -5.118  2 : Midlands  (0.330)  (0.466)  (0.935)  (1.195)  (1.186) 
-1.236  -2.052  -6.621  -6.637  -3.204  3 : North East  (0.582)  (0.365)  (1.470)  (1.578)  (1.238) 
-2.139  -2.695  -5.199  -2.427  -5.632  4 : Yorkshire  (0.348)  (0.384)  (1.254)  (0.750)  (1.027) 
-1.705  -2.796  -1.301  -6.734  -8.756  5 : Lancashire  (0.384)  (0.482)  (0.631)  (0.932)  (1.155) 
-2.665  -2.716  -2.756  -4.742  -7.109  6 : South  (0.358)  (0.457)  (0.537)  (0.910)  (0.819) 
-2.694  -3.961  -2.109  -1.980  -1.613  7 : Scotland  (0.356)  (0.460)  (0.887)  (0.438)  (0.632) 
-2.705  -1.777  -3.045  -5.234  -7.833  8 : Anglia  (0.405)  (0.491)  (0.504)  (0.983)  (0.995) 
-1.809  -1.113  -2.926  -2.726  -4.807  9 : Wales and West  (0.340)  (0.504)  (0.379)  (0.343)  (0.606) 
-2.512  -1.688  -2.886  -2.375  -4.260  10 : South West  (0.276)  (0.725)  (0.935)  (1.261)  (1.073) 
Note: The table contains unconditional price elasticities based on equation (2.17) and parameters estimated for 
equation (2.9), (2.12), and (2.13). Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. 
As an example to compare the own-price elasticities between two categories, we 
consider the most popular subcategory in each of the two categories. These are the first 
subcategory (Small / Medium / Mixed (Value)) of caged/barn eggs and the second 
subcategory (Mixed/ Medium (Branded)/Large) of free-range eggs. The free-range 
subcategory displays significantly higher own-price elasticities than caged and barn 
subcategory in five regions (The North East, Lancashire, the South, Anglia, and Wales 
and the West). In the remaining five regions the own-price elasticities are not 
significantly different for these two subcategories. A similar pattern of higher own-price 
elasticities for free range comparing to caged/barn eggs is also observed across other 
subcategories.  
2.4.2. Marginal Costs 
In order to compute the regional profit maximizing profits, we first need to find the 
marginal costs for each category of egg. The marginal costs are assumed to be constant 
across regions. First the unconditional own and cross-price elasticities for each region  
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have been calculated using (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19). Then, the marginal costs are 
recovered using equation (2.4).
6 
Table 2.10 summarises the marginal costs that are backed out of the model 
(averaged over the 37 months of study) and compares them to the farm gate costs.  
Table 2.10. Estimated marginal costs and farm gate prices 
  Caged & barn    Free range     
 
Small / Medium / 
Mixed (Value) 
Large / XLarge 
/Mixed (Other) 
Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
Branded/ XLarge/ 
Organic 
Estimated marginal 
costs 
         
Mean  3.24  4.34  7.64  9.15  14.15 
SD  0.24  0.24  0.69  0.95  1.39 
Min  2.94  3.89  5.08  6.18  12.03 
Max  3.62  4.69  9.34  10.04  16.72 
           
Farm gate prices           
Mean  2.28  4.30  4.38  5.73  7.03 
SD  0.29  0.25  0.21  0.27  0.33 
Min  1.75  3.81  4.07  5.30  6.51 
Max  2.74  4.66  4.85  6.21  7.66 
Notes: prices are in Pence, data reported for 37 months 
The average estimated marginal cost is higher than the farm gate price, 
which is reassuring. The gap between the estimated marginal costs and the farm 
gate prices is larger for free range eggs then caged and barn eggs. This may 
partly be due to the fact that the former are usually offered in smaller pack size, 
which are made of higher quality packaging materials. Another fact contributing 
to the gap may be the share of branded eggs in each category. For example, non-
Tesco branded eggs count only for 1.4% of sale of Caged & Barn 
Small/Medium/Mixed, while the same figure for Free Range 
Branded/XLarge/Organic is 54.7%. It seems reasonable that supermarket pay 
more for branded products compared to their own brands. 
                                                 
6   Following (2.4) in order to recover the marginal costs; first assume Er (5·5) is the price elasticity 
matrix calculated for region r. We define the weighted price elasticity matrix as  ￿ =
r
r rE E w  (where 
r w  is a (5·5) matrix and its components are the quantity share of region r between all regions for 
product j as  ( )
j
jr
r Q
q
k j = , w ). We calculate the vector  ( ) t t S I E E V + =
-1  where  t S  (5·1) is the vector 
of expenditure shares at period t. Define  t P  (5·1) as the vector of national prices at time t, then the 
marginal costs of product j at period t can be written as:  ( ) ( ) ( ) j S j P j V mc t t t jt / ￿ = .  
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2.4.3. Profit maximising prices 
Using the estimated marginal costs, we turn our attention to equation (2.6), which 
defines the firm’s profit maximisation problem. We solve this equation using numerical 
methods. Note that as a result of a change in the vector of prices, all quantities 
demanded will also change. The expenditure share of each category is therefore a 
function of prices. The price elasticities in (2.6) are also a function of prices and 
expenditure shares of different categories. In order to find the vector of profit 
maximizing prices for each region, we use an iterative procedure to maximise regional 
profits in each period. The iterative procedure is:  
Step 1) An initial set of prices is assumed (for quick convergence the vector of average 
national prices is used).  
Step 2) Based on the vector of prices, corresponding price indexes for the middle and 
top level are constructed.  
Step 3) Based on the top level price index, the overall demand and expenditure for eggs 
are calculated using the coefficients estimated for (2.13). 
Step 4) Based on the results of step 3 and the price index for the two middle levels from 
step 2, the quantity share of each category is calculated, using the coefficients 
estimated for (2.12). 
Step 5) Based on the expenditure on each category and the assumed prices, the bottom 
level expenditure shares and the quantities are calculated using coefficients 
estimated for (2.9). 
Step 6) Profit is calculated.  
Step 7) Repeat steps 2 to 6 to improve the profit until we find the maximum for the 
profit function.
7 
Figure 2.4 shows the profit maximizing national and regional prices that we 
calculate for caged and barn small/medium eggs (category one). It is clear that the 
prices for some of the markets would be lower and some higher under a regional pricing 
policy compared to prices under national pricing policy. Consumers in Anglia would 
                                                 
7    While the maximum found using this procedure is not guaranteed to be global; we believe since 
national prices are used as the initial values, the results here are the best approximate for regional 
profit-maximising prices.  
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face the lowest price, just above marginal cost. This is because Anglia has one of the 
highest price elasticities for this category of eggs, compared to other regions. That 
means that a marginal increase in price of this category of eggs is likely to decrease the 
demand for this category in Anglia more than other regions. The negative effect of this 
on profit is higher than the positive effect of the price rise. At the other extreme 
consumers in Lancashire, which has a significantly lower price elasticity for this 
category of eggs, would face substantially higher regional prices.  
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Figure 2.4. The average national and regional profit maximising prices 
for caged and barn small/medium eggs  
Table 2.11 shows the average of profit maximizing national and regional prices for 
all five subcategories. 
Table 2.11. The average national and regional profit maximising prices for all categories  
(Unit prices in pence) 
  Caged & barn     Free range 
Region  Small / Medium / 
Mixed (Value) 
Large / XLarge 
/Mixed (Other) 
Small/ Medium 
(Budget) 
Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large 
Branded/ XLarge/ 
Organic 
1 : London  4.1  9.0  11.8  14.9  19.5 
2 : Midlands  8.4  11.9  10.2  11.5  19.0 
3 : North East  7.6  6.6  9.7  14.3  19.7 
4 : Yorkshire  6.0  10.5  9.8  12.0  25.8 
5 : Lancashire  9.4  8.2  17.5  20.7  27.8 
6 : South  5.5  10.8  10.4  12.4  18.1 
7 : Scotland  6.6  8.7  11.7  13.9  19.2 
8 : Anglia  3.7  12.7  12.4  14.0  17.3 
9 : Wales and West  9.6  25.9  15.9  17.5  25.9 
10 : South West  4.9  6.8  11.9  13.8  21.1 
National prices  7.4  11.7  11.8  14.9  21.9  
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2.4.4. Impact on Retailer Profits 
What impact would a switch from a national to a regional pricing policy have on the 
retailer’s profits? Over the 37 months that we consider moving to a regional pricing 
policy would have increased Tesco’s profit on eggs by about 37%. This figure does not 
take into the account any extra costs (such as administrative and operational costs) 
which might occurs as a result of this policy. Figure 2.5 shows a plot of the estimated 
increase in profits in each month as a result of switching to a regional pricing policy. 
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Figure 2.5. The estimated profit gain for Tesco under regional pricing policy 
2.4.5. Impact on Consumer Welfare 
As mentioned before, the welfare effect of third degree price discrimination is 
ambiguous. In order to evaluate the level of utility under each pricing policies we use 
equation (2.7). After substituting sub-utilities from (2.8) in (2.7), the total consumer 
utility under the national pricing policy is  
( )
￿ ￿
￿
˛
˛
- ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
=
G
G j
jt
Grt
G j
jrt jt
N
rt
jr p
P q p
U b ˆ
ˆ log ˆ ˆ log
,    (2.22) 
where 
N
rt U  is the consumer welfare under national pricing policy in region r  and period 
t,   
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  jt p ˆ  is the national price of subcategory j in category G eggs in period t,
8 
  jrt q ˆ  is the regional demand of subcategory j in category G eggs in region r and 
period t under national pricing policy, 
  ( ) ￿￿ ￿
˛ ˛ ˛
+ =
G j G k
kt jt jkr
G j
jt jr Grt p p p a P ˆ log ˆ log
2
1
ˆ log ˆ log d , and 
  jr a ,  jr b , and  jkr d s, are coefficients estimated from equation (2.9) and reported in 
tables 2.B2 and 2.B4 for all ten regions. 
Similarly the total consumer utility under the regional pricing policy is  
( )
￿ ￿
￿
˛
˛
- ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
=
G
G j
jrt
Grt
G j
jrt jrt
R
rt
j p
P q p
U b
log log
,    (2.23) 
where 
R
rt U  is the total consumer welfare under regional pricing policy in region r and 
period t,  
  jrt p  is the regional price of subcategory j in category G eggs in region r period t 
(which calculated in section 2.4.3),  
  jrt q  is the regional demand of subcategory j in category G eggs in region r and 
period t under regional pricing policy,  and 
  ( ) ￿￿ ￿
˛ ˛ ˛
+ =
G j G k
krt jrt jkr
G j
jrt jr Grt p p p a P log log
2
1
log log d , and 
   jr a ,  jr b , and  jkr d s, are coefficients estimated from equation (2.9) and reported in 
tables 2.B2 and 2.B4 for all ten regions. 
                                                 
8   As discussed before, Tesco uses a national pricing policy then we expect  jrt jt p p = ˆ  for "r where the 
left hand side is calculated using 2.21. However some regional variations in prices were observed due 
to consumer choice. For this part we calculate the national prices using 
￿￿
￿￿
=
r h
jrht
r h
jrht
jt q
e
p ˆ .  
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So the change in consumer welfare in region r and period t, after switching to a 
regional pricing policy is 
N
rt
R
rt rt U U U - = D . Table 2.12 shows a summary result of this 
change in consumer welfare. Figure 2.6 shows average and range of estimated gain/loss 
in consumer welfare across ten regions in case of switching to a regional pricing policy. 
As result of the policy change, London and the South West regions are the biggest 
winners, and Wales and the west and Lancashire are two biggest losers. 
Table 2.12. Summary statistics for the change in consumer welfare  
as a result of switching to a regional pricing policy 
  #  Average  SD  Min  Max 
Change in 
Consumer Welfare 
370  4.9%  8.2%  -12.9%  27.0% 
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Figure 2.6. The average and range of estimated consumer gain/loss across the regions 
2.5. Summary and Conclusion 
We have estimated a three-level budgeting demand system for Tesco eggs. Using 
our estimates of the demand system, we calculated the difference that using a regional 
pricing policy would make to Tesco’s profit on eggs and to consumer surplus. Our 
estimates suggest that Tesco would substantially increase its profit. The gains to 
consumers are modest, with some consumers benefiting, but many losing out. 
These results lend some support to the attitude taken by the competition authorities 
in their investigations of the supermarket industry.  
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Appendix 2.A 
Unconditional Own Price Elasticity 
From (2.9) we get 
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The LHS of (2.A1) is 
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Substituting this into (2.A1) yields 
  ( )
j
G
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G
j
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E
q
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E
p
s
¶
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￿
￿
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￿
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￿
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1 b d l .       (2.A2) 
To calculate the last part of (2.A2) we have 
( )
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Looking at (2.10) 
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And taking derivative of YE with respect to PG  
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Substituting (2.A5) into (2.A4) and then (2.A3) 
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￿
+ + + =
¶
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Substituting this into (2.A2) 
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By defining the quantity share of size j in category G as 
G
j
j Q
q
d =  and the quantity share of 
category G in total number of eggs as 
Q
Q
d
G
G =  and reordering we get 
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Unconditional Cross Price Elasticity within a Category: 
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to log(pk): 
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The LHS of (2.A7) is  
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and then substituting into (2.A7) and rearranging we get 
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Reordering the final expression is  
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Unconditional Cross Price Elasticity between two Categories: 
The unconditional cross price elasticities between two categories are calculated by taking 
the derivative of (2.9) with respect to log(pk), we get ( j˛ G & k˛ H) are 
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The LHS of (2.A8) is 
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Substituting into (2.A8)   gives us 
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Calculating the last term of (2.A9) we get  
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Substituting from (2.A10) and (2.A11) into (2.A9), we finally get:  
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Appendix 2.B 
Table 2.B1. Summary statistics 
   Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
London            
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  11.795  0.100  11.615  11.965 
Log (expenditure on eggs)  Log(£)  6.576  0.073  6.392  6.702 
log (total quantity)  #  8.815  0.142  8.501  9.051 
log(p)  #  0.013  0.068  -0.089  0.136 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  8.526  0.152  8.219  8.828 
log(PC)  #  0.009  0.092  -0.176  0.155 
s1  %  52.97%  7.70%  37.54%  64.83% 
log (p1)  Log(£)  -2.586  0.094  -2.729  -2.433 
s2  %  47.03%  7.70%  35.17%  62.46% 
log (p2)  Log(£)  -2.146  0.104  -2.409  -1.995 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  7.428  0.137  7.097  7.658 
log(PF)  #  0.018  0.041  -0.034  0.101 
s3  %  25.11%  4.21%  14.90%  33.61% 
log (p3)  Log(£)  -2.137  0.081  -2.221  -1.924  
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   Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
s4  %  39.89%  6.19%  24.13%  53.08% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.897  0.050  -1.971  -1.807 
s5  %  35.01%  8.11%  18.82%  49.88% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.518  0.042  -1.598  -1.447 
Midlands             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  11.383  0.092  11.189  11.563 
Log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  6.148  0.071  5.991  6.308 
log (total quantity)  #  8.449  0.087  8.251  8.618 
log(p)  #  0.005  0.069  -0.105  0.119 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  8.208  0.081  8.033  8.351 
log(PC)  #  -0.004  0.095  -0.194  0.129 
s1  %  60.95%  5.84%  44.54%  69.04% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.607  0.094  -2.766  -2.472 
s2  %  39.05%  5.84%  30.96%  55.46% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.153  0.109  -2.428  -2.009 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.900  0.160  6.458  7.217 
log(PF)  #  0.018  0.041  -0.030  0.104 
s3  %  26.93%  6.00%  13.99%  35.54% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.143  0.089  -2.248  -1.911 
s4  %  41.52%  5.83%  30.38%  53.60% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.902  0.058  -1.975  -1.776 
s5  %  31.55%  6.74%  20.91%  50.46% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.504  0.069  -1.657  -1.378 
North East             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  9.424  0.201  8.943  9.756 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  3.975  0.166  3.637  4.278 
log (total quantity)  #  6.172  0.171  5.903  6.589 
log(p)  #  0.028  0.079  -0.145  0.155 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  5.828  0.202  5.481  6.368 
log(PC)  #  0.027  0.105  -0.248  0.172 
s1  %  40.39%  11.62%  17.21%  56.99% 
log (p1)  Log(£)  -2.594  0.110  -2.871  -2.402 
s2  %  59.61%  11.62%  43.01%  82.79% 
log (p2)  Log(£)  -2.134  0.122  -2.530  -1.967 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  4.879  0.350  4.277  5.529 
log(PF)  #  0.028  0.063  -0.097  0.136 
s3  %  29.03%  13.00%  6.53%  58.23% 
log (p3)  Log(£)  -2.161  0.098  -2.300  -1.920 
s4  %  42.39%  13.87%  15.36%  80.50% 
log (p4)  Log(£)  -1.901  0.078  -2.139  -1.775 
s5  %  30.17%  14.67%  7.01%  62.42% 
log (p5)  Log(£)  -1.507  0.087  -1.793  -1.354 
Yorkshire             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  10.593  0.109  10.389  10.760 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  5.234  0.092  5.004  5.407 
log (total quantity)  #  7.551  0.145  7.138  7.826 
log(p)  #  0.021  0.083  -0.120  0.162 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  7.298  0.147  6.884  7.545 
log(PC)  #  0.015  0.101  -0.196  0.167 
S1  %  63.31%  10.36%  35.11%  82.86% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.608  0.089  -2.745  -2.462 
S2  %  36.69%  10.36%  17.14%  64.89% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.156  0.146  -2.558  -1.954 
Free Range             
 
102 
   Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
log (quantity)  #  6.043  0.203  5.598  6.417 
log(PF)  #  0.031  0.062  -0.074  0.185 
S3  %  22.58%  8.76%  6.21%  39.53% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.162  0.106  -2.288  -1.873 
S4  %  56.63%  7.69%  37.38%  71.76% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.909  0.067  -2.063  -1.766 
S5  %  20.79%  8.01%  5.79%  42.66% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.529  0.080  -1.767  -1.419 
Lancashire             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  10.922  0.093  10.707  11.130 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  5.607  0.079  5.417  5.735 
log (total quantity)  #  7.891  0.096  7.704  8.105 
log(p)  #  0.016  0.079  -0.130  0.145 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  7.616  0.116  7.390  7.891 
log(PC)  #  0.025  0.103  -0.182  0.179 
S1  %  60.20%  9.29%  32.50%  76.01% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.586  -1.586  -0.586  0.414 
S2  %  39.80%  9.29%  23.99%  67.50% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.159  0.124  -2.464  -1.979 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.450  0.147  6.170  6.775 
log(PF)  #  -0.003  0.045  -0.060  0.096 
S3  %  28.75%  5.88%  17.29%  41.63% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.138  0.086  -2.247  -1.945 
S4  %  41.16%  10.07%  21.26%  61.50% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.900  0.065  -2.005  -1.746 
S5  %  30.09%  8.68%  13.21%  50.74% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.521  0.067  -1.716  -1.416 
South             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  11.384  0.074  11.229  11.526 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  6.072  0.078  5.942  6.272 
log (total quantity)  #  8.368  0.135  8.069  8.615 
log(p)  #  0.021  0.074  -0.112  0.137 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  8.102  0.143  7.762  8.394 
log(PC)  #  0.022  0.095  -0.190  0.153 
s1  %  60.86%  8.31%  40.37%  72.15% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.608  0.093  -2.772  -2.472 
s2  %  39.14%  8.31%  27.85%  59.63% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.158  0.123  -2.502  -1.996 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.905  0.167  6.548  7.321 
log(PF)  #  0.019  0.046  -0.028  0.112 
s3  %  27.03%  4.26%  21.01%  37.46% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.143  0.091  -2.234  -1.921 
s4  %  45.66%  6.33%  33.55%  64.62% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.905  0.051  -1.965  -1.802 
s5  %  27.31%  6.95%  13.13%  42.99% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.511  0.040  -1.602  -1.452 
Scotland             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  10.769  0.134  10.523  11.009 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  5.489  0.090  5.325  5.698 
log (total quantity)  #  7.808  0.135  7.505  8.160 
log(p)  #  -0.001  0.083  -0.170  0.126 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  7.538  0.135  7.204  7.932 
log(PC)  #  0.001  0.108  -0.266  0.135 
s1  %  60.46%  10.85%  32.26%  78.61%  
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   Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.617  0.105  -2.840  -2.468 
s2  %  39.54%  10.85%  21.39%  67.74% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.188  0.140  -2.583  -2.044 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.360  0.174  6.031  6.649 
log(PF)  #  -0.008  0.059  -0.077  0.111 
s3  %  28.00%  5.75%  17.15%  38.75% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.144  0.094  -2.274  -1.920 
s4  %  52.48%  6.28%  38.07%  70.98% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.912  0.060  -1.997  -1.813 
s5  %  19.53%  6.31%  4.64%  33.49% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.596  0.117  -1.945  -1.392 
Anglia             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  11.049  0.115  10.839  11.255 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  5.715  0.096  5.454  5.895 
log (total quantity)  #  8.010  0.108  7.760  8.241 
log(p)  #  0.033  0.073  -0.095  0.155 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  7.772  0.124  7.563  8.108 
log(PC)  #  0.028  0.105  -0.201  0.182 
s1  %  59.02%  9.12%  46.64%  73.59% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.610  0.102  -2.775  -2.455 
s2  %  40.98%  9.12%  26.41%  53.36% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.148  0.126  -2.508  -1.980 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.434  0.216  5.996  6.805 
log(PF)  #  0.038  0.040  -0.014  0.127 
s3  %  29.04%  6.42%  18.76%  52.72% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.140  0.087  -2.227  -1.920 
s4  %  37.39%  7.93%  21.45%  55.10% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.903  0.054  -2.013  -1.808 
s5  %  33.57%  8.09%  17.35%  49.02% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.504  0.040  -1.583  -1.400 
Wales and West             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  10.991  0.099  10.833  11.242 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  5.693  0.120  5.373  5.934 
log (total quantity)  #  7.975  0.086  7.740  8.150 
log(p)  #  0.012  0.070  -0.076  0.126 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  7.689  0.095  7.479  7.916 
log(PC)  #  0.000  0.086  -0.128  0.138 
s1  %  59.10%  5.58%  39.96%  68.47% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.608  0.087  -2.749  -2.475 
s2  %  40.90%  5.58%  31.53%  60.04% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.135  0.091  -2.261  -1.989 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  6.576  0.136  6.269  6.848 
log(PF)  #  0.028  0.051  -0.030  0.139 
s3  %  29.59%  4.83%  18.46%  38.78% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.148  0.089  -2.251  -1.920 
s4  %  45.91%  7.26%  22.54%  62.18% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.899  0.059  -1.991  -1.801 
s5  %  24.49%  7.76%  11.63%  43.55% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.527  0.072  -1.745  -1.410 
South West             
log (total expenditure)  log(£)  10.025  0.114  9.764  10.279 
log (expenditure on eggs)  log(£)  4.740  0.122  4.481  4.941 
log (total quantity)  #  7.133  0.195  6.816  7.502 
log(p)  #  0.033  0.078  -0.074  0.166  
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   Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Caged / Barn            
log (quantity)  #  6.928  0.222  6.581  7.359 
log(PC)  #  0.058  0.086  -0.064  0.201 
s1  %  70.64%  8.71%  41.75%  87.24% 
log (p1)  log(£)  -2.642  0.093  -2.783  -2.489 
s2  %  29.36%  8.71%  12.76%  58.25% 
log (p2)  log(£)  -2.144  0.088  -2.279  -1.960 
Free Range            
log (quantity)  #  5.410  0.249  4.771  5.976 
log(PF)  #  -0.039  0.067  -0.151  0.102 
s3  %  39.95%  11.06%  16.46%  68.49% 
log (p3)  log(£)  -2.150  0.093  -2.349  -1.920 
s4  %  39.25%  11.12%  17.37%  63.19% 
log (p4)  log(£)  -1.912  0.083  -2.067  -1.724 
s5  %  21.38%  10.49%  3.47%  46.44% 
log (p5)  log(£)  -1.570  0.114  -1.839  -1.418 
Note:  p: the Laspeyres price index for eggs;  
  PC: the Laspeyres price index for caged and barn eggs;   
  s1: the expenditure share of Small / Medium / Mixed (Value) sub-category in caged and barn eggs;  
  p1: the price of Small / Medium / Mixed (Value) sub-category of caged and barn eggs;  
  s2: the expenditure share of Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other) sub-category in caged and barn eggs; 
  p2: the price of Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other) sub-category of caged and barn eggs;  
  PF: the Laspeyres price index for free range eggs;  
  s3: the expenditure share of Small / Medium (Budget) sub-category in free range eggs;  
  p3: the price of Small / Medium (Budget) sub-category in free range eggs;  
  s4: the expenditure share of Mixed / Medium (Branded) / Large sub-category in free range eggs;  
  p4: the price of Mixed / Medium (Branded) / Large sub-category in free range eggs; 
  s5: the expenditure share of Branded / XLarge / Organic sub-category in free range eggs;  
  p5: the price of Branded / XLarge / Organic sub-category in free range eggs;  
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Table 2.B2. Bottom level results for Caged and Barn, coefficients for Small / Medium /Mixed (Value)  
and conditional own-price elasticities using approximate price index 
Dep var: share of expenditure 
on product 
London  Midlands  North 
East 
Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
-0.991  0.092  1.321  -0.578  0.904  -0.270  0.467  -1.027  -0.511  -0.778  Constant  (0.305)  (0.334)  (0.536)  (0.426)  (0.382)  (0.377)  (0.375)  (0.440)  (0.303)  (0.319) 
0.080  0.071  -0.029  0.094  0.049  0.004  -0.011  0.027  0.073  0.095  Log (E / P)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
-0.697  -0.380  -0.034  -0.826  -0.359  -0.843  -1.066  -0.761  -0.342  -0.306 
Log (p1)  (0.178)  (0.201)  (0.235)  (0.220)  (0.231)  (0.218)  (0.215)  (0.239)  (0.201)  (0.195) 
0.358  0.409  0.425  0.646  0.689  0.622  1.188  0.239  0.004  0.122 
Log (p2)  (0.171)  (0.182)  (0.217)  (0.141)  (0.192)  (0.179)  (0.182)  (0.201)  (0.206)  (0.213) 
R
2   0.647  0.720  0.686  0.619  0.807  0.951  0.946  0.913  0.735  0.701 
Adj – R
2    0.602  0.685  0.646  0.571  0.783  0.944  0.939  0.902  0.702  0.663 
1.67  2.34  1.99  1.48  3.80  17.64  15.93  9.54  2.52  2.13  Joint significance, F stat  
(p-value)  (0.192)  (0.091)  (0.135)  (0.238)  (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.075)  (0.115) 
5.75  4.29  0.36  3.71  1.43  0.01  0.06  0.32  7.08  12.39  Homotheticity Test; F stat 
(p-value)  (0.022)  (0.046)  (0.554)  (0.063)  (0.241)  (0.923)  (0.812)  (0.574)  (0.012)  (0.001) 
Conditional own-price elasticity                     
-2.316  -1.624  -1.085  -2.305  -1.596  -2.385  -2.764  -2.290  -1.579  -1.433  Small / Medium / Mixed (Value)  (0.336)  (0.330)  (0.582)  (0.347)  (0.384)  (0.358)  (0.356)  (0.405)  (0.340)  (0.276) 
-1.762  -2.048  -1.714  -2.762  -2.730  -2.590  -4.004  -1.582  -1.010  -1.415  Large/XLarge / Mixed (Other)  (0.364)  (0.466)  (0.364)  (0.384)  (0.482)  (0.457)  (0.460)  (0.490)  (0.504)  (0.725) 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors; for F-test results numbers in ( ) are p-values. Each region’s regression includes 37 observations. (E / P) is the total of 
expenditure caged and barn eggs in each month over the appropriate caged and barn price index , p1 is the average price of Small / Medium / Mixed (Value) for caged 
and barn eggs in each month, and p2 is the average price of Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other) for caged and barn eggs in each month. 
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Table 2.B3. Bottom level results for Caged and Barn, coefficients for Small / Medium /Mixed (Value) using exact price index 
Dep var: share of expenditure 
on product 
London  Midlands  North 
East 
Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
-0.973  0.093  1.328  -0.557  0.901  -0.266  0.471  -1.022  -0.500  -0.757  Constant  (0.327)  (0.347)  (0.568)  (0.478)  (0.412)  (0.410)  (0.356)  (0.420)  (0.287)  (0.318) 
0.080  0.071  -0.029  0.093  0.049  0.003  -0.012  0.028  0.073  0.095  Log (E / P)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
-0.726  -0.369  -0.062  -0.836  -0.329  -0.842  -1.078  -0.764  -0.250  -0.329 
Log (p1)  (0.191)  (0.208)  (0.244)  (0.247)  (0.251)  (0.242)  (0.214)  (0.233)  (0.196)  (0.194) 
0.473  0.468  0.426  0.753  0.703  0.625  1.186  0.273  0.012  0.004 
Log (p2)  (0.189)  (0.191)  (0.229)  (0.166)  (0.205)  (0.200)  (0.173)  (0.199)  (0.198)  (0.216) 
Number of iterations  6  5  5  6  5  4  4  5  5  6 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. Each region’s regression includes 37 observations. (E / P) is the total of expenditure caged and barn eggs in each month over 
the appropriate caged and barn price index, p1 is the average price of Small / Medium / Mixed (Value) for caged and barn eggs in each month, and p2 is the average 
price of Large / XLarge / Mixed (Other) for caged and barn eggs in each month. All simulations started with the initial values of [0.5  0  0  0] for the coefficients; and 
since the procedure converges quite fast the choice of initial values are not important . 
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Table 2.B4. Bottom level results for Free Range, coefficients for the three sub-categories and conditional own-price elasticities using approximate price index 
Dep var: share of expenditure 
on product 
London  Midlands  North East  Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
0.145  -0.034  0.013  -0.064  0.454  0.171  0.004  0.733  0.384  0.488 
Constant  (0.163)  (0.140)  (0.156)  (0.164)  (0.188)  (0.119)  (0.133)  (0.119)  (0.145)  (0.177) 
-0.092  -0.051  -0.042  -0.029  0.043  -0.019  0.049  -0.150  -0.075  -0.123  Log (E / P)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.063)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.042) 
-1.048  -1.041  -1.428  -1.006  -0.077  -0.385  -0.221  -0.422  -0.475  -0.704  log (p3)  (0.159)  (0.252)  (0.426)  (0.283)  (0.181)  (0.145)  (0.248)  (0.146)  (0.111)  (0.373) 
0.093  0.269  1.347  0.603  0.051  0.132  0.189  0.093  0.068  0.231  log (p4)  (0.130)  (0.257)  (0.426)  (0.303)  (0.013)  (0.189)  (0.229)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.389) 
0.955  0.772  0.081  0.403  0.026  0.253  0.032  0.329  0.407  0.472 
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log (p5)  (0.159)  (0.221)  (0.045)  (0.182)  (0.181)  (0.137)  (0.123)  (0.146)  (0.111)  (0.206) 
-0.292  0.583  0.478  0.451  -0.187  0.085  0.398  0.267  -0.096  0.274 
Constant  (0.192)  (0.138)  (0.234)  (0.171)  (0.185)  (0.130)  (0.133)  (0.118)  (0.143)  (0.170) 
0.112  -0.036  0.035  0.009  -0.057  -0.022  0.034  -0.062  0.088  0.031  Log (E / P)  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.065)  (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.043)  (0.029)  (0.042) 
0.093  0.269  1.347  0.603  0.051  0.132  0.189  0.093  0.068  0.231  log (p3)  (0.130)  (0.257)  (0.426)  (0.303)  (0.013)  (0.189)  (0.229)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.389) 
-0.348  -0.456  -1.791  -1.211  -2.348  -1.429  -0.260  -1.118  -0.517  -0.430  log (p4)  (0.320)  (0.496)  (0.669)  (0.425)  (0.384)  (0.415)  (0.230)  (0.367)  (0.157)  (0.495) 
0.255  0.187  0.444  0.608  2.297  1.298  0.071  1.025  0.449  0.199 
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log (p5)  (0.320)  (0.382)  (0.374)  (0.229)  (0.384)  (0.280)  (0.024)  (0.367)  (0.157)  (0.237) 
R
2   0.596  0.590  0.284  0.873  0.400  0.798  0.863  0.253  0.771  0.754 
Adj – R
2   0.560  0.553  0.220  0.862  0.346  0.780  0.851  0.186  0.750  0.732 
10.50  10.22  2.64  48.86  4.73  28.09  44.77  2.41  23.92  21.09  Joint significance, F stat  
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
1.62  1.96  0.60  2.22  0.75  0.66  0.92  1.59  7.12  0.83  Symmetry Test; F stat 
(p value)  (0.193)  (0.129)  (0.618)  (0.094)  (0.526)  (0.580)  (0.436)  (0.200)  (0.000)  (0.482) 
6.06  1.95  0.17  0.18  2.69  0.79  1.89  12.62  3.54  2.95  Homotheticity Test; F stat  
(p-value)  (0.004)  (0.150)  (0.844)  (0.836)  (0.075)  (0.458)  (0.159)  (0.000)  (0.035)  (0.059) 
Table continues on the next page  
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Table 2.B4. (continued) 
  London  Midlands  North East  Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
Conditional own-price elasticity                     
-5.174  -4.866  -5.919  -5.456  -1.268  -2.425  -1.789  -2.453  -2.605  -2.761  Small / Medium (Budget)  (0.632)  (0.935)  (1.469)  (1.253)  (0.631)  (0.537)  (0.886)  (0.504)  (0.377)  (0.934) 
-1.872  -2.099  -5.225  -3.138  -6.704  -4.130  -1.495  -3.990  -2.126  -2.095  Mixed/ Medium 
(Branded)/Large  (0.803)  (1.195)  (1.577)  (0.750)  (0.932)  (0.910)  (0.438)  (0.983)  (0.341)  (1.260) 
-4.457  -4.042  -2.740  -5.860  -8.720  -6.680  -1.527  -5.034  -4.495  -4.138  Branded/ XLarge/ Organic  (0.941)  (1.185)  (1.238)  (1.027)  (1.155)  (0.819)  (0.632)  (0.994)  (0.605)  (1.073) 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors; for F-test results numbers in ( ) are p-values. Each region’s regression includes 37 observations (except the North East and 
the South West where there are 35 and 36 observations respectively).  (E / P) is the total expenditure on free-range and organic eggs in each month over the appropriate 
free-range –organic price, index  p3 is the average price of Small / Medium (Budget) for free-range eggs in each month, p4 is the average price of Mixed / Medium 
(Branded) / Large free-range eggs in each month, and p5 is the average price of Branded / XLarge for free-range and all Organic eggs in each month. (Symmetry 
assumption imposed) The critical values of F distribution at 5% significance level are F(8 , 66) = 2.08, F(3 , 64) = 2.75 & F(2 , 66) = 3.14. 
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Table 2.B5. Bottom level results for Free Range, coefficients for the three sub-categories using exact price index 
Dep var: share of expenditure 
on product 
London  Midlands  North East  Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
0.101  -0.011  0.091  -0.044  0.539  0.162  0.010  0.742  0.468  0.556 
Constant  (0.255)  (0.233)  (0.229)  (0.299)  (0.340)  (0.205)  (0.228)  (0.206)  (0.238)  (0.296) 
-0.072  -0.037  0.038  -0.031  -0.038  -0.020  0.042  -0.119  -0.072  -0.135  Log (E / P)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.044)  (0.073)  (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.049)  (0.071) 
-1.035  -0.955  -1.409  -1.012  0.094  -0.387  -0.269  -0.394  -0.308  -0.701  log (p3)  (0.279)  (0.401)  (0.115)  (0.455)  (0.345)  (0.228)  (0.249)  (0.275)  (0.194)  (0.569) 
0.090  0.360  1.323  0.627  0.050  0.086  0.195  0.095  0.071  0.296  log (p4)  (0.102)  (0.402)  (0.115)  (0.481)  (0.000)  (0.302)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.593) 
0.945  0.595  0.086  0.385  -0.144  0.300  0.074  0.299  0.237  0.405 
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log (p5)  (0.279)  (0.206)  (0.000)  (0.370)  (0.345)  (0.105)  (0.249)  (0.275)  (0.194)  (0.596) 
-0.222  0.560  0.401  0.452  -0.223  0.107  0.402  0.266  -0.166  0.305 
Constant  (0.302)  (0.231)  (0.226)  (0.308)  (0.335)  (0.222)  (0.226)  (0.205)  (0.235)  (0.287) 
0.113  -0.064  -0.003  0.008  -0.057  -0.022  0.051  -0.089  0.089  0.021  Log (E / P)  (0.043)  (0.066)  (0.041)  (0.073)  (0.065)  (0.046)  (0.054)  (0.079)  (0.048)  (0.071) 
0.090  0.360  1.323  0.627  0.050  0.086  0.195  0.095  0.071  0.296  log (p3)  (0.000)  (0.402)  (0.115)  (0.481)  (0.000)  (0.302)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.593) 
-0.324  -1.034  -1.784  -1.259  -2.447  -1.316  -0.319  -1.125  -0.679  -0.552  log (p4)  (0.536)  (0.839)  (0.133)  (0.673)  (0.740)  (0.695)  (0.241)  (0.699)  (0.270)  (0.764) 
0.234  0.674  0.461  0.632  2.397  1.230  0.124  1.030  0.608  0.256 
M
i
x
e
d
 
/
 
M
e
d
i
u
m
(
B
r
a
n
d
e
d
)
 
/
L
a
r
g
e
 
log (p5)  (0.536)  (0.595)  (0.133)  (0.594)  (0.740)  (0.449)  (0.241)  (0.699)  (0.270)  (0.840) 
Number of Iterations   5  5  5  5  5  4  5  6  5  6 
Note: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. 
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Table 2.B6. Middle level results for all ten regions 
Dep var: log of category’s 
quantity 
London  Midl ands  North East  Yorkshire  Lancashire  South  Scotland  Anglia  Wales & 
West 
South 
West 
1.421  2.149  1.264  1.944  1.616  2.064  1.821  2.057  1.481  1.580  Constant  (0.196)  (0.233)  (0.473)  (0.342)  (0.339)  (0.261)  (0.248)  (0.293)  (0.263)  (0.344) 
1.083  0.986  1.152  1.029  1.075  0.998  1.042  1.002  1.089  1.158 
Log (YE)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.120)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.052)  (0.046)  (0.073) 
-1.100  -0.732  -1.262  -0.595  -1.082  -1.245  -0.686  -1.457  -1.285  -1.976 
Log (PC)  (0.091)  (0.114)  (0.395)  (0.200)  (0.179)  (0.127)  (0.122)  (0.143)  (0.215)  (0.401) 
0.172  0.223  0.900  0.723  0.071  0.212  0.281  0.818  0.264  0.653 
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log (PF)  (0.101)  (0.151)  (0.453)  (0.242)  (0.234)  (0.150)  (0.132)  (0.171)  (0.288)  (0.410) 
1.502  0.751  2.039  0.824  1.230  0.943  1.334  1.577  1.501  1.662  Constant  (0.206)  (0.253)  (0.511)  (0.353)  (0.355)  (0.278)  (0.255)  (0.318)  (0.264)  (0.344) 
0.906  1.008  0.730  1.003  0.929  0.987  0.912  0.878  0.902  0.772  Log (Y E)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.129)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.047)  (0.074) 
0.172  0.223  0.900  0.723  0.071  0.212  0.281  0.818  0.264  0.653 
Log (PC)  (0.101)  (0.151)  (0.453)  (0.242)  (0.234)  (0.150)  (0.132)  (0.171)  (0.288)  (0.410) 
-1.966  -2.855  -3.460  -0.428  -1.021  -2.208  -1.703  -5.144  -2.222  -1.319 
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e
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log (PF)  (0.254)  (0.376)  (0.835)  (0.432)  (0.565)  (0.351)  (0.273)  (0.479)  (0.498)  (0.591) 
R
2   0.972  0.953  0.725  0.730  0.903  0.956  0.927  0.935  0.593  0.874 
Adj – R
2   0.969  0.949  0.700  0.706  0.895  0.953  0.920  0.929  0.557  0.863 
31.04  18.29  2.38  2.45  8.47  19.91  11.43  12.98  1.32  6.27  Joint significance, F stat  
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.255)  (0.000) 
8.23  0.08  2.77  0.10  1.33  0.04  2.17  2.45  4.05  7.04  Homotheticity Test; F stat  
(p-value)  (0.001)  (0.923)  (0.070)  (0.905)  (0.271)  (0.961)  (0.122)  (0.094)  (0.022)  (0.002) 
0.86  0.18  0.01  0.29  1.15  0.78  1.02  0.34  0.02  1.16  Symmetry Test; F stat 
(p value)  (0.357)  (0.673)  (0.921)  (0.592)  (0.287)  (0.380)  (0.316)  (0.562)  (0.888)  (0.285) 
Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors; for F-test results numbers in ( ) are p-values. Each region’s regression includes 37 observations. YE is the total on eggs in each 
region, PC is the price index for caged / barn eggs in each month, PF  is the price for free-range / organic eggs in each month. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
              The Market for Kidneys in Iran 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The most effective treatment for End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is a kidney 
transplant (Renal Replacement Therapy: RRT). The only alternative treatment is 
dialysis and RRT is the only way for the patient to live without needing dialysis on a 
regular basis. Some researchers predict that the number of patient with ESRD will reach 
2 million worldwide by 2010 (Nwankwo et al., 2005). In the US, it is predicted that 
more than 40% of patients may die while on the waiting list (Matas, 2006). Xue et al. 
(2001) predict that more than 95,000 patients will be on the waiting list for a kidney 
transplant by 2010; the figure was more than 65,000 in 2007. 
There are two sources for a kidney transplant, cadaveric kidneys and kidneys from 
the live donors. Cadaveric kidneys can be harvested either from a brain-dead patient 
(whose heart is still beating) or cardiacally dead patient; the latter is considered to have 
a lower quality. Since a normal person can live on just one kidney, she can decide to 
donate one of her kidneys. The incentive to donate a kidney can be altruistic or 
obtaining money by selling a kidney. Altruistic kidney donation is mostly a case for 
emotionally related donors where the donor donates her kidney to either a relative or a 
close friend.  
In order to match a kidney from a donor with a potential recipient, their ABO and 
RdH blood types as well as tissues should be compatible. The ABO matching should  
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follow the same rules that should be considered for blood transfusion, although some 
programs are experimenting with ABO-incompatible transplantation (Gloor & Stegall, 
2007). Regarding the tissue matching, a higher proportion of tissues matched between 
the donor and recipient will increase the probability of a successful transplantation. 
It is well documented that RRT is cost effective treatment as compared to dialysis. 
For example the UK national health system (NHS) data reveals that the average cost of 
dialysis is £30,800 per year while the cost of kidney transplantation is £17,000 
following by a £5,000 annual spend on the drugs. That means over a period of 10 year 
(the median graft survival time: the time that transplanted kidney survives in patient’s 
body), the average benefit of kidney transplantation, comparing to dialysis, is £241,000 
per patient (UK Transplant, 2007).  
In order to compare the cost of two alternatives for Iran (all data for 2008); the 
annual cost of hemodialysis for a patient is about Rials 47.0m
1. The cost of a transplant 
operation
2 is about Rials 2.4m following by estimated Rials 40.0m annual expenditure 
on drugs
3. That means from the cost of point of view the transplant is preferred and the 
average benefit over the 10 year period is Rials 67.6m. The higher ratio of drug costs 
over operation costs in Iran comparing to UK is the result of Iranian system depending 
on imported drugs.  
It is worth mentioning, the above calculations (both for UK and Iran) are only the 
direct benefit of the transplantation by reducing the treatment costs. Three other factors 
may also be considered in the cost-benefit analysis i) the opportunity cost of the time, 
                                                 
1  By medical standards, every patients should receive thrice weekly dialysis (equivalent to 156 annual 
sessions), but the reported data in Iran shows that the mean annual sessions per patient is just 142. The 
tariff for every dialysis session is 92K ("K": medical K; which is determined by the ministry of health 
each year and for 2008 is Rials 3600). Then the dialysis cost will be 142×92×3600 ˜  47.0m. 
2   Kidney transplantation tariff is 650K ("K": surgical K; for 2008 is Rials 3700). This value is regardless 
of kidney source and method of nephrectomy and includes all expenses from admission to discharge 
(both donor and recipient) except some special drugs that sometimes are used for patients with special 
conditions or in case of some complications. The costs of initial tests prior to donation or implantation 
are not included in this. Then the transplant cost will be 650×3700 ˜ 2.4m. 
3   Different immunosuppressive regimens are used for different recipients; therefore, to determine 
a unique cost is somehow difficult, however considering the governmental subsidy, which these 
drugs receive, Rials 40m is the estimation. Donors receive no drugs routinely; unless complications 
happen rarely.  
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patient spends to get dialysis treatment, ii) the improved quality of life for patient after 
receiving the transplant, and iii) the risk of death during the surgery for donor. Becker & 
Elias (2007) reports that based on several studies, the risk of death during surgery for 
donor is between 0.03% and 0.06%. Matas et al (2003) based on the data from the US 
transplant centres for period 1993 – 2001 reports the donor’s death rate of around 
0.03%. 
It is also well known that kidneys from the live sources have a better quality as 
compared to the kidneys harvested from cadavers. Table 3.1 contains a summary of the 
statistics from US transplants which shows that the kidneys from live donors are more 
effective (NKUDIC, 2007). While the 10 year graft survival probability for live kidneys 
are 54.7%, the same figure for a cadaveric kidney is only 39.2%.
4 One issue that should 
be addressed here is the possibility that these data is affected by selection bias. In reality 
patients are not randomly matched to kidneys. Terminally ill patients are more likely to 
receive a cadaveric kidney which becomes available with lower degree of compatibility. 
On the other hand, patients on better conditions can wait a bit longer to receive a more 
compatible live donation. Then the cadaveric kidneys may show a lower graft survival 
not only because of its own condition but also because of the condition of recipients.  
Table 3.1: Survival probability for different treatments 
  1 year  2 years  5 years  10 years 
Patient survival under dialysis  77.7%  62.6%  31.9%  10.0% 
Patient survival following cadaveric transplant  94.3%  91.1%  81.2%  59.4% 
Patient survival following live-donor transplant  98.2%  95.8%  90.5%  75.6% 
Graft survival following cadaveric transplant  89.0%  83.3%  67.4%  39.2% 
Graft survival following live-donor transplant  95.2%  91.4%  80.3%  54.7% 
  Source: NKUDIC (2007) 
Harvesting kidneys has been a major concern for health systems all around the 
world in the last few decades. In order to increase the kidneys available from cadavers, 
two different systems adopted. The most popular one is the opt-in system where people, 
who wish to donate their organs after their death, sign up to the scheme. For example it 
is estimated that in the UK one in five people (more than 13 million) signed up to the 
scheme (Boseley, 2006). This voluntary scheme is run in many countries but usually the 
                                                 
4   Based on the results of a study in 2001 in Iran (not published officially), the graft survival rate in 
different intervals for kidney transplants are as follow: 6 months: 90.8%, 12 months: 89.1%, 18 
months: 88.2%, 24 months: 87.7%, 30 months: 87.2%, and 36 months: 85.9%.  
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donor’s wish is not enough to guarantee that the donation will take place after the 
donor’s death, since in many cases the consent of next of kin is also required, either by 
the law or informally. There are campaigns for encouraging organ donations in many 
countries. However, the shortfall of the number of organs available through this system 
in recent years is an issue; part of the problem is the decreasing number of deaths 
among younger people, whose organs are most suitable. For example it is claimed that 
one of the reasons behind the drop in the UK cadaveric kidney donation in recent years 
(table 3.2) is seat-belt legislation (Boseley, 2006).  
The alternative system is the opt-out system which is practised in some European 
countries, including Spain and Austria. In this system, the donor’s consent is presumed 
and a person needs to opt out the scheme if she does not want to donate her organs after 
death. UK also considered switching from opt-in system to this system, where it is 
under legal and political consideration (Wintour, 2008)
5. One legitimate argument 
against this system is that presumed consent means that the state is considered the 
owner of the body of deceased person. Some consider this to be a problematic 
assumption (Becker & Elias, 2007). Abadie & Gay (2006) develop an economic model 
to investigate the effect of presumed consent on the donation rate, their model predicts 
that the opt-out system may have a positive or negative effect on the rate of donations 
comparing to opt-in system depending on the model assumptions, however, their 
empirical analysis for 22 countries over a 10-year period shows after controlling for 
other determinants, presumed consent legislation has a positive and significant effect on 
organ donation rates. 
Another measure to boost the number of donations is an expansive legal definition 
of death, such as Spain uses, allowing physicians to declare a patient to be dead at an 
earlier stage, when the organs are still in good physical condition. This is controversial 
and has been mentioned as the main reason for individuals not wanting to participate in 
organ donation schemes. As a result of this procedure, putting extra effort and resources 
in procurement process, and the presumed consent system, Spain has one of the highest 
rates of cadaveric donations in Europe. (See Table 3.A1 in appendix 3.A) In summary 
the high rate of kidney donation in Spain is due to presumed consent policy, enhanced 
                                                 
5   Recently the government committee has recommended against opt-out.  
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infrastructure for donation, expansive legal definition of death, and more road accidents. 
However there has been no study to estimate the contribution of each factor. 
Table 3.2: The number of live and cadaveric kidney transplantation 1985 - 2006 
Iran  Spain  UK  US 
Year 
Live 
Cada
ver 
Total 
PMP*
  Live 
Cada
ver 
Total 
PMP 
Live 
Cada
ver 
Total 
PMP 
Live 
Cada
ver 
Total 
PMP 
1985  16    0.3                   
1986  98    1.6                   
1987  158    2.5                   
1988  247    4.0                   
1989  401    6.4                   
1990  498    7.9    1240  32.2  101  1726  31.9  2094  7322  37.3 
1991  571    8.9  16  1355  35.5  88  1608  29.6  2394  7281  38.3 
1992  689    10.7  15  1477  38.8  101  1622  30.1  2535  7203  38.5 
1993  808  8  12.2  15  1473  38.6  142  1555  29.6  2850  8170  43.5 
1994  718  2  11.0  20  1613  42.5  135  1588  30.1  3007  8383  44.1 
1995  790  8  11.8  35  1765  46.8  155  1615  30.8  3221  8598  46.3 
1996  743  12  11.3  22  1685  44.3  183  1499  29.3  3389  8560  46.7 
1997  1078  4  16.3  20  1841  46.9  179  1487  29.1  3597  8577  47.7 
1998  1193  2  17.8  19  1976  50.3  252  1330  26.8  4017  8938  50.7 
1999  1214  14  18.3  17  2006  50.9  270  1311  26.8  4511  8016  49.5 
2000  1389  32  20.5  19  1919  48.7  348  1323  28.3  5311  8087  52.5 
2001  1550  70  24.0  31  1893  46.7  358  1333  28.7  5989  8212  49.8 
2002  1585  96  24.5  34  1998  48.5  372  1286  28.1  6178  8508  50.9 
2003  1474  167  23.9  60  2069  49.8  451  1246  28.7  6464  8665  52.0 
2004  1563  207  26.0  61  2125  50.5  463  1367  30.8  6644  9349  54.5 
2005  1721  209  27.4  88  2049  48.3  543  1197  29.5  6541  9827  55.3 
2006  1615  243  26.4  102  2055  48.3  671  1240  31.7  6434  10659  57.3 
2007  1600  311  27.1  137  2074  49.5  804  1207  33.5  6037  10587  54.7 
Ave. annual 
growth rate 
(1996-06) 
8.1%  35.1%    16.6%  2.0%    13.9%  -1.9%    6.6%  2.2%   
Ave. annual 
growth rate 
(2001-06) 
0.8%  28.3%    26.9%  1.7%    13.4%  -1.4%    1.4%  5.4%   
* PMP: total number of organ donations per million population                                                         Source: IRODaT (2009) 
 
There is the argument of conflict of interest in medical teams who should either 
declare the death or try to save the badly injured patients. For example in US, in one 
case a medical official was accused of trying to end somebody’s life in order to harvest  
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their organs. In another case a doctor said she was under pressure by organ procurement 
team, to declare a patient dead sooner than medically advisable (Stein, 2007).
6  
If the donor is a close relative or emotionally related to the recipient, live donation 
is legal in most of the countries around the world. The sale of organs is forbidden in all 
countries except in Iran, which has a regulated system for selling kidneys. However, 
there is evidence of the abuse of the system in many other countries. Organ trafficking 
in India is an example where there are reports of removing the kidneys without donor’s 
consent (Patel, 1996)
7. Also, there are reports that patients from wealthy countries travel 
to poorer countries in order to buy a kidney (Boseley, 2006) which in some cases 
removed from donor’s body without their knowledge (Patel, 1996). 
In Iran a regulated system for kidney donation with monetary compensation was 
introduced in 1980s. Under this regime the donor receives a monetary compensation 
from the recipient and enjoys additional monetary and non-monetary bonuses from the 
government. The system has been criticised harshly (i.e. Harmon & Delmonico, 2006 
and Zargooshi, 2001) as well as receiving some warm support (i.e. Daar, 2006 and 
Mahdavi-Mazdeh et al., 2008) both inside Iran and internationally. Ghods & Savaj 
(2006) is one of the most recent papers which tries to reason in support of the system by 
highlighting the benefits and answering some of the critics. Data show that in 2006 
1858 kidney transplantation took place in Iran. 13% and 12% of these transplants were 
harvested from cadaveric and emotionally related live sources respectively and the other 
75% was from unrelated live donations (Pondrom, 2008). 
There has been no discussion on how the system works by economists. While there 
were a lot of discussion in medical journals on the Iranian system (for some of the most 
recent ones look at Ghods & Savaj (2006), Griffin (2007), and Mahdavi-Mazdeh et al. 
(2008)), the lack of publication in economics journals leads to misleading quotes in 
other researches. For example Becker & Elias (2007) mention that Iranian government 
opposes the cadaveric donation on religious grounds which in not true. On contrary, as 
figures in table 3.2 show the Iranian government tries hard to replace the live donation 
                                                 
6   China has also been under pressure for selling the organs of executed individuals (Kram, 2001) where 
Chinese transplant centres openly advertise for business from foreigners (Boseley, 2006). 
7   Kidney sale was legal in India in 1980s and early 1990s and then became illegal in mid 1990s.  
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with harvesting kidneys from cadavers and the number of other cadaveric organ 
donations is also growing fast (Pondrom, 2008).
8  
Another issue that should be addressed is the compatibility issue. There are two 
major considerations regarding the compatibility, blood type and tissues.  Blood type of 
the donor and the recipient is needed to have the general compatibility rule for the blood 
types (which is being depicted in table 3.3). Even with medical achievements in recent 
years to overcome the compatibility issue still incompatibility raises the rejection 
probability in transplant. Finding an exact blood type match between recipient and 
donor significantly increases the possibility of success. Tissue matching is performed by 
testing whether a number of antigens (normally 6 antigens) are matched between 
recipient and donor. Higher number of matches in tissues also increases the chance of 
success in transplant.  
Table 3.3: The compatibility rule for blood and organ donation 
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In this paper we try to establish clearly how the Iranian regulated system works, 
find facts using the data collected from one of procurement centres in Tehran, and 
explain the welfare effect of this market on all parties involved. Our finding shows the 
average waiting time in Iranian system is around 5 months. This can be considered a 
great success compared to average waiting time in other countries.  
                                                 
8   Research grants are also allocated by the Iranian government for research on cloning in order to be 
used in organ procurement. There is no significant opposition from religious leaders or other social 
pressure groups, but it is very unlikely that these researches lead to a significant breakthrough for 
organ procurement in the next decade, not only in Iran but also worldwide (Ghods & Savaj, 2006).  
 
118 
Following we start with a brief review on the economics literature on organ 
donation in section 3.2. In section 3.3 and 3.4 we demonstrate Iran’s case and present 
the data collected from one of the procurement centres. In section 3.5 a theoretical 
model will be introduced following by conclusion in section 3.6 which includes our 
findings and policy implications.  
3.2. Literature Review 
Economists have made contribution to the organ donation literature in two fields. 
First, the kidney market and issues associated with that. The other is designing a 
mechanism to resolve the compatibility issues where donor and recipient are selected. 
3.2.1. Kidney Market 
Discussion on buying and selling organs or parts of human body (including blood) 
can be done on four grounds: medical, moral, legal, and economic grounds. Top 
medical experts do not agree on whether the organ market can be implemented or 
should be banned.
9 
From the medical point of view, the evidence as presented in introduction shows 
that live donation is efficient and cost effective. Furthermore, if it is safe to be 
performed on an emotionally related donor, there should be no medical concern for a 
kidney market on the medical grounds. The only point would be to ensure the system 
puts the donor’s welfare before the recipient’s; the same rule which should be 
considered for an emotionally related pair. 
We are not going to discuss moral issues surrounding the kidney sales in full details 
in this paper. Roth (2007) explains how the ethical and moral belief of majority of a 
society may affect the market as repugnance.  
The legal discussions usually concentrate on answering the question of whether an 
individual has the right to sell one of her organs or not. For an economist, it might 
seems quite a reasonable assumption that one’s body can be considered as their own 
property, but defining a property framework for the human body is one of the fresh lines 
of research in medical ethics. (i.e. Quigley, 2007) 
                                                 
9   Some of the most recent arguments for and against the idea can be found respectively in Reese et al. 
(2006) and Danovitch & Leichtman (2006).  
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The early discussion on the economics of a market for human body parts goes back 
to 1970 when Titmuss argued that buying and selling blood has an adverse effect on the 
quality of the blood (Titmuss, 1997). Titmuss compares the data from the British system 
(where paying for the blood was illegal) with the American system (where blood donors 
got paid) and argues that the latter had a lower quality of denoted blood. Titmuss points 
out that a significant fraction of the American blood came from individuals with 
hepatitis and other diseases that could not be screened out, and the blood given under 
the British system tended to be healthier. Titmuss also argued that monetary 
compensation for donating blood might reduce the supply of blood donors. This 
hypothesis often referred to as crowding out effect. Titmuss predicts that people will 
give blood mainly for altruism and introducing money compensation into the system is 
going to diminish their incentives for blood donation. 
Becker (2006) argues that even if Titmuss was right about the quality of the blood, 
the American system provides more blood per capita than British system. This means 
that the crowding out effect is not present. However, the quality of blood is not a major 
problem now, since the modern screening methods can guarantee the blood is not 
contaminated. In case of kidneys, one can argue that medical developments can 
determine the well-being of the donor and recipient. On the other hand, since kidney 
transplant is a more complicated and costly procedure comparing to blood transfusion, 
the initial test for the donor in order to assess the quality of the kidney, as well as the 
donor’s safety and welfare, would be more justifiable. 
Mellström & Johannesson (2008) ran a field experiment on the blood transfusion 
system in Sweden to examine whether the crowding out effect can be determined. They 
designed three treatments. In the first one, subjects are given the opportunity to become 
blood donors without any compensation. In the second treatment subjects receive 
monetary compensation (SEK 50 ˜  $7), and in the last one subjects can choose to 
receive the payment or donating it to charity. Their experiment shows evidence for the 
crowding out effect only on some part of population (women) which will be eliminated 
if the monetary payment made to charity rather than the individual. 
Cohen (1989), Epstein (1993), and Kaserman & Barnett (2002) discuss the 
monetary compensation for cadaveric organ donations but Becker & Elias (2007) are 
the first to calculate a price for live kidneys. They calculate a price of a kidney (and a 
liver) based on three monetary compensations i) compensation for the risk of death as a  
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result of donation, ii) compensation for the time lost during recovery, and iii) 
compensation for the risk of reduced quality of life. They suggest a price of $15,200 for 
a kidney. They also point out that if the market for cadaveric kidneys established 
alongside the live kidney market, most kidneys will come from cadavers and live kidney 
prices works as a benchmark for the market equilibrium price for cadaveric kidneys.
10  
3.2.2. Kidney Exchange Mechanisms 
One of the main restrictions for emotionally related organ donations is the 
compatibility issue, where the donor’s kidney cannot be transplanted for their intended 
recipient. But it might be compatible with another patient who also has a non-
compatible donor.  
Roth et al. (2004) introduce a kidney exchange mechanism which efficiently and 
incentive compatibly, can increase the number of transplants within existing constraints. 
Their model resembles some of the housing problems studied in the mechanism design 
literature for indivisible goods (i.e. Shapley & Scarf, 1974 and Abdulkadiroglu & 
Sönmez, 1999). Modified versions of their model, in order to limit the number of 
simultaneous operations needed, with constraint on the maximum number of donor-
patient pairs to two or three, has been developed in later papers (Roth et al., 2005b; 
Roth et al., 2007; and Saidman et al., 2006). Roth et al. (2005a) provides evidence from 
the experiment of opening a kidney clearinghouse in New England, US. 
In an exceptional case a 6 way exchange performed in the US on April 2008 (BBC, 
2008). However, because of practical issues (the exchange operations should be done 
simultaneously and most possibly at the same hospital) as well as incentive issues 
(where medical teams should work together and it is most likely doctors in small 
hospitals should refer almost all of their patients to other centres) the exchange 
mechanism cannot provide enough kidneys to overcome the shortage. 
                                                 
10   If Becker & Elias (2007) suggestion for paying for cadaveric kidneys and livers is going to be 
practiced; one issue, which should be addressed, is its effect on health costs of other transplantations 
from cadaveric sources, like hearts and corneas. Currently no payment has been made for harvesting 
these organs which under the new system it seems plausible to assume they should be priced as well. 
One argument can be since the demand for these organs are not as high as kidney and liver the 
equilibrium price will not be significantly high and the altruistic donation may be enough to cover the 
demand. However, this issue can be subject of a separate research.  
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3.3. Iran’s Case 
3.3.1. Background 
The 1979 revolution in Iran was followed in 1980 by an eight year war with Iraq. 
Dialysis equipment was scarce because of economic sanctions and lack of funds for 
imports (Nobakht & Ghahramani, 2006). As a result of these events, nephrologists were 
encouraged to perform kidney transplants. At the beginning, the process relied on few 
cadaveric kidneys available, along with emotionally related donors. But the large 
number of patients on the waiting list forced the authorities to establish a regulated 
market for living unrelated donations. The efforts of charities, established and managed 
by dialysis patients and their close relatives, helped to develop the market. Table 3.2 
shows a clear picture of the development of kidney transplantation in Iran. It is notable 
that over a period of 10 year (1996-2006) the rate of cadaveric and live donation 
increased by 35.1% and 8.1% annually. Cadaveric transplants accounted for 1.6% of 
total number of transplantation in 1996, this figure reached 13.1% in 2006.  
3.3.2. Institutions 
There are several bodies involved in kidney procurement for patients in need of a 
kidney transplant in Iran:  
1) Kidney Foundation of Iran (or Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association 
(DATPA)) is a charity founded by some of kidney patients and their relatives about 20 
years ago. The foundation is a non-governmental organisation and helps kidney patients 
with their problems. With 138 branches around the country, they help kidney patients 
with medical, financial, and other problems. In about 10 centres they have kidney 
donation offices. Their main and busiest office is located in Tehran. The foundation also 
has official support of the Charity Foundation for Special Diseases. 
2) Office of the Governor of Tehran (Ostan-dari) has also an office for kidney 
donation which has limited activities comparing to the Kidney Foundation. There are 
similar offices in some other provinces located in the governors’ headquarters.  
3) Management Centre for Transplantation and Special Diseases which is part of 
the Ministry of Health and Medical Education and is responsible for cadaver transplant. 
This centre has different waiting lists for patients in need of various organs for 
transplantation and is the main (and only) centre involved in procurement of organs  
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from cadavers. The centre’s database ran nationally. When cadaveric organs of a 
deceased patient become available, the centre allocates the organs (including kidneys) to 
transplant centres around the country considering different factors including distance 
and waiting time.  
In summer 2007, there were around 1000 patients on their waiting list for kidney 
transplant. As it can be seen in table 3.2, in 2005 from 1854 kidney donation, 243 cases 
were from cadavers. That means around 13% of the kidneys come from cadaver 
sources. Religious and traditional views are a major barrier for cadaveric donations, 
however, in recent years the numbers of cadaveric of transplants is increasing. A 
scheme of donor registry (opt-in system) is designed and some individuals, especially 
young educated Iranians, have shown interest in signing to the scheme. But in practice 
the relatives of the dead person have veto power and they can overrule the original 
decision made by the person herself, as it is the case in many other countries with the 
opt-in system (Abadie & Gay, 2006). 
3.3.3. How Does Unrelated Kidney Donation in Iran Work?
11 
The Kidney Foundation keeps waiting lists for kidney patients with different blood 
types in each of its procurement offices. There are eight different lists for different 
blood types (see table 3.3). A kidney patient, who wishes to be added to the waiting list, 
needs to present a letter from his doctor. Since the foundation does not run any initial 
tests on patients, some patients may enter the list when they are not medically ready for 
a transplant. This may cause unintended delays in the matching process. A patient 
should be at a certain stage of the kidney failure disease to be considered ready for the 
transplant; and his general physical conditions (for example strength or minimum 
weight) also play a significant part in increasing the probability of success in operation. 
A patient is given priority in the waiting list, if he either is medically in an emergency 
situation (as assessed by his doctor) or is a disabled soldier
12.  
There is no centralised waiting list and each centre has its own waiting list. Patients 
are asked by foundation to book in their nearest centre but some patients enter several 
waiting lists (including the cadaveric waiting list) in order to minimise their waiting 
                                                 
11 This section is based on our interviews with the foundation staff, other sources and some published 
papers. 
12   Mostly injured in the eight year war with Iraq (1980-88).  
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time. However, the centres coordinate with each other in case of imbalances (especially 
for emergency cases) of demand and supply for kidneys with a particular blood type. 
Medical staff including the members of the transplantation team have no role in 
identifying potential donors. When a donor (aged between 22 and 35)
13 turns up to 
donate her kidney, she needs to provide certain documents; including a formal consent 
from either her spouse or her father (in case of un-married donors)
14. After the initial 
official paperwork, she will be referred to a clinic for the initial medical tests. The 
foundation office in Tehran has its own clinic which is used in order to offer medical 
support for kidney patients. Using this clinic speeds up the initial process. These tests 
determine whether the potential donor has any sort of kidney problem as well as a 
simple blood test and whether her kidney has two renal arteries
15. If the transplantation 
team suspected any possible harm to the donor either now or for the future, the donation 
will be cancelled. The costs of these tests, which are not high, have to be paid by the 
donor herself. Since the cost of these tests (estimated around Rials 50k) is not 
significantly high comparing to the monetary compensation, it does not seem to have an 
adverse effect on donors’ decision. 
After the donor passes the initial tests, the administrators contact the first patient in 
the same waiting list as the donor’s blood type. In this stage the staff also has in their 
mind to match the physical build of the donor and the patient or at least make sure that 
they are not extremely different. This also raises the issue of finding a suitable match for 
child patients which is difficult. Matches cross different blood types are rare and they 
                                                 
13   The reason for the age cap is considered to be a higher chance of the graft survival. Some researches 
on live donation do not support that the lower the age of the donor has a significant relationship with 
higher graft survival period. For example El-Agroudy et al (2003) shows that the average age for the 
live donor when kidney survived for more than 15 years was 30 – 8.6 while for the graft survival rate 
less than 15 years was 35 – 10.7. Another research (El-Husseini et al., 2006) reports for a 10 year graft 
surviving period, these figures as 37.1 – 9.4 and 36.2 – 8.5 respectively. However, it always will be the 
case that any operation (like being a kidney donor) is considered with a substantial risk after an age 
threshold.  
14   In Absence of next of kin, to make sure the donor is aware of her action and its consequences, she will 
be referred to a chartered psychologist at the coroner’s office for a psychic test. 
 
15    Most patients are not happy to have a kidney transplant from this type, since it reduces the chance of 
successful transplant. However, some researches show no difference regarding this (Makiyama et al., 
2003).  
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try to match the blood type of the donor and the recipient. Since having the same blood 
type is going to increase the possibility of a successful transplant (comparing to 
alternative transplants between compatible blood types), usually the doctors also advise 
their patients to wait for an exact match. 
If the patient who is on the top of the waiting list at the moment is not ready for the 
transplant at that moment, the next patient will be called, and so on, until a ready patient 
will be found. Then a meeting between the two parties is arranged (they are provided 
with a private area within the foundation building if they want to reach a private 
agreement) and they will be sent for tissue tests. If the tissue test gives the favourable 
result
16, a contract between the patient and the donor will be signed and they will be 
provided with a list of the transplant centres and doctors who perform surgery. When 
the patient and the donor are referred to transplant centre, a cheque from the patient will 
be kept at the centre to be paid to the donor after the transplant takes place. The guide 
price has been 25m Rials (» $2660) until March 2007 for 3 years and at this time
17 it has 
been raised to 30m Rials (» $3190).
18 This decision has been made because the 
foundation was worried of a decreasing trend in number of donors. In some cases, the 
recipient will agree to make an additional payment to the donor outside the system; it is 
not certain how common this practice is, but according to the foundation staff the 
amount of this payment is not usually big and is thought to be about 5m to 10m Rials (» 
$530 to $1060). The recipient also pays for the cost of tests, two operations, after 
surgery cares, and other associated costs (like accommodation and travel costs if the 
patient travels from another city). Insurance companies cover the medical costs of the 
transplant and the operations are also performed free of charge in state-owned hospitals. 
In addition, the government pays a monetary gift to the donor for appreciation of 
her altruism (currently, 10m Rials), as well as automatic provision of one year free 
health insurance
19, and the opportunity to attend the annual appreciation event dedicated 
                                                 
16   According to administrators of the foundation less than 10% of the tests have a positive cross-match 
which effectively rules out transplantation. It should be noted that the more tissue matching factor 
leads to a higher probability of success.
 
17  The Iranian new year starts at 20 March. The adjustment happened at the start on new year. 
18  The exchange rate for 20 Feb 2008: $1 ” Rials 9410; £1 ” Rials 18400.
 
19   Nobakht & Ghahramani (2006) claim that the donors are provided with a free life-long insurance 
which is in contrary with our findings, after interviews with the foundation staff.  
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to donors
20. The Charity Foundation for Special Diseases also provides the donors with 
a free annual medical test and high level of support, in case that the donor develops 
kidney problems in the future, regardless of whether this is due to the transplant or not.  
Emotionally related donors also enjoy these monetary and non-monetary bonuses as 
well as exemption of paying hospital costs, and it gives them a good incentive to 
register in the foundation offices. 
The minimum monthly legal wage for 2007 was Rials 1,830k (later raised to 2,200k 
for 2008). The minimum payment of Rials 45m is around 2 years of minimum wage.
21  
The minimum current payment (45m Rials) by using PPP exchange rate
22 is 
equivalent to $14,000 which is interestingly close to Becker & Elias (2007) suggestion 
for the market value of a kidney at $15,200 for the US. In 1980s when the sale of kidney 
was legal in India, donors were paid $1,603. After making this illegal in 1990s the 
average payment dropped to $975 (Goyal et al., 2002). Based on this paper and other 
researches, Becker & Elias (2007) estimate that the equivalent cost of a kidney in Indian 
market to US dollar in 2005 is in region of $17,078 to $17,665.  However, they even 
report a price of around 50,000 Rupees in 1980s which with their calculations will be 
equivalent to $81,510 in the US market for 2005. 
The government decision to ease the process by legislation and monetary and non-
monetary bonuses seems reasonable. The social negative effect of losing ESRD patients 
who are usually at working age and most possibly parents of underage children is quite 
significant. This decision is also justifiable on economic grounds, from the government 
and insurers point of view. A patient, who is going under constant dialysis, is going to 
spend a lot of time out of the job. Adding up to this opportunity cost, the financial 
burden for the dialysis on the patient, his family, social services, and the government 
                                                 
20   This event is an event to celebrate the altruism of family of cadaver organ donors as well as living 
kidney donors. Among the guests are also all the organ recipients. The events gather a very good 
publicity in media; usually to emphasis the importance of cadaveric donors. 
21   This figure is the minimum wage which is well below the minimum cost of living. The Iranian Central 
Bank reports the monthly average cost of living for a family of four to be Rials 8.7m for Tehran and 
Rials 6.64m for other urban areas. This makes the minimum compensation equivalent to 5.2 to 6.7 
months of average cost of living in urban areas. 
22   For PPP exchange rate an average of indexes suggested by IMF, and World Bank is used.  
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and considering a higher probability of death while in the waiting list, having no option 
for live transplant; shows the high alternative cost for the society. 
Advertising for kidney donors is banned. However, some patients manage to find 
donors from other informal channels in order to avoid the waiting list. The foundation 
handle these cases with due care and such cases need to be reviewed by the foundation 
managing director. However, since the bonus payment appreciation and other 
protections by the government are in place for donors, then any donation that takes 
place is registered in one of the foundation offices around the country. This includes 
most of donations from family members which recipient and donor do not involve in 
any financial transactions.  
In order to prevent international kidney trade, the donor and recipient are required 
to have the same nationality. That means an Afghan patient, who is referred to the 
foundation, should wait until an Afghan donor with appropriate characteristics turns up. 
This is to avoid transplant tourism. Transplant tourism seems to be a problem in India 
(Patel, 1996). Another issue can be Iranian nationals residing abroad and travel to Iran 
to buy a kidney, which is allowed under current legislation.
23 
Although the insurance companies will not cover the donor’s compensation, poor 
recipients can get help in order to provide the cost from different charities. The 
foundation staff also have an informal list of generous volunteers, who are eager to help 
poor patients financially. 
By the foundation’s procedure to keep 8 different waiting lists, if one assumes that 
the blood type distribution is the same between patients and potential donors then the 
waiting time would be fairly similar for all waiting lists, furthermore there will be no 
significant social benefit in matching between blood groups.  
                                                 
23   Official statistics show that around 1m refugees live in Iran mostly with Afghan and Iraqi origins 
(Some claim the actual figure is far more and in some stages over the past 20 years has even reached to 
around 3 million). Ghods and Savaj (2006) refer to a study on nationality of transplant recipients and 
kidney donors.  From 1881 kidney transplants, 19 (1%) recipients were refugees, and 11 (0.6%) were 
other foreign nationals who received kidneys from living-related donors or from living-unrelated 
donors of the same nationality. Of 1881 recipients, 18 (0.9%) also were Iranian immigrants (residing 
abroad for years) who came and received kidneys from Iranian paid donors. The scale of transplant 
tourism is very small in Iran.  
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One of the concerns about employing the Iranian system would be the possible 
welfare effect on the minorities because of the different pattern of the blood type 
distribution in their blood types. Table 3.A2 shows the blood type distribution of blood 
donors in different provinces. This data shows only the geographical distribution of the 
blood donors and usually is biased in favour O and negative blood types, since usually 
blood transfusion centres encourage these types of blood types to be donated more. 
However, looking at these data one line of the fresh research in Iranian system would be 
to investigate the proportion of different ethnic and race minorities in the pool of kidney 
donors and recipients. Walter et al. (1991) summarises the result of few other researches 
in Iranian ethnic variability of blood type frequencies based on ABO alleles (Their 
finding can be found on table 3.A3). Since their divisions in Iran population is neither 
consistent (have some geographical division and some ethnic minorities) nor inclusive 
(do not show a clear picture of the whole country) their findings can be addressed as 
another source of concern for this issue. They specially point out that Assyrian, 
Armenians, Zoroastrians, Jews, Turkmans, and Arabs, all religious and ethnic 
minorities, show a significant different pattern of ABO frequencies, however, they 
report a significantly lower percentage of O alleles for all of these minority groups than 
the Iranian average. 
There are two major papers which address the donors’ satisfaction issue. Zargooshi 
(2001) surveys 300 of kidney donors. They donated between 6 to 132 months ago. He 
finds that the majority of donors either did not receive or did not attend follow-up visits. 
Many of them regretted their original decision. On contrary Malakoutian et al (2007) 
report a 91% satisfaction between living kidney donors. However, the latter survey is 
asked the donors at the point of discharge from hospital.  
3.4. Data 
Our data contains 598 transplantations recorded in Tehran office of the Kidney 
Foundation between April 2006 and December 2008. In fact, this is the number of 
patients who withdrew from the waiting list with a kidney transplant in these 21 months. 
Of these, 549 were live kidney donations of which 539 were traded kidney and 10 
emotionally related donations. The remaining 49 transplantations took place with a 
cadaveric donation. In theory the waiting lists for live and cadaveric kidneys run 
independently; and the coverage of our data from cadaveric transplant is not complete.  
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While our data shows a 8.2% share for the cadaveric transplantations, which is slightly 
lower than around 13% on average from table 3.2. Having in mind that our data is only 
a subset of total transplants, this can be addressed by the number of patients who only 
sign in the cadaveric lists and not in the living waiting lists.  
The number of traded kidneys only includes the matches that the recipient and the 
donor both were registered in Tehran office. Since for other matches were either patient 
or the donor are found by other offices they did not have a complete profile of both 
parties. The foundation office in Tehran does not have a computerised database at the 
moment, and the data was produced by going through the files of every individual 
match, that has been made. 
We now demonstrate our findings from the data. It is clear that our finding can not 
be a good image of what is happening in terms of emotionally related donations, 
because of the small number of this type of donations in our sample. 
Table 3.4 shows the ABO and RhD blood types distribution of recipients.  
Table 3.4: The ABO and RhD blood types distribution of recipients  
  Blood Type     
  O+  A+  B+  AB+  O-  A-  B-  AB-  Total 
Traded  150  165  110  38  27  34  10  5  539  90.1% 
Non-Traded  3  2  2  1  0  1  1  0  10  1.7% 
Cadaver  15  15  11  2  1  3  2  0  49  8.2% 
Total  168  182  123  41  28  38  13  5  598   
In Order to check whether the traded kidneys are biased in favour of AB blood type 
and are disadvantageous for O type, table 3.5 demonstrates the ABO blood type 
distribution of recipients. Although the share of AB recipients is higher in traded cases 
but there is no significant difference for the share of O recipients in traded and 
cadaveric cases.  
Table 3.5: The ABO blood type distribution of recipients 
  Blood Type   
  O  A  B  AB  Total 
Traded  32.8%  36.9%  22.3%  8.0%  100% 
Non – Traded  30.0%  30.0%  30.0%  10.0%  100% 
Cadaver  32.7%  36.7%  26.5%  4.1%  100% 
Total  32.8%  36.8%  22.7%  7.7%  100%  
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Another concern could be discriminating against women in receiving kidneys. 
Traditionally in Iran, men are referred as breadwinner of the family. Although the sex 
pattern of labour force has been changed, but it is still biased towards a higher 
proportion of male workers. Since in this view, the economic value of a man is 
considered to be higher, one consequence in our argument can be a higher likelihood for 
a male patient receiving a kidney from traded sector. Table 3.6 shows the number and 
percentage of male and female recipients. The figures do not support any negative effect 
on female patients in our data.  
Table 3.6: The sex of recipients of each type of kidney 
  Male  Female  Total 
350  189  539 
Traded 
(64.9%)  (35.1%)  (100.0%) 
5  5  10 
Non-Traded 
(50.0%)  (50.0%)  (100.0%) 
33  16  49 
Cadaver 
(67.3%)  (32.7%)  (100.0%) 
Total  388  210  598 
On the other hand the donors are mostly men (Table 3.7). This can be because of 
the two facts. Firstly, the ages between 22 and 35; when the donation is accepted; is the 
fertility age; and women are less likely to be considered as potential donors. Secondly, 
as we mentioned before since men are supposed as the main breadwinner of the family, 
it is more likely that they sell their kidneys in order to overcome financial difficulties. 
Female donors count for around 18% of traded kidneys in our data; it is in contrary with 
the Indian case where 71% of the sold kidneys were from female donors (Goyal et al. 
2002).
24  
Table 3.7: The sex of donors of each type of kidney 
  Male  Female  Total 
Traded  446  93  539 
Non-Traded  4  6  10 
Total  450  99  549 
Table 3.8 demonstrates the age distribution of recipients and donors of traded 
kidneys. It shows that 10.9% of the recipients are under the age of 20. Finding kidneys 
                                                 
24   Indian data needs to be treated very carefully, since the kidney sale is illegal. However, the difference 
between two figures is quite significant.  
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for child patients is one of their main problems. The kidneys for these children should 
be small in size, and usually women donors are the best to match for these patients. The 
high number of transplants needed for relatively young patients (42.9% under the age of 
40 and 65.3% under the age of 50), shows the economic and social value of these 
transplants. Although the foundation’s policy is to limit the donors’ age to 35, 10.4% of 
the donors are older than 35. 
The joint blood type distribution of recipients and donors can be seen at table 3.9. 
On average 94.8% of kidneys are matched to an exact blood type. In total 28 cases out 
of 539 are matches between different blood types. The reason behind this can be 
emergency cases, matches found by patients themselves out of the formal system, and 
especial cases (like children recipients when the size of kidney plays an important rule). 
Table 3.8: Age distribution of recipients and donors 
Age  Recipients  Donors 
5 – 9  12  2.2%     
10 – 14  19  3.5%     
15 – 19  28  5.2%     
20 – 24  36  6.7%  148  27.5% 
25 – 29  50  9.3%  216  40.1% 
30 – 34  42  7.8%  119  22.1% 
35 – 39  44  8.2%  51  9.5% 
40 – 44  59  10.9%  5  0.9% 
45 – 49  62  11.5%     
50 – 54  58  10.8%     
55 – 59  65  12.1%     
60 – 64  40  7.4%     
65 – 69  16  3.0%     
70 – 74  7  1.3%     
75 – 79  1  0.2%     
Total  539  100.0%  539  100.0% 
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Table 3.9: Joint ABO and RdH frequency of transplants for recipients and donors 
    Donor     
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  Total 
O+  149        1        150  27.8% 
A+  2  163              165  30.6% 
B+  4    104        2    110  20.4% 
AB+    1  1  36          38  7.1% 
O-  7        20        27  5.0% 
A-  1  4      3  26      34  6.3% 
B-              10    10  1.9% 
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  5  0.9% 
163  168  105  38  24  26  12  3  539  100.0% 
Total 
30.2%  31.2%  19.5%  7.1%  4.5%  4.8%  2.2%  0.6%  100.0%   
Own type  91.4%  97.0%  99.0%  94.7%  83.3%  100.0%  83.3%  100.0%  94.8%   
The average waiting time for patients who receive a live kidney is 149 days (Table 
3.10). By waiting time, we mean the time gap between signing into the waiting list and 
the operation date. This includes the time needed for the tests and preparation before the 
transplant when a match initially introduced.  
Assuming a similar distribution in donors and recipients population over the blood 
types, waiting time is expected to be the same for all waiting lists. However, the waiting 
time for a given waiting list is going to be affected by the following: 
-  Not enough donors from that blood type turn up comparing to other blood types; it 
can be serious when one blood type is rare; like AB- for the Iranian population. 
-  When kidneys from a blood group is offered to other matching blood groups. In 
our data, type O+ recipient is likely to be slightly affected by this, as the waiting 
time for them 171 days (22 days more than the average). 8.6% of this type of 
kidney is allocated to other blood groups. 
-  When a patient enters before he is medically ready for the transplant; we cannot 
check for this in our data. 
-  When a mismatch arises in testing procedure which means a 2-4 weeks is added to 
waiting time of the next recipient of this kidney. However, we can assume this has 
a similar effect on all waiting lists.  
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-  As mentioned before the guideline price increased by 20% on March 2007. But 
our data shows no significant change in the waiting time or the number of 
donation. It could because of two reasons; firstly this increase has almost no 
significant effect in real term because of inflation
25. In fact considering the 
inflation the official level of payment has been decreased over the 3 years when it 
has been capped prior to March 2007. Secondly the price that actually paid in each 
case can be different from this benchmark by two parties’ negotiation process and 
it can also make that increase less significant. 
Table 3.10: Average waiting time for recipients based on the blood type of both parties 
    Donor   
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  Average 
O+  169        461        171 
A+  110  138              137 
B+  85    138        214    138 
AB+    104  32  128          125 
O-  163        117        129 
A-  92  205      249  177      184 
B-              124    124 
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  174 
Average  163  165  139  137  133  148  177  139  144 
Considering all of the mentioned factors, having a waiting list of around 5 months 
in Iranian system comparing to more than 3 years for some other countries seems a 
significant achievement. One question that may arise (also by looking at tables 3.2 and 
3.A1) is that the overall rate of kidney transplantation in Iran is not particularly higher 
than its European and north American counterparts, then why the Iranian waiting lists is 
much shorter. The fact is that the rate of ESRD patients in Iranian population is lower as 
well. One of the main reasons behind this can be the Iranian population structure, in 
2006 (latest census) 60.5% are below 30 and 86.1% are below 50 years old (SCI, 2007). 
It is estimated that in 2005, 1505 per million population (pmp) in North America, 585 
pmp in Europe, and 370 pmp in Iran suffered from ESRD. (Grassmann et al., 2005)  
Following, we list the possible policy considerations:  
                                                 
25   The reported rate inflation for 2006-07 is 18.4%.  
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- Since the donors might be subject to exploitation because of their social status; it 
needs to be guaranteed that they make an informed decision and are aware of all 
risks attached to their decision.  
- After donation networks needs to be strengthened in order to make sure the donors 
receive the best support possible.  
- Considering the Iranian population structure, it is expected that the demand might 
rise for kidneys in coming years and decades. Then, more efforts need to be put 
on other sources of kidneys. Cadaveric kidneys can be utilised more effectively. 
Unlike some developed countries, Iran faces no social barrier in new frontiers in 
medical research, e.g. cloning. Investing in this area may help to eliminate the 
demand for live donation in the future. 
- A national waiting list can reduce the waiting time as well as improving pre- and 
post- surgery support for both donors and recipients. 
3.5. Model 
Suppose we have a continuum population with the total mass normalised to one. Let 
there be two blood types X and Y, with shares of a and 1-a of the population 
respectively. The probability of a person being in need of a kidney is r regardless of her 
blood type, however a shock of d is considered for demand of type X kidneys; which 
can be positive or negative.
26 We assume that the demand for each type of kidney can 
be written as: 
( ) ( ) X
D
X P g r q a d + = 1           and           ( ) ( ) Y
D
Y P g r q a - = 1     (3.1) 
where          0 < a < 1 ; 
        0 £ r << 1     ;     -1 £ d << 1/r -1  ; 
0 < ¢ g      ; and   ( ) 1 0 = g  
                                                 
26  The shock is only considered for type X kidneys. From the overall welfare point of view analysis of a 
positive (negative) shock to demand for type Y kidney is equivalent to a negative (positive) shock to 
type X. However, the effect in welfare on each market can be different which is not important for our 
discussion here.   
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Assume that type X kidney cannot be donated to type Y, but type Y kidneys can be 
donated to type X recipients. Suppose the income distribution is independent of blood 
types, so the supply has the same functional form for both types.  Then the supplies can 
be written as: 
( ) X
S
X P f q a =           and           ( ) ( ) Y
S
Y P f q a - = 1      (3.2) 
where     0 > ¢ f  
In the absence of the shock ( 0 = d ), the equilibrium price for both markets is the 
same  ( ) ( ) P g r P f ˆ ˆ = .  
We assume that the regulator observes all the parameters of the market except the 
shock. Furthermore the regulator is able to allocate the kidneys efficiently. That means 
even if the market price is less than market clearing price, patients with the highest 
priority (highest willingness to pay) will receive kidney and the maximum feasible 
consumer surplus will be achieved. The regulator sets a uniform price for both markets. 
This price is equal to the market clearing price in the absence of the shock. The 
regulator is now faced with the problem whether to allow trade between the markets or 
not.  
Negative shock ( 0 < d ): 
At the price set by the regulator ( P ˆ ) there is now excess supply of type X kidneys. 
Since type Y cannot receive type X kidneys, the equilibrium in the Y market remains 
unchanged. In the X market the quantity reduces. Figure 3.1 shows this situation where 
D and D’ are the original demand and demand in presence of a negative shock, 
respectively. Allowing the intra-trade is making no difference on the outcome and social 
welfare in this case. However, since the regulatory price is now higher than the market-
clearing price, total welfare is reduced. The highlighted area in figure 3.1 shows this 
loss.   
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Figure 3.1: Demand and supply in X type markets  
in presence of a negative shock to demand for X  
Positive shock ( 0 > d ): 
At the price set by the regulator  P ˆ  there is now excess demand for type X kidneys. 
If intra-trade between the two markets is allowed, some of type Y kidneys will be sold in 
type X market. In order to achieve the maximum welfare in this case some of the Y 
kidneys should be allocated to X patients. Y kidneys should be allocated to X recipients 
until the marginal willingness became the same in both markets (dashed red line in 
figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 compares the gain and loss in consumer surplus in X and Y 
market.  The graph to the left demonstrates type X market where D and D’ representing 
demand in absence and presence of a shock respectively. The right graph presents the 
case for type Y. The two arrows show the welfare-improving shift in supply after a 
positive shock to demand for X. The two marked areas shows the gain and loss resulted 
by intra-trade. 
Allowing the intra-trade has no effect on the supplier surplus. The consumer surplus 
gained by type X patients overweighs the loss in type Y patients’ consumer surplus. 
Overall patients’ welfare improves as a result of intra-trade in case of a positive shock 
to demand for X.  
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Figure 3.2: Demand and supply in two blood-type markets 
in presence of a positive shock to demand for X  
It is worth mentioning even if the regulator sets a price different from the 
equilibrium price; still this welfare analysis is true. In presence of a positive shock to 
demand for X, Whatever the price set by the government, allowing intra-trade reduces 
the consumer surplus for type Y and consumer surplus for type X increases. The latter 
always dominates and the outcome is a higher social welfare resulted by intra-trade. 
3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate how the Iranian kidney market works. Our focus was 
not on the moral and ethical issues surrounding the discussions. The effect of the Iranian 
system on reducing the waiting time for patients is significant, which based on our data 
it is around 5 months. One should be careful in advising to ban the sale at all. The 
alternative solution practiced in other developing countries, e.g. black market for 
organs, might have dramatic consequences. This may result lower standards on medical 
conditions, as well as leaving the donors who can be vulnerable without any official 
support.  
We showed that allowing intra-trade between different blood types although has a 
negative effect on the welfare of some patients, but is going to improve the social 
welfare. 
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Appendix 3.A 
Table 3.A1: Number of kidney transplants per million population for some countries in 2006 
PMP (per million people)
 
Country  Live  Cad.  Total    Country  Live  Cad.  Total 
Cyprus  54.3  11.4  65.7    Poland  0.5  23.5  24.0 
US  21.6  35.7  57.3    Slovenia  0.0  24.0  24.0 
Austria  7.0  41.5  48.5    Argentina  4.9  16.7  21.6 
Spain  2.3  46.0  48.3    Israel  7.7  12.4  20.1 
Norway  17.1  28.1  45.2    New Zealand  11.3  8.4  19.7 
Belgium   4.0  40.6  44.6    South Korea  14.1  4.9  19.0 
Uruguay  2.5  41.8  44.3    Greece  5.7  13.1  18.8 
France  4.0  38.0  42.0    Puerto Rico  3.5  15.3  18.8 
Malta  10.0  30.0  40.0    Mexico  13.7  4.6  18.3 
Netherland  17.1  22.1  39.2    Lebanon  16.0  2.0  18.0 
Finland  0.6  38.3  38.9    Brazil  9.6  8.2  17.8 
Portugal  3.8  33.2  37.0    Lithuania  1.8  15.9  17.7 
Canada  15.0  21.5  36.5    Colombia  1.9  13.4  15.3 
Czech Rep.  3.2  33.1  36.3    Pakistan  15.1  0.0  15.1 
Switzerland  15.7  19.9  35.6    Estonia  0.7  13.4  14.1 
Ireland  1.0  32.4  33.4    Turkey  10.1  4.0  14.1 
Denmark  10.7  22.1  32.8    Brunei  13.4  0.0  13.4 
Latvia  0.0  32.6  32.6    Cuba  0.7  9.9  10.6 
Germany  6.3  25.8  32.1    Romania  7.9  1.9  9.8 
UK  11.2  20.6  31.8    Hong Kong  1.9  7.6  9.5 
Hungry  1.3  29.6  30.9    Qatar  2.6  4.0  6.6 
Jordan  30.5  0.0  30.5    Guatemala  6.0  0.4  6.4 
Australia  13.3  16.0  29.3    Trinidad & Tobago  6.2  0.0  6.2 
Italy  1.5  27.6  29.1    South Africa  2.1  3.0  5.1 
Iran  23.0  3.4  26.4    Bulgaria  0.3  4.6  4.9 
Iceland  26.0  0.0  26.0    Ukraine  1.4  1.1  2.5 
Slovak Rep.  5.4  20.4  25.8    Malaysia  0.9  1.0  1.9 
Saudi Arabia  9.3  16.4  25.7    Gerogia  1.8  0.0  1.8 
Croatia  4.5  20.3  24.8    Moldova  0.6  0.0  0.6 
Source: IRODaT (2008)  
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Table 3.A2: The ABO and RdH blood type distribution of Iran provinces 
* 
  ABO  RdH   
  O  A  B  AB  +  -   
Azarbayejan Gharbi  37.4%  20.9%  32.9%  8.8%  90.2%  9.8%  1.62% 
Azarbayejan Sharghi  37.3%  20.9%  33.9%  7.9%  88.6%  11.4%  7.08% 
Booshehr  27.2%  27.2%  40.1%  5.4%  92.5%  7.5%  0.10% 
Chahar Mahal & Bakhtiari  32.1%  19.5%  43.9%  4.5%  88.8%  11.2%  0.32% 
Fars  28.8%  24.9%  39.0%  7.2%  90.4%  9.6%  2.02% 
Gilan  30.5%  22.1%  41.0%  6.4%  89.2%  10.8%  4.90% 
Hamedan  32.9%  23.7%  35.8%  7.6%  91.0%  9.0%  3.85% 
Hormozgan  19.9%  28.1%  46.2%  5.8%  91.8%  8.2%  0.06% 
Ilam  37.3%  23.6%  32.3%  6.8%  91.6%  8.4%  0.09% 
Isfahan  32.9%  22.9%  37.4%  6.9%  89.5%  10.5%  4.77% 
Kermanshah  32.2%  23.8%  36.2%  7.8%  91.0%  9.0%  1.72% 
Kerman  27.0%  28.5%  37.1%  7.4%  89.0%  11.0%  1.15% 
Khoozestan  29.7%  24.9%  38.8%  6.6%  91.2%  8.8%  2.44% 
Khorasan  29.9%  26.8%  35.0%  8.2%  89.5%  10.5%  4.37% 
Kohkilooyeh & Boyer Ahmad  31.9%  13.3%  50.4%  4.4%  88.5%  11.5%  0.04% 
Kurdestan  31.6%  24.6%  36.5%  7.3%  90.9%  9.1%  0.75% 
Lorestan  34.1%  21.6%  37.6%  6.7%  91.9%  8.1%  1.28% 
Markazi  31.8%  24.0%  36.9%  7.3%  89.2%  10.8%  8.74% 
Mazandaran  29.0%  24.8%  39.2%  7.0%  90.1%  9.9%  5.08% 
Semnan  30.6%  25.8%  34.5%  9.0%  89.4%  10.6%  3.63% 
Sistan & Baloochestan  26.5%  28.7%  38.4%  6.4%  89.4%  10.6%  0.19% 
Tehran  32.4%  23.5%  35.9%  8.2%  89.6%  10.4%  43.29% 
Yazd  26.7%  32.4%  31.0%  9.9%  87.2%  12.8%  1.33% 
Zanjan  34.0%  21.8%  35.9%  8.3%  90.2%  9.8%  1.20% 
Iran  32.1%  23.7%  36.4%  7.8%  89.6%  10.4%   
* The data is arranged based on an older version of national divisions which currently is 
changed and consist of 30 provinces.   Source: IBTO (2000) 
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Table 3.A3: ABO allele frequencies in 21 Iranian population groups 
  p (A)  q (B)  r (O) 
Tehranis  22.74%  16.85%  60.41% 
Gilanis  20.54%  15.43%  64.03% 
Mazandaranis  20.02%  17.35%  62.63% 
Azaris  25.06%  16.16%  58.78% 
Kurds  22.48%  17.10%  60.42% 
Lurs  22.05%  14.55%  63.40% 
Khorasanis  20.61%  18.10%  61.29% 
Isfahanis  21.91%  16.87%  61.22% 
Farsis  19.76%  16.91%  63.33% 
Yazdis  20.21%  24.20%  55.59% 
Kermanis  21.48%  16.89%  61.63% 
Baluchis  18.59%  19.15%  62.26% 
Bandaris  15.70%  18.05%  66.25% 
Khoozestanis  19.44%  17.17%  63.39% 
Turkomans  21.12%  24.81%  54.07% 
Ghashghaais  20.07%  14.30%  65.63% 
Arabs  17.23%  22.34%  60.43% 
Assyrians  37.06%  11.69%  51.25% 
Armenians  37.78%  10.92%  51.30% 
Zoroastrians  16.38%  29.94%  53.68% 
Jews  26.63%  18.56%  54.81% 
Total  22.23%  16.95%  60.82% 
Source: Walter et al. (1991)  
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